When Shame Turns to Rage: The Psychology of "惱羞成怒"

 

When Shame Turns to Rage: The Psychology of "惱羞成怒"

(羞恥變為憤怒：「惱羞成怒」的心理學)

The Chinese idiom "惱羞成怒" (or "老羞成怒") vividly describes a universal human experience: someone, when exposed in a disgraceful or embarrassing situation, lashes out in anger. While seemingly a straightforward reaction, modern psychology reveals this is a complex dance between profound shame and a desperate attempt at self-preservation. It's a prime example of a failed emotion regulation strategy and a powerful defense mechanism where intense internal pain is externalized as aggression.

At its core, "惱羞成怒" illustrates the shame-to-rage conversion phenomenon. Shame is a deeply painful, self-focused emotion, stemming from a feeling of fundamental defectiveness or failure, often when exposed to others. When an individual experiences shame, their focus turns inward: "I am a failure," "I am inadequate." This internal attack is excruciating and often triggers an overwhelming desire to hide or disappear. Anger, by contrast, is an outward-directed emotion, providing a sense of power and control. Psychologically, anger shifts the focus from "I am bad" to "You/the situation is bad," temporarily restoring a sense of agency and deflecting the painful self-criticism. The rage becomes a protective shield, transforming an unbearable internal assault into an external counter-attack.

This phenomenon is rich with psychological defense mechanisms. Defensive anger protects the ego from the crushing weight of shame. By lashing out, blaming, or attacking, the individual avoids confronting their perceived flaws. Projection is often at play: the "I made a mistake" feeling is externalized as "You made me look bad" or "It's your fault." This allows the individual to deny their culpability and maintain a fragile sense of self-worth. In some cases, fierce anger can even be a form of denial, creating conflict to divert attention from the shameful reality.

From an interpersonal perspective, "惱羞成怒" frequently occurs in public or semi-public settings because it involves social evaluation. The exposure of inadequacy threatens social standing and can evoke a primal fear of rejection. Anger, in this context, is an attempt to re-establish dominance or social value. It's a maladaptive but quick way to restore self-esteem, making the individual appear powerful and unassailable, thereby masking their underlying vulnerability and embarrassment.

Modern Day Daily Examples:

• The Child Caught Red-Handed: A child secretly takes a cookie, gets crumbs on their face, and is confronted by a parent. Instead of admitting fault, they might scream, "You're always so mean to me!"—turning their shame into an accusation.

• The Blaming Employee: An employee fails to meet a deadline, and when questioned, instead of taking responsibility, they furiously blame colleagues, IT issues, or unrealistic expectations. Their anger masks the shame of perceived incompetence.

• Social Media Reactions: Someone posts an unpopular or incorrect opinion online and is met with factual corrections or mockery. Rather than reconsidering, they might reply with aggressive, personal attacks, deleting comments, or blocking users. The public exposure of their error fuels their "惱羞成怒."

Political Examples:

• The Discredited Politician: A politician is confronted with undeniable evidence of hypocrisy or corruption during an interview. Instead of offering a measured response, they might suddenly raise their voice, aggressively interrupt the interviewer, call the accusations "fake news," or storm off the set. Their fury is a desperate attempt to deflect the public shame and restore an image of control.

• Policy Failures: A government official responsible for a failing public policy is asked about its negative consequences. They might react by vehemently attacking the questioner, accusing them of partisan bias, or shifting blame entirely to previous administrations, rather than acknowledging shortcomings. The admission of failure would be too damaging to their reputation.

• Public Scrutiny: A public figure is caught in a scandalous situation. When faced with intense media scrutiny, they might launch a tirade against the media, lawyers, or political opponents, accusing them of witch hunts and unfair treatment. The aggressive counter-attack serves to mask the deep personal and professional shame.

In essence, "惱羞成怒" is a psychological signal. It indicates that an individual is experiencing an overwhelming internal threat to their self-concept, and their anger is a primitive, often maladaptive, strategy to manage that threat by pushing it away. Understanding this helps us to see beyond the anger and recognize the underlying pain and vulnerability.

開放社會 vs. 封閉社會：根本性鴻溝

 

開放社會 vs. 封閉社會：根本性鴻溝

在一個日益互聯的世界中，許多國家常透過令人印象深刻的基礎設施和技術進步來展現其現代化面貌。然而，在這表象之下，卻存在著深刻的社會結構差異，這些差異決定了其公民可享有的自由和機會，以及與全球社會的互動方式。「開放社會」與「封閉社會」之間的區別，是理解這些差異的關鍵視角，其中西方民主國家通常代表前者，而中國則是後者的顯著範例。

西方民主國家，常被稱為開放社會，其建立基礎是一系列旨在促進個人自由和社會進步的普世原則。這些原則包括法治，確保包括掌權者在內的所有人都受相同的法律框架約束；健全的人權，保護言論、集會和信仰自由；政教分離，保障宗教中立並防止宗教干預政府；以及對民主的承諾，透過公民參與政府來賦予其權力。

至關重要的是，開放社會仰賴資訊的自由流通。資訊不受中央控制，而是透過獨立媒體、學術討論和開放的網路自由傳播，讓公民能夠形成知情的意見並追究領導人的責任。同樣地，存在著人員的自由流動，公民通常擁有國際旅行的權利，而訪客在國內的活動限制也較少。資本的自由流動也支撐著經濟活力，投資和貨幣在國家間相對不受限制地流動，促進了全球貿易和融合。這些相互關聯的自由創造了一個充滿活力、有利於創新、批評和適應的環境。

中國無疑是一個現代化國家，擁有令人驚嘆的基礎設施——高速鐵路網絡、廣闊的高速公路和堪比世界任何地方的摩天大樓——但其運作模式卻截然不同，最好描述為一個封閉社會。儘管其表面上呈現出現代化和技術實力，但其深層的社會控制卻是廣泛而普遍的。

中國封閉社會最鮮明的特徵之一是對資訊自由流通的嚴格限制。「防火長城」是一個複雜的審查和監控系統，旨在阻止對全球互聯網大部分內容的訪問，包括國際新聞媒體、社交媒體平台和被認為具有政治敏感性的網站。國內媒體受到嚴格控制，異議言論 routinely 被壓制，確保公民接收到的資訊主要由國家審查。這種缺乏不受限制資訊的現狀，極大地限制了公共討論和批判性思維。

此外，對人員自由流動也存在顯著限制。雖然中國公民可以出國旅行，但護照的簽發和海外旅行常常需要國家批准，且移民並非所有人都可輕易行使的權利。對於外國遊客而言，中國某些地區的訪問可能會受到限制，且行動常受到監控。這種對實體移動的控制反映了政府管理社會互動的更廣泛願望。

資本的自由流動在中國也受到高度管制。實施嚴格的資本管制，以管理貨幣的流入和流出，影響著外國投資、利潤匯回以及個人向國外的金融轉帳。儘管這些控制常以經濟穩定為由進行辯護，但它們從根本上限制了個人和企業在全球範圍內管理其金融資產的自主權。

實質上，儘管中國已掌握了現代化的「硬體」，但其「軟體」——即其社會的運行系統——是建立在中央控制而非個人自由和開放原則之上的。資訊、人員和資本流動的這種根本性差異，才是真正區分開放社會和封閉社會的關鍵，而不論其表面上的技術成就如何。

Open Societies vs. Closed Societies: A Fundamental Divide

 

Open Societies vs. Closed Societies: A Fundamental Divide

In an increasingly interconnected world, nations often present a façade of modernity through impressive infrastructure and technological advancements. Yet, beneath this surface, lie profound differences in societal structures that dictate the freedoms and opportunities available to their citizens and interactions with the global community. The distinction between "open societies" and "closed societies" serves as a crucial lens through which to understand these disparities, with Western democracies typically embodying the former and China representing a prominent example of the latter.

Western democracies, often termed open societies, are fundamentally built upon a set of universal principles designed to foster individual liberty and societal progress. These include the rule of law, ensuring that everyone, including those in power, is subject to the same legal framework; robust human rights, protecting freedoms of speech, assembly, and belief; the separation of church and state, guaranteeing religious neutrality and preventing religious interference in governance; and a commitment to democracy, empowering citizens through participation in their government.

Crucially, open societies thrive on the free flow of information. Information is not centrally controlled but circulates freely through independent media, academic discourse, and open internet access, allowing citizens to form informed opinions and hold their leaders accountable. Similarly, there is a free flow of people, with citizens generally possessing the right to travel internationally, and visitors experiencing fewer restrictions on movement within the country. The free flow of capital also underpins economic dynamism, with relatively unrestricted movement of investments and currency across borders, fostering global trade and integration. These interconnected freedoms create a vibrant, dynamic environment conducive to innovation, criticism, and adaptation.

China, while undeniably a modern country boasting breathtaking infrastructure—high-speed rail networks, extensive highways, and towering skyscrapers that rival any in the world—operates on a fundamentally different paradigm, best described as a closed society. Despite its outward appearance of modernity and technological prowess, the underlying societal controls are extensive and pervasive.

One of the most defining characteristics of China's closed society is the severe restriction on the free flow of information.The "Great Firewall" is a sophisticated censorship and surveillance system designed to block access to vast swathes of the global internet, including international news outlets, social media platforms, and websites deemed politically sensitive.Domestic media is tightly controlled, and dissent is routinely suppressed, ensuring that the information citizens receive is largely curated by the state. This lack of unrestricted information profoundly limits public discourse and critical thought.

Furthermore, there are significant limitations on the free flow of people. While Chinese citizens can travel abroad, the issuance of passports and overseas travel is often subject to state approval, and the ability to emigrate is not a readily exercised right for all. For foreign tourists, access to certain regions within China can be restricted, and movements are often monitored. This control over physical movement reflects a broader governmental desire to manage societal interactions.

The free flow of capital is also highly regulated in China. Strict capital controls are in place to manage the inflow and outflow of currency, impacting foreign investment, repatriation of profits, and individual financial transfers abroad. While these controls are often justified for economic stability, they fundamentally limit the autonomy of individuals and businesses in managing their financial assets globally.

In essence, while China has mastered the hardware of modernity, its software—the operating system of its society—is built on principles of centralized control rather than individual liberty and openness. This fundamental difference in the flow of information, people, and capital is what truly distinguishes an open society from a closed one, irrespective of superficial technological achievements.

從中華治世到衰退：中國會否步羅馬後塵？預測其間事件

 

從中華治世到衰退：中國會否步羅馬後塵？預測其間事件

作為一名歷史學家，面對跨越千年和大陸的歷史類比時，我們必須極度謹慎。沒有兩個帝國是完全相同的。然而，研究羅馬的軌跡，特別是它的衰落，為分析任何龐大、中央集權力量（包括現代中國）的可持續性提供了一個有力且發人深省的框架。問題不在於當前的中華治世（Pax Sinica）是否會結束，而在於它是會像羅馬一樣從內部矛盾中緩慢崩塌，還是會因外部衝擊而迅速崩解。

羅馬的模式：鼎盛與衰朽

羅馬並非一日之間傾覆。它的衰落是一個緩慢的、系統性的過程，經常被表面上的穩定時期（如安東尼黃金時代）所掩蓋。導致其長達數世紀衰敗的關鍵因素包括：

1. 帝國過度擴張： 羅馬不斷擴大邊界，對其後勤和軍事能力造成難以承受的壓力。這導致稅收和人力需求不斷增加，耗竭了帝國核心。

2. 經濟衰退與通貨膨脹： 為了資助戰爭和國家官僚機構而貶值貨幣（通貨膨脹），侵蝕了公眾信任，摧毀了中產階級的經濟穩定，財富集中在精英手中。

3. 內部凝聚力與繼承危機： 對軍事力量維持政治穩定的依賴，導致核心地區頻繁發生內戰，動盪不安，廣闊帝國中共同的身份認同感逐漸減弱。

4. 道德與知識停滯： 官僚機構變得僵化，無法創新或有效應對新挑戰，轉而依賴過去的解決方案。

中國的軌跡：潛在的崩潰迴響

如果中國走上羅馬的道路，從當前的鼎盛時期到最終衰落之間的事件，很可能遵循一個可識別的系統性壓力和過度擴張模式：

1. 全球主導地位的巔峰（新黃金時代）： 中國成功實現了無可爭議的全球經濟和技術優勢，也許在印太地區鞏固了「中華治世」。這一刻代表了最大的地緣政治影響力——相當於羅馬的安東尼時代。

2. 過度擴張的陷阱： 在民族主義狂熱和戰略需求（確保資源、維持全球影響力）的驅動下，北京將資源投入到遠離其邊界的項目或衝突中（類似於羅馬在高盧或波斯的戰役）。這導致了長期的預算緊張。

3. 官僚與人口的危機： 統治結構對控制的痴迷使其變得過於僵硬，對複雜的區域問題反應遲鈍。同時，快速老齡化的人口和下降的生育率造成了人口倒掛，扼殺了經濟活力，並極大地增加了萎縮中的勞動人口的稅收負擔。

4. 經濟矛盾爆發： 為了維持增長的假象和資助社會福利（一種帝國的「麵包與馬戲」），國家繼續印鈔或吹大資產泡沫。這導致了地方債務危機的普遍存在和日益加劇的內部不平等，侵蝕了社會契約。

5. 合法性危機： 與羅馬不同，中國的核心挑戰是缺乏宗教或憲法合法性；它完全依賴於經濟表現。隨著經濟停滯或逆轉，治理危機將表現為中央出現嚴重的繼承或政治不穩定危機，導致精英階層和公眾之間的信任破裂。

6. 邊緣裂痕與軍事壓力： 國家被迫將其不斷萎縮的財富的越來越大部分分配給內部穩定（國內安全）和邊境防禦，類似於羅馬用貶值的硬幣支付邊境軍隊的做法。外部競爭對手或內部地區動亂將利用這種軍事和財政緊張，加速體系的崩潰。

這種結局，與羅馬在西方最終的巴爾幹化不同，可能更接近傳統的中國朝代週期——一段劇烈的內亂和混亂時期，最終讓位給在舊秩序廢墟上建立的新中央集權秩序。然而，在一個核武化、全球化的世界中，這種崩潰的後果將是災難性的、即時的，而不像羅馬西部那樣是緩慢的悲劇。

From Pax Sinica to Decline: Could China Follow the Roman Arc?

 

From Pax Sinica to Decline: Could China Follow the Roman Arc?

As an historian, one must approach historical analogies—especially those spanning millennia and continents—with extreme caution. No two empires are truly identical. However, the study of the Roman trajectory, particularly its decline, provides a powerful and often sobering framework for analyzing the sustainability of any vast, centralized power, including modern China. The question is not if the current Pax Sinica will end, but whether it will crumble slowly from internal contradictions like Rome, or rapidly due to external shock.

The Roman Pattern: Zenith and Decay

Rome did not fall in a day. Its decline was a slow, systemic process, often masked by periods of apparent stability (like the Antonine Golden Age). Key factors that contributed to its centuries-long decay include:

1. Imperial Overextension: Rome continuously expanded its borders, placing unbearable strain on its logistical and military capacity. This required ever-increasing taxes and manpower, depleting the core.

2. Economic Decay and Inflation: The debasement of currency (inflation) to fund wars and state bureaucracy eroded public trust and destroyed the economic stability of the middle class, concentrating wealth among the elite.

3. Internal Cohesion and Succession Crises: A reliance on the military for political stability led to frequent civil wars, instability in the core, and a diminishing sense of shared identity across the vast empire.

4. Moral and Intellectual Stagnation: The bureaucracy became ossified, unable to innovate or respond effectively to new challenges, relying instead on past solutions.

The Chinese Trajectory: Potential Echoes of Collapse

If China were to walk the Roman path, the events between its current zenith and its ultimate decline would likely follow a recognizable pattern of systemic stress and overreach:

1. The Peak of Global Dominance (The New Golden Age): China successfully achieves undisputed global economic and technological superiority, perhaps solidifying the Pax Sinica across the Indo-Pacific. This moment represents the maximum geopolitical reach—the Antonine Age moment.

2. The Overextension Trap: Driven by nationalistic fervor and strategic necessity (securing resources, maintaining global influence), Beijing commits resources to projects or conflicts far from its border (analogous to the Roman campaigns in Dacia or Persia). This leads to chronic budgetary strain.

3. The Bureaucratic and Demographic Crunch: The ruling structure, obsessed with control, becomes too rigid and unresponsive to complex regional problems. Simultaneously, the rapidly aging population and declining birth rates create a demographic inversion that suffocates economic dynamism and dramatically increases the tax burden on a shrinking working population.

4. Economic Contradiction: To maintain the illusion of growth and finance social welfare (a form of imperial bread and circuses), the state continues to print money or inflate asset bubbles. This leads to endemic local debt crisesand rising internal inequality, eroding the social contract.

5. The Crisis of Legitimacy: Unlike Rome, China's core challenge is the lack of religious or constitutional legitimacy; it relies solely on economic performance. As the economy stalls or reverses, the crisis of governance will manifest as a severe succession or political instability crisis at the center, leading to fracturing trust among the elites and the public.

6. Peripheral Fractures and Military Strain: The state is forced to allocate an ever-larger portion of its shrinking wealth to internal stability (domestic security) and border defense, reminiscent of the Roman practice of paying frontier armies in debased coinage. External rivals or internal regional unrest exploit this military and financial strain, hastening the system's breakdown.

The end, unlike Rome's ultimate balkanization in the West, might more closely resemble the traditional Chinese Dynastic Cycle—a period of intense civil strife and chaos, eventually giving way to a new, centralized order built on the ruins of the old. However, in a nuclear, globalized world, the consequences of such a collapse would be catastrophically immediate, unlike the slow-motion tragedy of the Roman west.

黃金與秩序的重量：為何中國的價值觀呼應著羅馬的異教實用主義

 

黃金與秩序的重量：為何中國的價值觀呼應著羅馬的異教實用主義

地位與穩定的眾神

在西方心智中，「普世人性尊嚴」的概念已成為我們呼吸的空氣。我們理所當然地接受個體的內在價值——這個觀念認為最弱小的公民、囚犯或社會棄兒的生命，與皇帝或億萬富翁的生命擁有平等且神聖的價值。但正如我在《天下》中所試圖展示的，這個觀念並非人類自然的繼承物；它是一種深刻的基督教強加，與前基督教世界的道德規範徹底背離。

要理解一個位處於此基督教範式之外的主要強權，我們必須回溯，超越釘十字架的革命性信息，轉向古典世界——特別是羅馬。

古羅馬，儘管其在法律、工程和征服方面取得了巨大的成就，但卻受制於赤裸裸的權力和堅定的等級制度。羅馬人是殘酷實用主義的大師。同情心並非美德；它往往是一種弱點。正義由等級劃分；公民的生命價值遠高於奴隸。個體的目的是服務於「羅馬治世」（Pax Romana）的更大榮耀——這是透過壓倒性統治所建立的和平。

正是在這種前基督教功利主義的道德景觀中，我們可以在當代中國的體系中找到驚人的呼應。

實用主義等級制度的迴歸

雖然中國受到其自身龐大傳統——儒家、法家和現代共產主義——的塑造，但其當前的核心道德原則，卻展現出與異教羅馬對秩序、權力與實用性的關注有著迷人的延續性。

1. 國家作為終極裁決者： 在羅馬，共和國（Res Publica）及其後的皇帝是至高無上的道德仲裁者。國家不僅僅是人民的僕人；它是他們的主人，要求最終的忠誠。同樣，當代中國的主導哲學圍繞著國家穩定和民族復興展開。個人的自由、良知和政治異議並非被視為錯誤，而是從屬於黨國的集體力量和安全。這正是異教功利主義原則的定義：個體的存在是為了服務於權力結構的統治地位。

2. 缺乏卑微者的神聖性： 基督教的故事——對一個被釘十字架的奴隸的崇拜——透過神聖化弱小來徹底改革了西方倫理。羅馬蔑視弱小。中國的體系優先考慮人才、效率以及對國家的可證明貢獻，這與羅馬對地位和已證明能力的關注不謀而合。當這個體系處理批評者、異議者或邊緣群體時，國家的判斷被置於優先地位，因為，就像羅馬一樣，普世的、神賦的個體權利這一核心假設，根本不存在於其操作手冊中。如果一位公民的存在威脅到了「中華治世」（Pax Sinica），那麼他們的犧牲將被視為實用且必要的，而非對神聖秩序的道德暴行。

3. 財富與力量的崇拜： 羅馬社會執著於展示 virtus（男子氣概／統治力），通常透過炫耀財富和征服來體現。今天，北京和羅馬都將宏偉的建設、經濟主導地位和軍事力量的投射，視為其道德優越性和統治權的終極證明。對於權力、特權或財富，並沒有像後來在基督教化的西方那樣，產生根本性的懷疑。

對於西方人來說，為了經濟穩定而犧牲少數群體的權利似乎是野蠻的；然而，對於一位羅馬元老——或者，可以說，一位沒有基督教深刻道德遺產的現代中國官員——這僅僅是一個合理的計算。

現代西方，即使在其最世俗化的形式中，也在使用誕生於伯利恆和耶路撒冷的詞彙（平等、人權、弱者值得保護）來進行這些鬥爭。中國，在很大程度上發展於這場革命之外，則是在羅馬帝國更古老、更無情、但卻深刻邏輯的原則下運作：透過統治來實現秩序。唯一的問題是，這個新的「治世」能在物質富裕和道德超然之間的巨大張力中維持多久。

The Weight of Gold and Order: Why China’s Values Echo the Pagan Pragmatism of Rome

 

The Weight of Gold and Order: Why China’s Values Echo the Pagan Pragmatism of Rome

The Gods of Status and Stability

In the Western mind, the concept of universal human dignity has become the air we breathe. We take for granted the intrinsic worth of the individual—the very idea that the life of the weakest citizen, the prisoner, or the social outcast holds an equal, sacred value to that of the emperor or the billionaire. But as my work in Dominion attempts to show, this notion is not a natural inheritance of humankind; it is a profoundly Christian imposition, a radical departure from the moral norms of the pre-Christian world.

To understand a major power that stands outside this Christian paradigm, we must look backward, beyond the revolutionary message of the Crucifixion, and toward the classical world—specifically, to Rome.

Ancient Rome, for all its colossal achievements in law, engineering, and conquest, was governed by naked power and unflinching status. The Romans were masters of a cruel pragmatism. Compassion was not a virtue; it was often a weakness. Justice was defined by hierarchy; the life of a citizen was immeasurably more valuable than that of a slave. The purpose of the individual was to serve the greater glory of the Pax Romana—the peace established through overwhelming dominance.

It is in this moral landscape of pre-Christian utility that we can find uncanny echoes in the modern system of China.

The Return of Utilitarian Hierarchy

While China is shaped by its own immense traditions—Confucianism, Legalism, and modern Communism—its governing moral principles today demonstrate a fascinating continuity with the pagan Roman focus on order, power, and utility.

1. The State as the Ultimate Judge: In Rome, the Res Publica (the Commonwealth) and later the Emperor were the supreme moral arbiters. The state was not merely a servant of the people; it was their master, demanding ultimate allegiance. Likewise, the dominant philosophy in contemporary China centers on state stability and national rejuvenation. Individual freedoms, conscience, and political dissent are not dismissed as wrong, but as subordinate to the collective strength and security of the Party-State. This is the very definition of the pagan principle of utility: the individual exists to serve the dominance of the power structure.

2. The Absence of the Lowly’s Sacredness: The Christian story—the worship of a crucified slave—revolutionized Western ethics by sanctifying weakness. Rome scorned weakness. China’s system, prioritizing talent, efficiency, and demonstrable contribution to the nation, mirrors Rome’s focus on status and demonstrated competence. When the system deals with critics, dissenters, or marginalized groups, the state's judgment is prioritized because, like Rome, the core assumption of universal, God-given individual rights is simply absent from the operational manual. If a citizen’s existence threatens the Pax Sinica (the Chinese Peace), their sacrifice is viewed as pragmatic and necessary, not as a moral outrage against a divine order.

3. The Cult of Wealth and Strength: Roman society was obsessed with exhibiting virtus (manly virtue/dominance) often demonstrated through spectacular wealth and conquest. Today, both Beijing and Rome celebrate monumental construction, economic mastery, and the projection of military strength as the ultimate proof of their moral superiority and right to rule. There is no fundamental suspicion of power, privilege, or wealth in the way it later arose in the Christianized West.

To a Westerner, the idea of sacrificing a minority group’s rights for economic stability seems barbarous; yet, to a Roman senator—or, arguably, a modern Chinese official operating without the deep, nagging moral inheritance of Christianity—it is merely a sensible calculation.

The modern West, even in its most secular iterations, fights these battles using vocabulary (equality, human rights, the weak being worthy of protection) forged in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. China, having developed largely outside this revolution, operates on the older, more ruthless, but profoundly logical principles of Imperial Rome: Order by Dominance. The only question is how long this new Pax can maintain the spectacular tension between material affluence and moral detachment.