英國「銀髮罪犯潮」：一個警察與稅收無法解決的社會問題，需要教會與清真寺

 英國「銀髮罪犯潮」：一個警察與稅收無法解決的社會問題，需要教會與清真寺

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在英國，一個令人不安的新現象正在浮現：愈來愈多老年人身陷囹圄。過去十年間，60歲及以上囚犯人數激增82%，相較2002年更暴漲243%。從中彩票退休老人變身毒梟，到八旬老翁走私可卡因，再到「黑幫奶奶」掌控販毒家族，犯罪的面孔正在老化。然而這不僅是執法問題，更是一場社會與道德危機，無法單靠警察或稅收解決，可能需要教會與清真寺的參與。

一個典型例子是約翰，65歲退休時中了250萬英鎊彩票。他未選擇安逸退休，反而在大曼徹斯特郡阿斯特利的紅磚小屋打造毒品帝國，警方估計規模達2.88億英鎊。2025年，80歲的約翰與三名同夥（包括37歲兒子）被判16年6個月。類似案例屢見不鮮：80歲的馬爾科姆·霍伊蘭為Byrne犯罪集團走私1300萬英鎊可卡因；65歲「黑幫奶奶」黛博拉·梅森在倫敦運營8000萬英鎊販毒網絡；66歲彼得·蘭姆策劃1.2億英鎊A類毒品走私。

背後是更深層趨勢：老年犯罪不僅規模擴大，類型也多元。毒品是主因，但非唯一。官方數據顯示，50歲以上男性囚犯中45%因性犯罪入獄，70歲以上高達80%，而性犯罪在全體囚犯中僅佔18%。例如69歲卡森·格萊姆斯數十年性侵22名男童；81歲理查·伯羅斯潛逃泰國27年後，因性侵24名10至15歲男孩被判46年。

諾森比亞大學犯罪學高級講師路易絲·里德利指出，刑期延長、對老年人不當行為容忍度降低、慣犯屢次違假釋，以及「公共保護監禁刑」遺留問題（無限期關押，現已廢除但仍有數千人服刑）。然而許多老年囚犯孤獨、隔離、精神空虛。監獄「主要是年輕人的地方」，老年人承受更多無聊、悔恨與虛度人生感。

這凸顯國家權力的局限。更多警察、監控與稅收可管理犯罪症狀，卻無法修復破碎的道德想像、治癒長期孤獨或為晚年墮入犯罪者找回人生意義。這種工作不在法庭或監獄，而在社區、家庭與宗教場所。

教會與清真寺透過牧養關懷、輔導與小組團契，能接觸老年人，提供歸屬感、道德約束與精神指引，防止退休者因無聊或尋求意義而犯罪。對已入獄者，信仰社群可提供探訪、牧師關懷與釋放後支援，降低再犯率並幫助重新融入社會。

英國「銀髮罪犯潮」是社會病態的症狀：人口老化，物質富裕卻情感與精神脆弱。解決之道不僅是更好監獄與更聰明執法，更需強大道德生態——教會、清真寺、家庭與社區共同預防犯罪、治癒破碎生命，恢復迷失者尊嚴。

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Britain’s “Silver‑Criminal” Wave: A Social Crisis Beyond Police and Tax, Calling for Churches and Mosques

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In Britain, a disturbing new pattern is emerging: more and more older people are ending up in prison. Over the past decade, the number of prisoners aged 60 and above has surged by 82%, and compared with 2002, it has exploded by 243%. From lottery‑winning retirees turned drug lords to octogenarian cocaine smugglers and “gangster grannies” running multi‑million‑pound trafficking networks, the face of crime is ageing. Yet this is not just a law‑enforcement problem; it is a social and moral crisis that cannot be solved by policing or taxation alone, but may require the quiet, persistent presence of churches and mosques.

One emblematic case is John, a 65‑year‑old retired man who won £2.5 million on the lottery in 2010. Instead of a quiet retirement, he used the money to build a clandestine drug empire in a red‑brick house in Astley, Greater Manchester, producing pills at a scale that police later estimated at £288 million. In 2025, the now 80‑year‑old John and three accomplices, including his 37‑year‑old son, were sentenced to 16 years and six months in prison. Similar stories are no longer rare: 80‑year‑old Malcolm Hoyle smuggled £13 million worth of cocaine for the Byrne crime family; 65‑year‑old “gangster granny” Deborah Mason ran an £80 million drug network in London; 66‑year‑old Peter Lamb plotted a £120 million Class A drug smuggling operation in Gateshead.

Behind these sensational headlines, a deeper trend is visible. Crime among the elderly is not only growing in scale but in variety. While drugs are a major driver, they are not the only one. Official data show that among male prisoners aged 50 and over, about 45% are serving time for sexual offences, rising to roughly 80% among those over 70. By contrast, sexual offences account for only 18% of all prisoners. Men like 69‑year‑old Carson Grahame, who sexually abused 22 boys over decades, and 81‑year‑old Richard Barrows, a serial paedophile extradited from Thailand and sentenced to 46 years, reveal how long‑hidden predation can surface only when the law finally catches up.

Experts such as Dr Louise Ridley, a senior lecturer in criminology at Northumbria University, point to several structural factors: longer sentences, harsher treatment of older offenders, repeat re‑offending by habitual criminals, and the legacy of “public protection” indeterminate sentences that keep some people locked up indefinitely. Yet she also notes that many elderly prisoners are deeply lonely, isolated, and spiritually adrift. Prisons, she says, are “in large part young people’s places,” and older inmates often suffer more from boredom, regret, and a sense of wasted life than from physical hardship.

This is where the limits of state power become clear. More police, more surveillance, and higher taxes may manage the symptoms of crime, but they cannot repair broken moral imaginations, heal long‑term loneliness, or restore a sense of purpose to people who have drifted into criminality in their later years. That kind of work is not done in courtrooms or prisons; it is done in communities, in families, and in places of worship.

Churches and mosques, with their networks of pastoral care, counselling, and small‑group fellowship, are uniquely positioned to reach older people before they fall into crime. They can offer a sense of belonging, moral accountability, and spiritual direction to retirees who might otherwise feel invisible, bored, or desperate for meaning. For those already caught in the justice system, faith communities can provide visiting programmes, chaplaincy, and post‑release support that reduce recidivism and help reintegrate people into society.

Britain’s “silver‑criminal” wave is a symptom of a wider social malaise: an ageing population that is materially comfortable but emotionally and spiritually fragile. To address it, the country needs not only better prisons and smarter policing, but also a stronger moral ecology—one in which churches and mosques, alongside families and local communities, become active partners in preventing crime, healing broken lives, and restoring dignity to those who have lost their way.

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當未來不確定時：政治不穩定如何將人才推向穩定國家

 當未來不確定時：政治不穩定如何將人才推向穩定國家

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一個前途未卜的國家，失去的不只是投資與信心，更是人才——尤其是最優秀的那群人。這種「人才外流」（brain drain）是常被忽略卻極具決定性的競爭優勢：當政治、安全或法治顯得脆弱時，有選擇的家庭會選擇把子女送往更穩定的地方。NVIDIA 執行長黃仁勳（Jensen Huang）的故事，便生動展示了政治不穩定如何悄悄將人力資本推向海外——往往在國家意識到損失之前就已發生。

黃仁勳出生於台灣，童年部分時間在泰國度過，父親是化學與儀器工程師，協助建立煉油廠。約 1973–1974 年，全家遷至曼谷，但政治氣氛很快影響長期計畫。他在 2025 年 12 月接受《喬·羅根體驗》（The Joe Rogan Experience）訪談時回憶，泰國頻繁的軍事政變與街頭軍隊讓父母對國家安全與穩定感到不安。「你知道，泰國總是政變，」他說。「士兵起義，某天街上就出現坦克與部隊。」

當時黃仁勳九歲，哥哥十一歲。父母擔心泰國不適合孩子未來發展，決定將兩兄弟送往華盛頓州塔科馬（Tacoma）的親戚家——這些親戚他們從未見過。從此，黃仁勳在美國就學，最終領導全球最具影響力的科技公司之一。他的軌跡不僅是個人成功故事，更是政治不確定性如何悄悄輸出國家未來創新者的案例。

當一個國家顯得不穩定——無論是政變、長期政治危機或制度薄弱——父母與年輕專業人士會開始問：「孩子在哪裡安全？他們在哪裡能無中斷地發展職業？」回答不佳的國家失去的不只是學生或短期工作者，而是整代潛在企業家、科學家與工程師。例如泰國，近年可見移民潮上升，尤其是受過教育的年輕人加入「Let’s Move Abroad」等線上社群，一度在四天內成長至超過五十萬成員後被政府關閉。其他政治動盪國家也有類似模式，人才悄悄遷往美國、加拿大、澳洲或西歐。

這種人才外流的經濟成本常被低估。像黃仁勳這樣的人看似個案，但乘以成千上萬家庭，效果便成結構性：感覺不穩定的國家最終補貼了更穩定國家的創新與稅基。穩定國家則獲得技能勞工、全球網絡、僑民投資與文化軟實力。長此以往，形成自我強化差距：國家越不穩定，人才越外流；人才越外流，越難解決根本問題。

對任何憂心長期競爭力的國家，政治與社會穩定不僅是治理議題，更是經濟與人口議題。一個清晰可預測的未來本身就是競爭優勢——它讓人才留在國內，而非遠赴海外尋求安全與機會。

When the Future Is Uncertain: How Political Instability Drives “Brain Drain” to Stable Countries

 When the Future Is Uncertain: How Political Instability Drives “Brain Drain” to Stable Countries

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A country with an uncertain future does not just lose investment and confidence; it loses people—especially the most talented. This “brain drain” is a quiet but decisive competitive edge that many policymakers forget: when politics, security, or the rule of law feel fragile, families with options choose to send their children to more stable places. The story of NVIDIA’s CEO, Jensen Huang, offers a vivid example of how political instability can push human capital abroad—often before the country even realises what it has lost.

Huang was born in Taiwan and spent part of his childhood in Thailand, where his father worked as a chemical and instrumentation engineer helping to build an oil refinery. Around 1973–1974, the family moved to Bangkok, but the political climate soon shaped their long‑term plans. In a December 2025 interview on The Joe Rogan Experience, Huang recalled that Thailand’s repeated military coups and soldiers on the streets made his parents uneasy about the country’s safety and stability. “You know, in Thailand there are coups all the time,” he said. “Soldiers rise up, and then one day there are tanks and troops out on the streets.”

At the time, Huang was nine years old and his older brother nearly eleven. Concerned that Thailand might not be a secure environment for their children’s future, their parents decided to send the boys to live with relatives in Tacoma, Washington—people they had never met in person. From there, Huang attended school in the United States, eventually rising to lead one of the world’s most influential technology companies. His trajectory is not just a personal success story; it is also a case study in how political uncertainty can quietly export a country’s future innovators.

When a nation appears unstable—whether through coups, chronic political crises, or weak institutions—parents and young professionals start to ask: Where will my children be safe? Where can they build a career without constant disruption? Countries that answer those questions poorly do not lose only students or temporary workers; they lose entire generations of potential entrepreneurs, scientists, and engineers. Thailand, for instance, has seen a visible rise in emigration, particularly among young, educated Thais who join online communities such as “Let’s Move Abroad,” which once grew to over half a million members in just four days before being shut down. Similar patterns can be seen in other politically volatile countries, where talented individuals quietly relocate to the United States, Canada, Australia, or Western Europe.

The economic cost of this brain drain is often underestimated. A single person like Jensen Huang may seem like one outlier, but multiplied across thousands of families, the effect becomes structural: the country that feels unstable ends up subsidising the innovation and tax base of more stable ones. Stable countries, in turn, gain not only skilled workers but also global networks, diaspora investment, and cultural soft power. Over time, this creates a self‑reinforcing gap: the more unstable a country feels, the more talent leaves; the more talent leaves, the harder it becomes to fix the underlying problems.

For any nation worried about its long‑term competitiveness, political and social stability is not just a governance issue; it is an economic and demographic one. A clear, predictable future is itself a competitive advantage—one that keeps brains at home instead of sending them abroad in search of safety and opportunity.

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戰爭的親密經濟：越南戰爭黑市與性經濟書籍導讀

 戰爭的親密經濟：越南戰爭黑市與性經濟書籍導讀

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越南戰爭長期被視為軍事與政治衝突，但近年學術研究轉向其地下經濟：黑市、軍事相關貿易與美軍基地周邊的性經濟。這些作品顯示戰爭不僅在叢林與村莊中進行，也在市場、妓院與暗巷交易中展開，性、金錢與生存交織。對熟悉金貞敏《黑市親密》的讀者，越南戰爭提供平行但獨特的案例，展現軍事主義如何重塑性別勞動、非正式貿易與日常生活。

越南戰爭經濟書籍

多部研究直接連結越南戰爭與非法與性別經濟：

• Amanda Boczar，《美國妓院：越南戰爭期間的性與外交》（Cornell University Press, 2022）
  Boczar 探討美軍與越南及亞洲女性的性接觸，聚焦妓院與「娛樂」空間如何成為外交、監視與種族化欲望的場所。她揭示性經濟嵌入美軍與外交策略，越南女性在剝削與能動性間周旋。

• 《帝國禮物：肥皂、人道主義與南越黑市》（Radical History Review, 2023）
  這篇論文將美軍分發的肥皂視為「禮物」轉黑市商品，追蹤南越黑市如何將軍需肥皂轉為非法貿易，截斷美帝流動，創造戰時資本主義下的替代社會關係。

• 《越南黑市經濟》（University of Hawai‘i Institutional Repository, 2023）
  這篇社會史重建南越跨國黑市，展現平民、士兵與商人如何在佔領區移動貨物。它強調戰時參與者透過走私、生存與非正式交易記憶戰爭。

• 《劍橋越南戰爭史》第29章：「越南戰爭經濟」（Cambridge University Press, 2024）
  這章將戰爭經濟置於全球脈絡，涵蓋美援、通脹與軍事支出的 destabilizing 效果，為正式與非正式經濟共存提供背景。

• Anthony P. Campagna，《越南戰爭的經濟後果》（Praeger, 1991）
  這本經典研究聚焦戰爭對美國經濟的影響，但暗示戰爭支出如何在海外催生非正式與軍事相關市場。

這些作品顯示，越南戰爭像韓戰一樣，圍繞美軍存在產生複雜性與黑市經濟，與《黑市親密》共享對親密、性別與非正式貿易如何成為戰爭物質基礎的興趣。

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Intimate Economies of War: Introducing Books on the Vietnam War’s Black Markets and Sexual Economies

 Intimate Economies of War: Introducing Books on the Vietnam War’s Black Markets and Sexual Economies

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The Vietnam War has long been studied as a military and political conflict, but a growing body of scholarship now turns to its intimate, underground economies: black markets, military‑linked trade, and sexual economies around U.S. bases and occupied zones. These works show that the war was not only fought in jungles and villages, but also in markets, brothels, and back‑alley exchanges where sex, money, and survival intertwined. For readers familiar with Jeongmin Kim’s Black Market Intimacies, the Vietnam War offers a parallel yet distinct case of how militarism reshapes gendered labor, informal trade, and everyday life.

Key Books on Vietnam’s War Economies

Several recent studies explicitly connect the Vietnam War with illicit and gendered economies:

• Amanda Boczar, An American Brothel: Sex and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War(Cornell University Press, 2022)
  Boczar examines sexual encounters between American servicemen and Vietnamese and other Asian women, focusing on how brothels and “entertainment” spaces functioned as sites of diplomacy, surveillance, and racialized desire. Her work reveals how sexual economies were embedded in U.S. military and diplomatic strategies, and how Vietnamese women navigated both exploitation and agency within these structures.

• “Imperial Gift: Soap, Humanitarianism, and Black Marketeering in South Vietnam” (Radical History Review, 2023)
  This article by an emerging scholar theorizes U.S.‑distributed soap as a “gift” turned black‑market commodity. It traces how South Vietnamese black‑marketeers repurposed military‑supplied soap into an illegal trade good, intercepting U.S. imperial flows and creating alternative social relations under wartime capitalism.

• “Vietnam’s Black Market Economy” (University of Hawai‘i Institutional Repository, 2023)
  This social‑history paper reconstructs South Vietnam’s transnational black market, showing how civilians, soldiers, and traders moved goods across borders and through occupied zones. It highlights how wartime participants later remembered the war through stories of smuggling, survival, and informal exchange.

• The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War, Chapter 29: “The Economics of the Vietnam War” (Cambridge University Press, 2024)
  While broader in scope, this chapter situates the war’s economic history in global context, including U.S. aid flows, inflation, and the destabilizing effects of military spending. It provides essential background for understanding how formal and informal economies co‑existed during the conflict.

• Anthony P. Campagna, The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War (Praeger, 1991)
  Campagna’s classic study focuses on the war’s impact on the U.S. economy—spending, inflation, employment, and long‑term structural change—but it also hints at the ways war spending fueled informal and military‑linked markets overseas.

Together, these works suggest that the Vietnam War, like the Korean War, produced a complex sexual and black‑market economy around U.S. military presence. They share with Black Market Intimacies an interest in how intimacy, gender, and informal trade become central to the material foundations of war and occupation.

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黑市親密：韓戰跨太平洋性經濟導讀

 黑市親密：韓戰跨太平洋性經濟導讀

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金貞敏（Jeongmin Kim）的《黑市親密：韓戰跨太平洋性經濟》（Black Market Intimacies: The Transpacific Sexual Economy of the Korean War，史丹佛大學出版社，2026）重新定義了我們理解韓戰的方式：它不僅是一場軍事衝突，更是東亞性別與商業交織的關鍵時刻。本書揭示韓國與日本女性與美軍士兵之間涉及金錢與物質的非法交易，如何在戰時與戰後為韓國與日本的區域經濟奠定物質基礎。金貞敏並非將這些交易視為戰爭的邊緣「副作用」，而是證明它們是後二戰東亞「美軍基地資本主義」形成的核心。

金貞敏是曼尼托巴大學歷史系助理教授，她挑戰傳統觀點，即黑市與性經濟位於正式經濟與法律結構之外。她追蹤交易性性行為與軍需商品市場如何緊密交織於官方軍事供應鏈、貨幣系統與佔領政策。透過韓語、日語、英語與美軍檔案的多語言史料，她拼湊出跨國日常交易網絡：韓國女性將駱駝牌毛毯與威士忌帶到首爾市場，沖繩女性交易美軍軍票，以及無數女性在性勞動與中介角色間穿梭，流通戰爭物資與貨幣。

她超越冷戰檔案將性經濟簡化為「賣淫」與「暴力」的框架，恢復女性勞動的活生生經驗——這種勞動對維持美軍存在與當地生計至關重要。《黑市親密》因此提供了一段「親密且全球」的韓戰史，迫使讀者重新思考在戰爭與佔領下，「性親密」與「市場經濟」之間被視為對立的關係。

本書也呼應歐洲相關研究，探討戰爭經濟、性別與軍事資本主義。例如：

• 被佔領的女性：性別、合作與抵抗在納粹佔領區（Claire Eldridge 與 Claire Langhamer 編輯），探討納粹佔領下女性身體與勞動的政治理化。

• 戰爭的代價：性、金錢與美國佔領德國（Maria Höhn），分析二戰後德國美軍基地周邊的性經濟。

• 愛、戰爭與境遇：二戰歐洲女性（Sarah Ansari 與 Elizabeth Buettner），追溯女性工作、親密與生存策略如何塑造戰時與戰後經濟。

• 佔領蘇聯境內的軍妓院（Laura J. Hilton 等），調查東歐二戰期間與戰後的國家管制性經濟。

這些歐洲研究與金貞敏共享對戰爭與佔領重塑性別勞動市場與親密關係的關切，儘管背景不同。它們顯示《黑市親密》是全球軍事主義親密經濟對話的一部分，連結東亞與二十世紀更廣泛的戰爭、性與資本主義模式。

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