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2025年10月21日 星期二

The State's Hidden Tax: Analyzing William Rees-Mogg's Case Against Fiat Currencies in The Crisis of World Inflation

 

The State's Hidden Tax: Analyzing William Rees-Mogg's Case Against Fiat Currencies in The Crisis of World Inflation


Published in 1974, William Rees-Mogg’s The Crisis of World Inflation offers a stark and uncompromising critique of modern monetary systems. The book’s central argument revolves around the historical inevitability of failure for fiat currencies—money declared legal tender by a government but not backed by a physical commodity like gold.

The Inherent Flaw of Fiat Money

Rees-Mogg contends that history offers a clear lesson: all fiat currencies, regardless of the political system that issues them, eventually fail due to inflation. The root cause is the irresistible temptation for governments to print money as a short-term solution to fiscal problems. This process, evident in crises like the post-2008 financial bailout and the mass money creation during the COVID-19 pandemic, inevitably leads to the erosion of currency value.

Inflation as Hidden Taxation

The author defines inflation not merely as rising prices, but fundamentally as a form of hidden taxation—the state taking money from its citizens by stealth. Taxation is politically difficult, but printing money provides governments (whether democratic or autocratic) with an easier, less obvious mechanism to seize purchasing power.

The mechanism is explained using Irving Fisher’s Quantity Theory of Money, summarized by the equation MV = PT:

  • M (Money Supply): The amount of money in the economy.

  • V (Velocity): The rate at which money is spent.

  • P (Prices): The general price level.

  • T (Transactions): The number of transactions.

Rees-Mogg argues that when governments significantly increase the money supply (M), the easiest way for the equation to balance is for prices (P) to rise, absorbing the extra currency in the system. The book serves as a foundational warning against government debasement of the currency and implicitly encourages readers to consider real investments that hold value against monetary instability.

2025年10月1日 星期三

Stop Cutting Costs Everywhere: The Single Systemic Fix for Britain’s Spending Crisis

 

Stop Cutting Costs Everywhere: The Single Systemic Fix for Britain’s Spending Crisis

For busy readers, here is the cure: The chronic financial instability of low income and high expenditure can be resolved immediately by abandoning the policy of forcing all government departments to cut costs equally. Instead, the government must adopt a scientific, single-focus strategy: Identify the one or two critical bottlenecks (constraints) that prevent the state from delivering mandated services (public value), and flood only those bottlenecks with resources.

This may require accepting that non-critical departments operate at "inefficient" local levels, but the overall system output—the public value delivered for every pound spent—will rise dramatically, closing the fiscal gap without punitive tax hikes or abandoning social mandates. This is a breakthrough solution, not a compromise.


The Problem: A Vicious Cycle of Waste

The UK faces a chronic fiscal imbalance where government expenditure currently exceeds 45% of GDP, vastly outpacing the historical taxation ceiling of 37-38% of GDP . Our political discourse is trapped in a constant conflict: parties argue over whether to raise taxes (deemed economically capped) or to slash essential services (Welfare, Health, Education) .

This oscillation between high social demand and the imperative to cut budgets is not a reflection of ineptitude, but of a fundamental flaw in how we think about management—a flaw rooted in the belief that efficiency must be pursued everywhere.

The root cause of the recurring financial crisis and the constant failure to meet public mandates lies in this outdated management thinking—the ingrained habit of maximizing "local efficiency" within departmental silos (the "Cost World" paradigm).

In government, this looks like:

  1. Universal Cost Cutting: Every department, whether it is a bottleneck or not, is told to reduce its Operating Expense (OE). This is done even though such indiscriminate cuts damage the overall ability of the system to deliver services (Throughput).
  2. Focus on Symptoms: When public services fail (e.g., hospital waiting lists balloon, or infrastructure projects stall), the immediate, reactive political response is to treat the symptom by throwing money at the affected area temporarily, but this rarely addresses the underlying cause, leading to the symptom's recurrence.
  3. Conflict in Performance: Departments focus on meeting their own budget goals, inadvertently undermining the performance of other critical services because they fail to support the system’s weakest link.

The Breakthrough: Focusing on the Weakest Link

The solution, derived from applying scientific cause-and-effect analysis (known as the Thinking Process) to complex systems, shifts the goal from minimizing cost to maximizing the rate of public value delivered (Throughput).

This strategy is based on the simple common sense observation that every system is like a chain: its overall strength is determined solely by its weakest link (the constraint).

The Four Steps to Fiscal Stability:

  1. Identify the Constraint: Locate the one policy, procedure, or specific capacity shortage that currently limits the government's ability to maximize Throughput. In a service-oriented democracy, this is often a policy constraint, such as the hospital discharge policy preventing bed availability, or long administrative processing times preventing infrastructure delivery.
  2. Exploit the Constraint: Ensure that this constraint resource operates at maximum efficiency, with no downtime, wasted time, or mistakes.
  3. Subordinate Everything Else: Crucially, align all other departments to support the constraint, even if it means non-constraint resources have to idle or operate below their theoretical efficiency. For example, if bureaucratic planning is the bottleneck, the injection is to subordinate all administrative timelines to support the maximum pace the planning department can sustain. Spending money on non-constrained areas (e.g., doubling the capacity of non-bottleneck doctors or teachers) provides almost zero benefit to the overall system output.
  4. Elevate Strategically: Only after steps 2 and 3 are maximized should the government invest in increasing the capacity of the constraint itself. This means that the billions currently spent broadly (such as the £181bn on General Welfare or £94bn on Education are redirected and prioritized only toward solutions that demonstrably increase the Throughput of the single bottleneck, creating a massive leverage point.

This approach guarantees that every taxpayer's pound provides the greatest increase in public service delivery possible, enabling the government to fulfill its progressive social mandates without accumulating crippling debt. It replaces constant firefighting—treating symptoms—with strategic action focused on the underlying cause.



2025年9月25日 星期四

Smarter, Not Just Smaller: Holistic Solutions to Government Spending Inefficiency

 

Smarter, Not Just Smaller: Holistic Solutions to Government Spending Inefficiency

The debate over government spending often simplifies into a binary choice: more spending or less spending. As our research has shown, the problem isn’t just the amount of money spent, but how it’s spent. The observation that government spending on goods and services is more expensive is well-documented, with studies pointing to a "factor of X" ranging from cost overruns on major projects to millions in wasted software licenses. The root causes, from Milton Friedman’s "spending other people’s money on others" to bureaucratic “red tape,” highlight a fundamental lack of incentive for efficiency. The question then becomes, will simply a "small government" solve the issue? The answer is no, not entirely.


The Incompleteness of the "Small Government" Argument

While reducing the size and scope of government can certainly eliminate some areas of waste, it is an incomplete solution. A small government, by its nature, can also underinvest in essential public goods like infrastructure, education, and national defense, which have a high rate of return for the economy and society. The core issue is systemic, not merely one of scale. Even a small government can suffer from the same bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of competition in bidding, and political interference that plague larger ones.

The real solution lies not in making government smaller, but in making it smarter. This requires a holistic approach that targets the root causes of inefficiency, regardless of a government’s size or political structure.


Universal Solutions for All Governments

These solutions address the fundamental breakdowns in a government's procurement and management processes and can be applied in both democratic and authoritative systems.

  1. Data-Driven Transparency and Accountability: The key to solving the problem of misaligned incentives is shining a light on the process. Implementing open contracting data standards allows for public tracking of every stage of a procurement contract, from bidding to completion.1 This level of transparency makes it easier to spot price gouging and collusion, forcing actors to act more ethically. Chile’s experience with open procurement, which led to a 28% reduction in IT costs, is a testament to this approach.

  2. Modernizing Bureaucracy and Talent: Government inefficiency often stems from outdated, rigid processes and a "brain drain" of skilled talent to the private sector.2

    • Streamline Processes: Reduce the layers of approval and "red tape" that stall projects and inflate costs.3 Adopt agile, modular approaches for technology and infrastructure projects to deliver value in smaller, more efficient increments.4

    • Cultivate Expertise: Invest in training and professional development for public servants, particularly in procurement and project management. Offer competitive compensation and career paths that reward efficiency and innovation, not just seniority.

  3. Performance-Based Contracts: Move away from fixed-price contracts that reward completion regardless of quality. Instead, use contracts that tie payments to measurable performance outcomes and key performance indicators (KPIs), creating a shared incentive for success.5


Tailored Solutions for Different Government Types

While the above solutions apply universally, the path to implementing them differs greatly.

For Democratic Governments

Democratic systems, with their emphasis on checks and balances, should leverage these strengths to combat waste.

  1. Legislative and Regulatory Reform: Pass laws that simplify and modernize the procurement process, making it less vulnerable to lobbying and special interests (addressing the public choice theory).6Establish independent, non-partisan oversight bodies with the authority to audit and investigate spending.

  2. Empowering Citizen Oversight: Foster a culture where government is held accountable by the public. Support investigative journalism, watchdog organizations, and open data initiatives that allow citizens to become part of the oversight process.

  3. Strategic Use of Public-Private Partnerships (P3s): P3s are not a magic bullet, but when used with a rigorous Value for Money (VfM) analysis, they can transfer risk and leverage private sector expertise.7The public sector's role shifts from a direct builder to a smart partner, focused on securing the best overall value, not just the lowest initial cost.

For Authoritarian Governments

In systems where public or legislative oversight is limited, the impetus for change must come from the top down.

  1. Centralized Accountability and Anti-Corruption: Create a powerful, centralized anti-corruption agency with a direct line of authority to the highest levels of government. This body must have the power to investigate and prosecute officials who engage in corrupt or wasteful spending, with the full backing of the state.

  2. Mandated Efficiency Metrics: Implement mandatory performance metrics for all government agencies. Leaders should be held accountable for meeting specific, quantifiable efficiency goals, with rewards and punishments tied directly to outcomes. This creates an internal incentive for efficiency that can work even without external oversight.

  3. Limited Openness as a Control Mechanism: While full democratic transparency may not be an option, a government can implement limited open contracting as an internal control mechanism. By making a portion of procurement data available, the central government can monitor for fraud and waste among lower-level officials without ceding full control.


The problem of government spending inefficiency is not a simple one with a simple solution. It is a complex issue rooted in misaligned incentives and systemic failures. While a small government may be a political ideal for some, the practical solution lies in building a smarter government. By combining universal principles of transparency and modernization with tailored, system-specific solutions, it is possible to transform public spending from a source of waste into a powerful engine for national progress and value.


The 'Taxpayer's Dilemma': A Nuanced Look at Why Government Spending Costs More, and What Milton Friedman's Quadrants Reveal

 

The 'Taxpayer's Dilemma': A Nuanced Look at Why Government Spending Costs More, and What Milton Friedman's Quadrants Reveal

Introduction: The Observation and the Inquiry

The assertion that government spending on goods and services is less efficient and more costly than private sector expenditures is a common one, often rooted in anecdotal evidence and widely shared intuition. The central question posed by this analysis is not merely to confirm this observation, but to quantify the cost differential, to uncover its systemic origins, and to evaluate these findings against the foundational economic principles articulated by figures like Milton Friedman. The objective is to move beyond a simple, static “factor of X” and instead construct a comprehensive framework that explains the complex, multi-faceted nature of public sector inefficiency.

This report will employ a multi-disciplinary approach, synthesizing empirical data from governmental and academic sources with core principles from microeconomics and political economy. By examining specific data on labor costs and procurement, the analysis will establish that a single "factor of X" is a misrepresentation of a far more complex reality. It will then apply three key theoretical models—Milton Friedman's four quadrants of spending, Public Choice Theory, and the Principal-Agent Problem—to reveal the deep-seated incentive structures that perpetuate this inefficiency. Finally, the report will connect these theories to the tangible, day-to-day operational challenges, such as outdated technology and bureaucratic processes, that manifest the systemic problems. This holistic perspective aims to provide a clear, evidence-based understanding of why government spending is so often a subject of public debate and concern.

Part I: Quantifying the Inefficiency—The Elusive "Factor of X"

The notion of a single, universal "factor of X" that quantifies the difference between public and private sector costs is a compelling simplification, but it fails to capture the intricate dynamics at play. A closer examination of available data reveals that this factor is not a constant, but a variable that shifts dramatically depending on the specific area of spending. The inefficiency is not a simple markup; it is a complex outcome of structural distortions and systemic failures.

Government Labor Costs: A Tale of Two Tiers

When analyzing the cost of federal civilian employees, the data presents a nuanced picture that defies a simple one-to-one comparison. A 2022 report from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) indicates that the cost of total compensation—the sum of wages and benefits—for federal workers is not uniformly higher than for their private sector counterparts [1]. The reality is an inverse relationship based on educational attainment. For federal workers with a master's degree or more, the cost of total compensation was, on average, less than the cost for similar private sector employees. Conversely, for workers with a high school education or less, federal compensation was significantly more expensive [1].

The CBO’s findings highlight a profound market distortion. While federal workers with a bachelor's degree earned about 10 percent less in wages, on average, than similar private sector workers, those with no more than a high school education earned about 17 percent more. This suggests that the government's centralized pay scale and benefit structures do not respond to the market's supply and demand for different skill sets in the same way as private firms [1]. Private companies must compete for top-tier talent, driving up wages for highly-educated employees, whereas the government offers greater job security and more generous benefits, which may be more attractive to workers at lower educational levels. This structural rigidity, not a simple "factor of X," is the true inefficiency in government labor costs.

The following table provides a clear breakdown of the CBO's 2022 findings, illustrating this complex relationship.

Table 1: Federal Compensation vs. Private Sector by Educational Attainment (2022)

Educational LevelFederal Worker's Wage vs. Private Sector CounterpartFederal Worker's Total Compensation vs. Private Sector Counterpart
No more than a high school education~17% moreMore
Bachelor's degree~10% lessMore
Master's degree or moreLessLess
Professional degree or doctorate~29% lessLess

Data adapted from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 2022 report [1].

The table reveals that while federal workers with more education may have received less in overall compensation than their private sector equivalents, federal workers with less education received more [1]. This suggests that the "factor of X" is not a static number, but a dynamic, and sometimes inverted, measure depending on the specific labor pool being considered.

The Procurement Premium: Billions in Lost Value

The phenomenon of government spending costing more is particularly evident in the domain of public procurement. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) explicitly defines "waste" as the expenditure of government resources "carelessly, extravagantly, or without adequate purpose" [2]. The cost of this waste is not a simple price markup but an accumulation of unnecessary expenses resulting from inefficient practices, systems, and controls. The GAO's "High-Risk List" highlights 38 areas of the federal government that are "seriously vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement" [3].

Specific examples of this waste are compelling. One agency, for instance, unnecessarily spent over $35 million on software fines and unused licenses over several years [2]. This was not the result of a single inflated price but rather a consequence of poor or nonexistent inventory tracking, which made it impossible for the agency to know what it had already purchased [2]. This single example underscores that the problem extends far beyond a high sticker price; it is a fundamental breakdown in management and oversight.

Broader data points to even more significant issues. Since 2003, federal agencies have reported an estimated $2.8 trillion in improper payments, with over $150 billion annually for the last seven years alone [3]. The government also faces chronic difficulties in controlling cost growth and schedule delays in high-dollar procurements, especially those for critical national defense, space, and healthcare programs [3]. These issues demonstrate that the "factor of X" in procurement is an aggregation of multiple systemic failures—including outright waste, fraud, and a failure to implement modern processes—rather than a simple, universal premium.

Beyond the Numbers: The Value Proposition

A simple cost-to-cost comparison between government and private spending is fundamentally flawed because it fails to account for a range of critical factors that are part of the value proposition. The "Value for Money" (VfM) analysis used in Public-Private Partnerships (P3s) provides a more sophisticated framework for comparison [4, 5]. A VfM analysis compares a P3 project's financial impact against a "Public Sector Comparator" (PSC), which estimates the whole-life cost of a project if it were delivered through a traditional public approach [4, 5].

The VfM framework shows that a P3 project can be considered a better value even if its initial cost is higher than a traditional public-sector project. This is because the P3 model transfers significant risks—such as cost overruns, construction delays, and maintenance costs—to the private entity [5]. The PSC is specifically designed to adjust for these risks and other factors, like competitive neutrality, before a valid comparison can be made [5]. This analytical process reveals that the "factor of X" is not just about price but about the allocation of risk and the valuation of qualitative factors, such as the social and economic benefits of accelerating a project's delivery, which cannot be easily monetized [4].

Part II: The Theoretical Bedrock of Inefficiency

The empirical evidence of waste and cost premiums in government spending is a symptom of deeper, structural problems. To understand the root causes, it is necessary to examine the foundational economic and political theories that explain the behavior of individuals and institutions within the public sector.

Milton Friedman's Quadrant of Least Concern

Milton Friedman's famous framework on the four ways to spend money provides a simple yet powerful explanation for the systemic waste in government spending [6, 7]. The model categorizes spending based on who is doing the spending and whose money is being spent. The four quadrants are:

  1. You spend your own money on yourself: In this quadrant, there is a maximum incentive for both cost-consciousness and a dedication to getting the most value or quality for the expenditure.

  2. You spend your own money on someone else: Here, the incentive to be careful about the cost remains high, but the concern for what is received is not as great. For example, when buying a gift for a friend, a person is careful about the budget but may not be as concerned with whether the recipient will fully appreciate the item [6].

  3. Someone else's money on yourself: In this scenario, the individual is highly motivated to seek the best possible quality or experience, with little concern for the cost. This is the "good lunch" analogy, where the diner is spending someone else's money and is incentivized to maximize their own personal satisfaction [6].

  4. Someone else's money on someone else: This is the quadrant of least concern. The individual doing the spending is not concerned with the cost, as it is not their money, nor are they concerned with the quality or outcome, as the final good or service is for a third party [6].

Government spending, particularly on public goods and services, fits squarely into this fourth quadrant [8, 9]. Bureaucrats, as agents of the government, are spending taxpayer money (someone else's money) on contractors and employees (someone else) to provide services to the public (still someone else). In this system, the fundamental incentive for efficiency is absent [8]. The bureaucrat is not personally concerned with the price, as it is not their money, and they are not concerned with the final outcome for the public, as it is not for their own direct benefit. This theoretical model perfectly explains the GAO's findings of wasteful spending on unused software licenses [2] and the CBO's data showing compensation premiums for certain employee groups [1]. The problem is not malice but a lack of structural incentive for efficiency.

The Public Choice Theory of Government Failure

Public Choice Theory provides a crucial causal link between the macro-level political environment and the micro-level inefficiencies in spending. The theory applies the principles of economics to political decision-making, viewing political actors, bureaucrats, and voters as self-interested individuals who seek to maximize their own utility, not necessarily the public good [10, 11].

According to this theory, government intervention is often a predictable outcome of "rent-seeking" behavior by special interest groups [10]. These groups use their resources to obtain economic benefits through lobbying and political connections, often at the expense of the broader public [10]. For instance, a politician may support a law that benefits a small number of auto workers by raising tariffs, even if the total cost to the millions of affected consumers and exporters far outweighs the benefit to the special interest group [11]. The politician, motivated by the votes and financial incentives promised by the special interest group, will likely support the law, even if it is economically inefficient for the nation [11].

This dynamic directly explains why government purchasing is often used to advance political objectives rather than to simply capture savings [12]. As a McKinsey report notes, government purchasing is a powerful tool for achieving goals like supporting the domestic economy, promoting specific regions or industries, or buying from smaller businesses to promote entrepreneurship [12]. In these cases, the degrees of freedom for the purchasing organization are limited, and savings may even be an "unwelcome" outcome [12]. This is not a failure of the process but a successful implementation of a political mandate, demonstrating that some of the "extra cost" of government spending is a deliberate trade-off to achieve non-economic policy goals.

The Principal-Agent Problem in the Public Sector

The Principal-Agent Problem explains the conflict of interest that arises when an agent (e.g., a bureaucrat or politician) is tasked with acting on behalf of a principal (the public) but has different, often conflicting, interests [13]. This theory provides a framework for understanding why a lack of oversight and a tendency toward budget maximization are inherent risks in government.

The public, as the principal, has limited information and cannot possibly oversee every decision made by its agents [13]. Furthermore, the public is not a monolithic entity; it is composed of many individuals and groups with conflicting interests [13]. It is therefore impossible for an agent to serve all masters simultaneously. This conflict, combined with the theory articulated by economist William Niskanen that the goal of bureaucrats is to "maximize their own budgets rather than general social welfare" [13], provides a theoretical explanation for the GAO's findings on a lack of oversight and the mismanagement of assets [2]. The incentive for a bureaucrat is not to save money but to justify a larger budget for the next fiscal year, as a larger budget can mean more power and a greater potential for career advancement [13].

This conflict of interest is also evident in the interaction with corporate lobbyists. The problem of "regulatory capture," where regulators become controlled by the corporations they are meant to regulate, can arise when individuals with public sector experience move back and forth between government and private industry [13]. This creates a situation where there is little incentive to keep regulations simple, as their best interests may conflict with the interests of the public they are serving [13].

Part III: The Systemic and Operational Root Causes

Beyond the theoretical underpinnings, the inefficiency in government spending is also the product of tangible, day-to-day operational challenges. These are not isolated issues but form a negative feedback loop that perpetuates the theoretical problems and results in tangible waste.

A Crisis of People and Processes

A significant portion of the cost premium is a direct result of a crisis in talent, technology, and process. Government procurement departments are suffering from a "brain drain" as experienced employees retire and are not replaced by a new generation of talent [14]. This widening skills gap severely undercuts procurement capabilities at a time when modernization is desperately needed. Procurement professionals are often "lost in the red tape jungle," bogged down by compliance paperwork that prevents them from engaging in higher-value strategic work [14].

This is compounded by the use of outdated, "Stone Age systems" that are fragmented and painfully inefficient [14]. Vital technological modernization is long overdue, depriving departments of the tools needed to enhance their work. The result is a self-perpetuating cycle: the lack of modern, efficient technology and the overwhelming bureaucratic processes make government jobs less attractive to new, tech-savvy talent. This leads to a talent shortage, which in turn makes it harder to modernize the processes and systems. A McKinsey survey confirmed this, finding that public-sector institutions lag behind private-sector companies in the "efficiency of purchasing tools and processes" and struggle to "attract and retain the best people" [12].

Political Objectives Overriding Efficiency

As discussed in the theoretical section, the "extra cost" of government spending is not always an accident of inefficiency; it is sometimes a deliberate choice to achieve non-economic policy goals. Government purchasing is a powerful tool for advancing various political objectives [12]. This includes using purchasing to support the domestic economy, to promote specific regions, or to purchase from companies owned by minority groups [12]. In these instances, efficiency is traded for a political goal.

For example, a government might choose a more expensive domestic supplier over a cheaper international one to protect jobs or foster a particular industry [12]. This is not a failure of process but a successful implementation of a political mandate. The inefficiency arises when these non-economic goals are pursued without a clear understanding of the full cost or when they are implemented without proper oversight.

The Inherent Monopolies of Government

A central driver of efficiency in the private sector is the profit motive and the constant pressure of market competition [15, 16]. Private businesses must be efficient to be profitable, and if they are not, they face the risk of going bankrupt [16]. This competitive pressure forces innovation and a focus on cost-effectiveness [15]. This same pressure for efficiency does not inherently exist in government [16].

Governments are often monopolies. Citizens cannot go to a different provider for a building permit, fire services, or a national defense system. The lack of competition means there is no external market pressure for innovation or efficiency, as the government will receive tax dollars whether it is efficient or not [16]. While a lack of a profit motive does not preclude efficiency, the absence of this competitive pressure is a key structural flaw that explains the chronic cost differential between the public and private sectors.

Conclusion: Reconciling Theory with Reality

The "factor of X" in government spending is not a simple, static multiplier but a complex phenomenon resulting from a confluence of systemic factors. The empirical data from the CBO and GAO reveals a patchwork of inefficiencies, ranging from inverted compensation premiums for certain employee groups to billions of dollars in procurement waste and improper payments [1, 2, 3].

These tangible, real-world problems are the direct manifestations of deeper theoretical issues. Milton Friedman's model of the four quadrants provides a compelling explanation for the lack of incentive for cost-consciousness and quality control in a system where taxpayer money is spent on behalf of a third party [6]. Public Choice Theory links these micro-level behaviors to the macro-level political environment, where self-interested actors and special interest groups can prioritize non-economic goals, such as political favors or domestic job creation, over fiscal efficiency [10, 12]. Finally, the Principal-Agent Problem explains the inherent divergence of interests between the public and its governmental agents, who may be more concerned with maximizing their budgets and power than with delivering value for the public [13].

The operational failures—including a talent crisis, outdated technology, and a "red tape jungle"—are not isolated issues but are part of a negative feedback loop that perpetuates the systemic problems [14]. The lack of a competitive market and the absence of a profit motive remove the key drivers of efficiency and innovation that are foundational to the private sector [16].

Ultimately, the excess cost of government spending is not an accident. It is a predictable outcome of a system whose fundamental incentive structures are not aligned with a commitment to efficiency and fiscal responsibility. Acknowledging these root causes, from the theoretical to the operational, is the first and most critical step toward building a more efficient and accountable government that truly serves the public interest.

2025年7月17日 星期四

Oh, Good Grief. Another Fine Mess.

Oh, Good Grief. Another Fine Mess.


You know, I’ve been around a while, and I’ve seen my share of ridiculousness. But this story coming out of the UK, it just… it takes the biscuit. Or the whole tin of biscuits, more like. It's got everything: a monumental screw-up, a desperate cover-up, and a price tag that would make a sane person faint. And lives, too. Don't forget the lives.

Apparently, back in February 2022, some bright spark in the British military was trying to help Afghans who'd worked with them. Good intentions, I suppose. But then, this genius, this digital maestro, decides to send an email. Not just any email, mind you. An email from his personal account. Now, who uses a personal email for official government business? I mean, really. My grandmother knew better than that, and she thought the internet was a fancy telephone.

Anyway, this fellow, he thinks he's sending a tiny little list of 150 names to a buddy. But instead, he manages to attach a whole database. Thirty-three thousand names! Addresses, phone numbers, the works. And then, just to sprinkle a little extra absurdity on top, he sends it to… well, to some people who probably shouldn'thave it. People who, let's just say, weren't exactly rooting for the Afghans trying to get out. It's like handing the fox the keys to the hen house, along with a detailed list of all the chickens. You’d think a professional soldier would know how to attach a file. Or maybe just… not send top-secret information via Gmail. Common sense, folks. It’s not so common anymore.

So, word gets out that this list is floating around. Not immediately, of course. Government wheels turn slowly, even when lives are at stake. It takes until August 2023 for someone to finally notice. And then, when some villain threatens to post the whole thing on Facebook, suddenly everyone wakes up.

What do they do? They launch "Operation Rubific." Sounds very official, doesn't it? Very dramatic. It involved secretly evacuating some of the Afghans, telling them to basically run for their lives to a neighboring country, then the Brits would swoop in. Like a B-movie, only with real people. And most of the 33,000? Well, they were just left to, as the report says, "fend for themselves." Because, you know, you can't save everyone. Especially not when the initial problem was caused by someone who apparently can't tell the difference between "send to one" and "send to all, including the bad guys."

But Operation Rubific wasn't just about secret flights. Oh no. This is the government, after all. They had to involve the lawyers. They went to court and got themselves a "super-injunction." Now, I’ve heard of injunctions. You can't talk about something. But a super-injunction? You can't even say the injunction exists! It's like trying to hide an elephant in a phone booth by putting a tiny sticker on the door that says "No Elephants Here," and then telling everyone they can't mention the sticker. And these things usually last a few months. This one? Two years. Two years of silence. All on our dime, of course. Because secrets aren't cheap.

Finally, a persistent journalist from The Times says, "Enough is enough!" and the judge agrees. Poof! The secret's out. And what happens? The Defence Secretary apologizes. Says the soldier in question has been "redeployed." Not fired. Not disciplined. Just… moved. And the general in charge? Still has the Prime Minister's full confidence. No one gets blamed. No one takes the fall. Typical. It’s like when the toaster catches fire, and instead of getting a new toaster, you just move it to a different counter and pretend nothing happened.

Turns out, this whole thing caused quite a kerfuffle inside the Conservative government. They were arguing over how much it would cost to fix this colossal mess – eventually settling on a cool £6 billion. Six billionpounds! To clean up one idiot's email. And they bickered over who should pay, and whether these Afghans were even really at risk. Some minister, a veteran, apparently used "emotional blackmail" to convince the Prime Minister to go ahead with the rescue. "Emotional blackmail." In government. I'm shocked. Truly.

So, they sent out invitations to about 5,400 people, which swelled to almost 24,000 with families. All now in the UK. And costing billions. Meanwhile, back in Afghanistan, the Taliban supposedly got their hands on the list too, and have been "hunting" these people down. Reports say over 200 on that leaked list have already been killed. Two hundred. Because someone hit the wrong button.

You know, it makes you think. About all the little mistakes people make at work. Spilling coffee. Forgetting to send an email. But then you hear about this, and it really puts things in perspective. One little click. Two hundred lives. Tens of thousands uprooted. Six billion quid. All to clean up a mistake that could have been avoided with a little common sense, and maybe, just maybe, an IT department that teaches people how to send an email without accidentally triggering an international incident. It’s just… well, it’s just so very, very British, isn’t it? Mess it up, pay to cover it up, and hope no one notices. And we, the public, pay for the lesson. Again.

2025年6月19日 星期四

From Imperial Charity to Modern Mismanagement: A Stark Contrast in Refugee Aid

 

From Imperial Charity to Modern Mismanagement: A Stark Contrast in Refugee Aid

The historical wisdom of the Qing dynasty in managing large-scale famine relief, particularly through its humble porridge charities, stands in stark contrast to the modern-day British approach to accommodating asylum seekers. While separated by centuries and vastly different contexts, the principles of pragmatic resource allocation and the challenges of genuine need versus perceived entitlement reveal a surprising wisdom in the "backward" Qing methods compared to the apparent inefficiencies and disarray in contemporary Britain.

In times of devastating famine, the Qing dynasty's "porridge factories" were strategically located outside city walls. The gruel provided was intentionally of low quality – thin, watery, and sometimes even containing sand or impurities. This seemingly harsh approach wasn't born of cruelty, but a calculated necessity. As we discussed, this "poor quality" served as a crucial self-selection mechanism. Only those truly on the brink of starvation, for whom the meagre sustenance was a matter of life or death, would come and endure such conditions. This prevented the squandering of precious, limited resources on those who might have other means of support, ensuring that the most vulnerable – the old, the weak, and children – were prioritized. It was a brutal but effective way to ensure aid reached its intended recipients and to maintain social order amidst chaos.

Fast forward 200 years, and the British approach to accommodating asylum seekers paints a very different picture. Recent revelations from the UK highlight a system plagued by what appears to be monumental inefficiency, questionable expenditure, and a disconnect from the realities of public resources.

The example of the Huddersfield student accommodation is particularly illustrative. A purpose-built, "high-end" facility, leased by the government for £7 million with the capacity for over 700 asylum seekers, has reportedly remained empty for over a year. This procurement failure mirrors the frustrations seen with other large-scale infrastructure projects, demonstrating a profound lack of foresight and coordination. In a time of desperate need for accommodation, the inability to utilize such a significant investment is astonishing, especially when the government simultaneously resorts to opening hotels to house a surging number of arrivals. This directly contradicts the principle of optimal resource utilization that was implicitly, if brutally, embedded in the Qing's porridge strategy.

Furthermore, the very nature of the "care" provided, and the expectations of some recipients, raise serious questions about the current system's efficacy and fairness. Surveys conducted by health partnerships, asking asylum seekers about their satisfaction with their accommodation and food, have revealed complaints ranging from a lack of cigarettes in rooms to a desire for specific types of food (like rice instead of English beans) and requests to be moved closer to relatives. While acknowledging the importance of basic human dignity, these concerns, when juxtaposed with the plight of homeless British citizens, including ex-servicemen, who are unlikely to receive similar surveys or provisions, underscore a perceived disparity in care.

The Qing dynasty's approach, while undeniably primitive by modern standards, was rooted in a pragmatic understanding of scarcity and human nature. The "bad quality" porridge 粥 was a stark reminder of the dire circumstances, encouraging self-reliance where possible and ensuring that only the truly desperate would partake. It was a system designed to stretch minimal resources to save maximal lives, prioritizing basic survival over comfort or personal preference.

In contrast, the British situation, as described, appears to be a case of overspending on underutilized facilities, coupled with a level of provision that, while perhaps well-intentioned, seems to lack the stringent prioritization and realistic assessment of need that characterized the Qing's crisis management. The "wisdom" of the Qing, born from centuries of battling famine, lay in its brutal efficiency and its unflinching focus on the core objective: keeping the most vulnerable alive with the bare minimum. The modern British system, despite its vastly superior resources, seems to be grappling with a different set of challenges – perhaps a lack of clear strategy, an over-reliance on external providers, and a public debate that often struggles to reconcile humanitarian imperatives with the practicalities of finite resources and the perceived fairness of distribution.

Ultimately, while the contexts are incomparable, the core principles of effective crisis management remain timeless. The Qing's humble porridge, with its sand and its scarcity, perhaps offers a surprising, if uncomfortable, lesson in the stark realities of resource allocation when true desperation calls. The modern British state, despite its technological prowess and wealth, might do well to reflect on the ancient wisdom of making every grain count, and ensuring that aid, however generous, is delivered with both compassion and pragmatic efficacy.