2025年5月25日 星期日

China's Unyielding Quest for 'Strong Nation': Why Not Happiness, or Just Being Norway?

 

China's Unyielding Quest for 'Strong Nation': Why Not Happiness, or Just Being Norway?

As a historian of Chinese thought, I often encounter a curious question, particularly from Western observers: why does China seem so fixated on becoming a "強國" (qiángguó), a strong nation or great power? Why isn't the aspiration simply to be a happy country, a self-sufficient country, a rule-abiding country, or even a prosperous, peaceful nation like Australia or Norway? This isn't just a modern phenomenon; it's a deeply ingrained historical imperative.

To understand this, we must delve into the very bedrock of China's historical consciousness.

From "Middle Kingdom" Trauma to "Standing Up"

For millennia, China perceived itself as the "Middle Kingdom" (天下), the cultural and political center of the known world. This wasn't merely arrogance; it was a self-sustaining worldview where strength was inherent in its civilization, its governance, and its culture. Weakness was an anomaly, a temporary deviation from the natural order.

However, the 19th and early 20th centuries shattered this perception. The "Century of Humiliation" (百年國恥) – marked by the Opium Wars, unequal treaties, foreign invasions, internal rebellions, and the carving up of its territory by imperial powers – inflicted a profound and lasting trauma. China, once the proud "Middle Kingdom," found itself weak, exploited, and on the verge of collapse. This period wasn't just about economic exploitation; it was a brutal assault on national dignity and sovereignty.

It was in this crucible of humiliation that the modern Chinese aspiration for "強國" was forged. Strength became the ultimate, existential goal. It wasn't merely about prosperity; it was about survival. It was about ensuring that such a catastrophic period of vulnerability would never happen again. When Mao Zedong declared in 1949 that "the Chinese people have stood up," it was a direct response to this historical trauma, a promise that weakness would be banished.

Why Not "Happy," "Self-Sufficient," or "Rule-Abiding" First?

The desire for happiness, self-sufficiency, and rule of law are not absent from Chinese aspirations; rather, they are often seen as consequences or components of strength, not alternatives to it.

  • Happiness: How can a nation guarantee its people's happiness if its sovereignty is constantly threatened, its resources plundered, and its people subjected to foreign dictates? Strength, in this view, provides the security and stability necessary for happiness to flourish.

  • Self-Sufficiency: A weak nation, even if it desires self-sufficiency, might be forced into dependence by stronger powers. True self-sufficiency requires the economic and military might to resist external pressures.

  • Rule-Abiding: While China emphasizes its own rule of law, the historical experience taught that a weak nation's rules are easily disregarded by stronger ones. To be truly "rule-abiding" on the international stage, and to ensure its own rules are respected, a nation must first be strong enough to command that respect.

For China, strength is the prerequisite for all other desirable national attributes. Without it, the others are precarious.

The "Big Landmass" Factor: Why Not Australia or Norway?

This brings us to the question of why China doesn't aspire to be like Australia or Norway – prosperous, peaceful, and relatively small. The answer lies in the fundamental differences in their historical experiences, geopolitical realities, and sheer scale.

  • Historical Trauma: Australia and Norway, while having their own histories, did not endure the same century-long, existential national humiliation at the hands of multiple foreign powers. Their national narratives are not defined by a desperate struggle for survival against overwhelming external forces.

  • Scale and Geopolitics: Australia is a continent-sized nation with a relatively small, homogeneous population, surrounded by vast oceans, and historically protected by powerful allies. Norway is a small, resource-rich nation in a stable region, benefiting from strong international alliances. China, by contrast, is a massive continental power with an immense, diverse population, sharing land borders with numerous countries, and facing a complex and often challenging geopolitical environment.

    • For a nation of China's size and population, the idea of being "small and peaceful" might be perceived as an invitation to vulnerability, a return to the very weakness that led to its past suffering. A small, peaceful state can thrive when larger powers guarantee its security; a large state must largely guarantee its own.

  • "Great Power" Mentality: The historical "Middle Kingdom" self-perception, however distorted by modern history, still influences China's grand strategic thinking. It predisposes the nation to think on a scale of global influence and historical destiny, rather than simply optimizing for a comfortable, smaller existence.

The Unthinkable: Fragmentation into Smaller States?

The notion of China dividing into many smaller countries, akin to Europe or Central America, is profoundly alien and even anathema to mainstream Chinese thought.

  • The Primacy of Unity (大一統): Chinese history is replete with cycles of unity and disunity. Periods of "大一統" (great unification) are almost universally celebrated as eras of peace, prosperity, and cultural flourishing. Conversely, periods of "分裂" (fragmentation), like the Warring States, the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, or the Warlord Era, are remembered as times of immense chaos, suffering, and foreign encroachment. Unity is seen as the ultimate guarantor of strength and stability; disunity, the ultimate source of weakness and internal strife.

  • Logistical Nightmare: Beyond historical precedent, the practicalities of dividing such a vast, interconnected landmass with its massive population are unimaginable. How would resources be distributed? What about internal trade, infrastructure, defense, and the myriad ethnic and regional identities?

  • Loss of Influence: Fragmentation would inevitably lead to a drastic reduction in global influence for any of the successor states, potentially making them individually vulnerable to external pressures, much like China experienced during its "Century of Humiliation."

In essence, China's unyielding quest for "強國" is not a whimsical choice but a deeply rooted historical imperative born from a traumatic past. It is a national project to ensure sovereignty, security, and dignity on a scale commensurate with its vast landmass and immense population. While other nations might aspire to a quiet prosperity, China's historical memory and geopolitical realities compel it to seek strength as the fundamental guarantee for its future. The idea of fragmentation is not just impractical; it is a terrifying echo of its darkest historical periods.