2026年2月25日 星期三

The Golden Age of Thieves: Why the UK (and West) is a Thief's Paradise in Human History

 

The Golden Age of Thieves: Why the UK (and West) is a Thief's Paradise in Human History

Chocolate bars locked in anti-theft boxes at Tesco and Sainsbury's? This surreal sight in UK supermarkets signals a retail crime epidemic, with shoplifting hitting 5.5 million incidents last year—second-highest on record—and chocolate emerging as a top target alongside booze and meat. Retailers like Heart of England Co-op lost £250,000 to chocolate thefts alone, resold on black markets funding organised crime.

For thieves, today's UK is a dreamland unmatched in history. Petty thefts—once policed rigorously—now flourish amid record highs, with self-checkouts and sparse staffing enabling bulk grabs. Western Europe and North America echo this: US shoplifting surges, French luxury goods raids, all while inflation squeezes low-value hauls into high-profit flips. Never before have thieves faced such lax deterrence amid abundant targets.

Central culprit? UK police priorities. Forces have long deprioritised "low-level" crimes, openly stating minor thefts like shoplifting won't be investigated without CCTV or strong leads—effectively a public "hands-off" policy. Despite 2023 Home Secretary mandates to pursue every theft, backlogs and resource shortages mean most go unprobed; retailers beg for tougher sentences as ACS warns chocolate funds gangs.

Western police mirror this: understaffed, focused on "serious" violence amid budget cuts post-austerity. Thieves know the odds—prosecution under 5% for petty crimes—making the era a bonanza. History's bandits faced gallows or patrols; today's exploit woke policing and bureaucracy. Fix: reinstate zero-tolerance, or watch bacon next in boxes.

當「無上限」簽證遇上疲於奔命的官僚體系——英國如何失去對合法移民的掌控

 當「無上限」簽證遇上疲於奔命的官僚體系——英國如何失去對合法移民的掌控

過去二十年,英國設計了多種沒有明確數量上限的簽證途徑,後來成為大規模、幾乎無制衡移民流入的主要來源。

第一個關鍵轉折是 2004 年後東歐八國加入歐盟所帶來的自由流動。當時工黨政府選擇不設過渡性配額,假定大部分勞工會前往德國等其他經濟體,因此在政策上沒有寫入硬性「人數上限」。來自東歐的淨流入遠超預期,但由於自由流動屬於「權利導向」而非「配額導向」,在脫歐前幾乎沒有行政上的「總掣」。

其後,引入積分制使多個簽證類別在實務上處於「無上限」狀態,尤其是學生、家庭與工作路徑。國際學生可攜眷屬,而整體人數沒有總量控制;配偶/家庭簽證則屬需求驅動而非配額制,一度推高家庭類簽證至歷史高位。決策者往往將這些路徑視為在經濟或道德上「自我正當化」,把人數管理交給薪金門檻與合規審查,而非明確的年度限額。

部分具體方案更凸顯前端設計薄弱與官僚文化的結合。例如 Tier 1(企業家)簽證在 2019 年被關閉,官方結論是大量申請涉及薄弱甚至造假的商業計劃,實際創新與就業成效有限;監管不足,而內政部在大規模審核企業真實性方面力不從心。 季節工及臨時工路徑的規模亦迅速擴張,與 2019 年相比增幅約九成,但執法能力的疑慮始終存在。

為何備受批評、效率低落的內政部仍能簽出如此龐大的簽證數量?多份檢視報告指出,一旦路徑存在,只要申請形式上符合規則,多數案件的默認結果就是「批准」,即使個案處理緩慢且錯誤頻仍。積壓、分流不善與「不合格」文化可以同時存在於高核准率之中;複雜與拖延傷害的是個別申請人,但在官員以「清案量」為主要績效指標下,總體簽發量仍不斷攀升。

更深層的問題在於結構:歷屆政府以經濟、外交或權利為目標,刻意迴避政治上敏感的硬性限額,卻又依賴一個本就疲弱的官僚體系來營運實質「無上限」的制度,當合法移民人數創新高時又轉而責怪該體系。除非在政策層面先正面回答「要多少人」這個問題,而不只是設計資格與權利,任何新路徑都可能重演——開口無上限,由一個從未被打造用來控制總量的系統來管理。

When “Open-Ended” Visas Meet a Weary Bureaucracy – How the UK Lost Control of Legal Migration

 When “Open-Ended” Visas Meet a Weary Bureaucracy – How the UK Lost Control of Legal Migration

Over the last 20 years, several UK visa routes were designed without hard numerical caps and later became major drivers of large, largely unchecked immigration flows.

The first big shift was the post‑2004 free movement from the EU8 accession states. The Labour government chose not to impose transitional limits, assuming most workers would go to Germany or other EU economies, so no explicit numerical ceiling was written into policy. Net inflows from Eastern Europe far exceeded projections, but because free movement was rights‑based rather than quota‑based, there was no administrative “off switch” until Brexit.

Later, the points‑based system multiplied uncapped or loosely controlled categories, especially student, family, and work routes. International students could bring dependants with no overall numeric ceiling, and partner/family visas were demand‑led rather than capped; family and partner grants have at times reached historic highs. Policymakers treated these as economically or morally “self‑justifying” streams, so volume management was left to vague salary thresholds and compliance checks, not to quotas or annual limits.

Some specific schemes illustrate how weak front‑end design combined with bureaucratic culture. The Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) route, for instance, was closed in 2019 after officials concluded it attracted many weak or fraudulent business plans and delivered little innovation or job creation; monitoring was poor and the Home Office struggled to verify genuine businesses at scale. Seasonal worker and temporary routes have also expanded rapidly, with grants around 90% higher than in 2019, despite persistent concerns about enforcement capacity.

Why could an overstretched, often criticised Home Office process so many visas? Inspectors repeatedly note that once a route exists, the default is to grant the vast majority of compliant applications, even while basic casework is slow and error‑prone. Backlogs, poor triage and “not fit for purpose” culture coexist with high grant rates; complexity and delay hit individuals, but volume keeps flowing because staff are incentivised to clear work, not to question whether aggregate numbers make sense.

The deeper problem is structural: ministers pursued economic, diplomatic or rights‑based goals and deliberately avoided politically explosive hard caps. They leaned on a sluggish bureaucracy to run effectively unlimited schemes, then blamed that same bureaucracy when legal migration hit record levels. Until policy is framed around explicit volume choices, rather than only criteria and rights, any new route risks repeating the pattern of open‑ended visas administered by a system never designed to police their scale.

2026年2月24日 星期二

藍色與帝國:從藍染叛亂看早期全球化的血色紡線

 藍色與帝國:從藍染叛亂看早期全球化的血色紡線


藍染的故事,本質上就是早期全球化的故事:同一抹藍,把曼徹斯特的紡織工廠、孟加拉的農田與台灣的山坡連在一起。在合成染料出現之前,歐洲工業完全仰賴植物性靛藍,使得殖民地的木藍產區成為世界經濟的重要節點。孟加拉的「藍染叛亂」並非孤立事件,而是在不平等的全球商品鏈之下,契約偏向單方、風險高度外溢時爆發的一場暴力警訊。

18、19 世紀,大英帝國的工業革命以紡織為核心,靛藍成為棉織品大量生產的戰略染料。在德國化學工業尚未開發出可規模化生產的合成靛藍之前,世界的藍色幾乎都必須從植物獲得。於是,在英國統治下的印度,木藍成了典型的殖民經濟作物;在台灣,靛藍也成為地方重要出口。來自歐洲的需求,透過價格與制度設計,把遙遠的地方納入同一條價值鏈。

從全球化的角度看,1859–1860 年孟加拉的藍染叛亂(Neel Vidroho)說明了:當全球需求透過殖民權力落地時,很容易變成制度化暴力。歐洲種植園主依靠殖民政府的庇護,以「預付貸款」(dadon)與不對稱契約,迫使不識字的農民改種木藍而放棄糧食作物。農民承擔土壤劣化、歉收與飢荒的風險,遠方的都會社會則獲得穩定、廉價、色牢度高的藍色布料。當價格與合約條件嚴重偏離農民的生存邏輯時,「起義」其實是一種理性的經濟選擇:試圖退出一個對自己極不利的全球市場。

這場運動從拒收預付款、拒絕耕種開始,很快發展為對藍靛工廠(neelkuthi)的直接攻擊,反映出「工廠」在地方社會眼中不只是一處生產設施,更是抽取地租與勞動剩餘的象徵。值得注意的是,藍染叛亂呈現出跨階級、跨宗教的動員:印度教與穆斯林農民並肩抵抗,部分對種植園勢力不滿的地主與城市知識分子也加入戰線。這說明當全球化的壓力過於集中地壓在基層時,地方社會會產生跨界的聯合行動,試圖重新談判自己在世界經濟中的位置。

文化與輿論在這場全球化衝突中扮演了橋樑角色。迪納班杜·米特拉的劇作《藍靛之鏡》(Nil Darpan)把農民所承受的暴行與屈辱搬上舞台,讓原本「地方性」的苦難,在印度與英國兩地引發輿論震盪。可以說,藍靛不僅以貨物形式跨境流動,其背後的故事與憤怒,也透過戲劇與報刊進入帝國公共領域,成為迫使宗主國回應的輿論壓力。

英國政府成立藍染委員會(Indigo Commission)、承認制度性剝削並禁止強迫種植,從全球化史的視角看,是在為跨地域商業活動「補上」制度。之後印度契約法等近代商業法律的出現,可被視為在危機後試圖讓全球貿易回到「可治理」軌道的一種調整:不是要終結帝國式全球化,而是要讓它以更穩定、更可預測的方式運作。法律現代化,在此同時也是全球化風險管理的工具。

台灣的靛藍經驗則提醒我們:即便政治體制不同,只要被納入同一全球需求鏈,就會面臨相似的結構性問題。大菁、小菁之所以成為重要經濟作物,與其說是地方自主選擇,不如說是順應遠方市場的價格信號。當曼徹斯特的染缸同時使用來自印度與台灣的靛藍時,這種「看不見的連結」正是全球化的典型樣貌:彼此素未謀面的社會,在日常生活中卻被同一種顏色、同一條供應鏈緊緊扣在一起。

回望藍染叛亂,我們看到的不只是十九世紀的一場農民運動,而是一個早期全球化的教案:當商品鏈的設計讓風險向生產端集中、讓定價權掌握在遙遠的核心地帶時,衝突與反抗只是時間問題。從木藍到現代的咖啡、可可或電子代工,問題形式已變,本質卻相當一致——全球化究竟是互惠的連結,還是精緻化的掠奪?藍色染料曾為帝國帶來巨額利潤,如今則為我們提供重新思考全球經濟秩序的深藍鏡面。

Blue Rebellion, Global Indigo: How a Colonial Dye Linked Empires and Peripheries

 Blue Rebellion, Global Indigo: How a Colonial Dye Linked Empires and Peripheries


The story of indigo is a story of early globalization: a single shade of blue binding together Manchester’s mills, Bengal’s fields, and Taiwan’s hillsides. Long before synthetic dyes, European industry depended on plant-based indigo, making regions like colonial India and Taiwan critical nodes in an emerging world economy. The “Blue Rebellion” in Bengal was not a local anomaly, but a violent flashpoint in a global commodity chain built on unequal power, coercive contracts, and one-sided risk.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the British industrial revolution turned textiles into the backbone of imperial manufacturing. Indigo from Indigofera tinctoria became strategically important as the key dye for mass-produced cotton goods. While German chemists would later revolutionize dye production with synthetic indigo in the late 19th century, before that breakthrough the world’s blue quite literally depended on plants. In British India, that demand took institutional form through the plantation and the ryoti system; in Taiwan, it shaped local farming choices and export patterns. The same imperial market appetite pulled distant landscapes into a single value chain.

From a globalization perspective, the Indigo Revolt (Neel Vidroho) of 1859–1860 in Bengal reveals how global demand can harden into structural violence. European planters, backed by colonial authority, used advances (dadon) and legally weighted contracts to lock illiterate farmers into indigo cultivation instead of food crops. Farmers bore production risk, soil degradation, and the threat of famine, while distant metropoles benefited from color-fast blue on factory cloth. When prices and terms no longer made sense, peasants did what rational economic agents do in a distorted market: they tried to exit. The “rebellion” was, at its core, a struggle over who gets to decide what the land is for—and for whom global trade should work.

The uprising’s trajectory—from refusal of advances to organized armed resistance—shows globalization’s social underside. Indigo factories (neelkuthi) became symbols of external extraction; attacks on them were not only acts of anger but attempts to break an exploitative production model. The cross-class and cross-religious solidarity among Hindu and Muslim peasants, supported by some zamindars and urban intellectuals, illustrates how global market pressures can catalyze unlikely alliances at the periphery. Plays like Dinabandhu Mitra’s Nil Darpan turned local suffering into a trans-imperial moral scandal, reminding us that global flows of ideas can run both ways: from village to metropolis as well as the reverse.

The British response—commissioning an official inquiry and eventually curbing forced indigo cultivation—highlights another dimension of globalization: the gradual adaptation of legal and contractual frameworks to manage cross-border commerce. The Indigo Commission’s famous line that every chest of indigo was “stained with human blood” was not just rhetoric; it marked an acknowledgement that the existing form of global trade was politically unsustainable. Later legal reforms, including the codification of contract law and mechanisms like force majeure, can be read as attempts to stabilize global commerce after crisis, making imperial capitalism more governable rather than less exploitative.

Taiwan’s experience with indigo, though different in political form, sits in the same global story. As an export crop tied to external demand, Taiwanese “big qing” and “small qing” production responded to the price signals and fashion cycles generated far away. The fact that blue dye from Taiwan and Bengal could end up in the same Manchester dye vats underscores a central truth of globalization: places that never meet in a political sense can be tightly coupled through commodity chains. When demand surges, hillsides are cleared and labor is reallocated; when synthetic dyes arrive or prices fall, entire local economies must pivot or collapse.

Seen from today, the Blue Rebellion is not just a footnote in Indian agrarian history; it is an early case study of resistance to a form of globalization that offloads risk onto producers while concentrating power with distant buyers. It invites us to ask enduring questions: Who controls the terms of integration into world markets? How are contracts designed to allocate risk between core and periphery? And when global value chains become too extractive, what forms of collective action emerge to renegotiate the deal? The indigo that once colored imperial textiles now colors our understanding of how deeply connected—and deeply unequal—the first wave of globalization really was.

按需殺戮:中國的器官摘取產業與美國最大敵手的真實本質》——一場人類良知的審判

 

《按需殺戮:中國的器官摘取產業與美國最大敵手的真實本質》——一場人類良知的審判


有些書令人不安,因為它揭開了世界刻意忽視的黑暗面。《按需殺戮:中國的器官摘取產業與美國最大敵手的真實本質》正是這樣一部作品。作者以深入調查與強烈道德勇氣,揭示一個政府主導的強迫器官摘取體系——從醫院、監獄到行政命令,構成當代最駭人的人權災難之一。

書中不僅記錄受害者與目擊者的證詞,還分析中國器官移植產業如何與對宗教及政治異議人士的迫害同步發展。更尖銳的是,它直指西方世界的沉默——在利益與依賴中選擇視而不見。

這不只是關於暴行的報導,而是一場對權力與道德界線的審視。對政策制定者、媒體人以及重視人道價值的讀者而言,《按需殺戮》是一部必讀之書,它迫使我們面對:若真相如此血腥,我們還能假裝不知嗎?

Killed to Order: The Book Exposing a Hidden Atrocity Behind China’s Rise

 

Killed to Order: The Book Exposing a Hidden Atrocity Behind China’s Rise


Some books disturb you because they reveal what the world prefers not to see. Killed to Order: China’s Organ Harvesting Industry & the True Nature of America’s Biggest Adversary is one of them. Written with meticulous research and moral courage, it chronicles the evolution of a state-backed system of forced organ extraction—linking hospitals, prisons, and political repression into one of the most chilling human-rights violations of our time.

The author unpacks how China’s organ transplant boom coincided with the persecution of religious minorities and dissidents, documenting survivors’ testimonies, court evidence, and leaked official directives. Beyond exposing brutality, the book challenges Western complacency—asking why global institutions, influenced by Chinese investments and market dependence, have chosen silence over scrutiny.

This is not simply a story about crime; it is a revelation about how power works when profit and ideology merge. For policymakers, journalists, or ethically minded readers, Killed to Order offers a lens to understand the moral cost of global engagement with authoritarian regimes. It is a book that demands not just reading, but reckoning.