2026年1月6日星期二

The Tragedy of the Commons Is Not About Greed — It Is About Bad System Design

Why People Are Good, and Only Bad Measurements Make Them Do Bad Things

When people hear The Tragedy of the Commons, the dominant conclusion is almost automatic:

“People are greedy. If left alone, they will destroy shared resources.”

Dr. Yung-mei Tsai’s classroom simulation is often cited as proof of this belief. Students, acting rationally, over-harvest a shared resource until it collapses. The commons dies. Everyone loses.

But this conclusion is wrong — or at least dangerously incomplete.

The tragedy does not arise from greed.
It arises from how the system is designed, what is measured, and what is rewarded.

When viewed through the lens of the Theory of Constraints (TOC), Tsai’s simulation becomes powerful evidence of a very different truth:

People are fundamentally good. Systems that reward local optimization create destructive behavior.

What Actually Happens in the Simulation

In the simulation, each participant is allowed to take up to two items from a shared resource pool per round. The pool regenerates based on what remains. Early rounds forbid communication.

Most groups rapidly destroy the resource.

The usual interpretation:

Students are selfish
Individuals prioritize themselves
Cooperation is fragile

But observe more carefully what participants are actually doing.

Each player is:

Acting rationally
Responding to uncertainty
Protecting themselves from loss
Optimizing according to the rules and incentives provided

This is not moral failure.
This is logical behavior in a poorly designed system.

The Core Mistake: Confusing Local Success with Global Success

The real problem in the simulation is not human nature — it is local optimization.

Each participant is implicitly measured on:

“How many items did I collect this round?”

No one is measured on:

Total system output over time
Sustainability of the resource
Collective success

In TOC terms:

The system has a constraint (the regeneration capacity of the commons)
The players are not measured on protecting it
Therefore, they unknowingly destroy it

This is exactly what happens in organizations every day.

Why This Is Not Greed

Greed implies excess beyond rational need.

But in the simulation:

Players take more because not taking feels risky
Players fear others will take instead
Players respond to a measurement system that rewards immediate extraction

If greed were the cause, communication would not fix the problem.

Yet when communication is allowed:

Groups quickly self-organize
Fair rules emerge
The resource stabilizes
Everyone earns more over time

Greedy people do not suddenly stop being greedy.

Bad systems do stop producing bad outcomes when redesigned.

The Role of Measurement: The Real Villain

TOC teaches a simple but uncomfortable truth:

Tell me how you measure me, and I will tell you how I behave.

In the simulation:

Individuals are rewarded implicitly for short-term extraction
There is no penalty for system collapse
There is no metric for long-term throughput

This mirrors real-world KPIs:

Departmental efficiency
Individual bonuses
Utilization rates
Quarterly targets

Each looks reasonable in isolation.

Together, they destroy the system.

Global Goal vs. Local KPIs

The tragedy disappears the moment the system is redesigned so that:

The global goal is explicit
Individual actions are subordinated to that goal
The constraint is protected
Success is measured at the system level

When participants align around:

“Maximize total benefit over time for everyone”

Their behavior changes — without changing who they are.

This is the most important lesson of the simulation.

People Are Not the Problem

TOC insists on this principle:

Blaming people is lazy thinking. Improve the system.

The tragedy of the commons is not evidence that:

People are selfish
Cooperation is unnatural
Control is required

It is evidence that:

Poor measurements create destructive incentives
Local KPIs generate global failure
Systems shape behavior more powerfully than values

Why This Matters Beyond the Classroom

Organizations collapse commons every day:

Sales destroys operations
Cost cutting destroys throughput
Efficiency destroys flow
Bonuses destroy collaboration

Leaders then blame:

Culture
Attitude
Motivation

But the real cause is almost always the same:

We reward local optima and hope for global success.

Hope is not a strategy.

The Real Lesson of the Tragedy of the Commons

The tragedy is not inevitable.

It is designed.

And anything designed can be redesigned.

When systems:

Align measurements with the global goal
Protect the constraint
Reward collective success

People naturally behave in ways that look cooperative, ethical, and even generous.

Not because they changed —
but because the system finally allowed them to succeed together.

共享資源與個人私慾：蔡勇美博士與「公地悲劇」

想像一個美麗的社區花園。如果每個人都只摘取自己需要的量，花園就會生意盎然。但如果有人決定多摘一些去賣，其他人為了不「吃虧」也紛紛效仿，幾天之內花園就會被洗劫一空。這就是**「公地悲劇」（Tragedy of the Commons）**——一個定義了許多現代危機的社會與經濟陷阱。

認識蔡勇美博士 (Dr. Yung-mei Tsai)

為了讓學生和公眾理解這種複雜的人類行為，任教於德州理工大學（Texas Tech University）的著名社會學教授蔡勇美博士在1993年發表了一篇具里程碑意義的論文。蔡博士是都市社會學和社會心理學的專家，致力於揭示社會結構如何影響個人選擇。他的研究將抽象理論轉化為切身經驗，其中最著名的便是他的課堂模擬遊戲。

什麼是「公地悲劇」？

這一理論最早由加勒特·哈丁（Garrett Hardin）提出，意指在一個共享資源系統中，每個個體都基於自身的利益獨立行事，最終會耗盡該資源。儘管大家都知道資源耗盡對任何人長期都沒有好處，但短期私慾往往戰勝了集體理性。

日常生活中的例子：

辦公室公共冰箱： 每個人都使用，但沒人清理。最終冰箱變得骯髒不堪，因為每個人都假設「別人」會清理，自己只需繼續存放食物。
公共 Wi-Fi： 當咖啡館裡的每個人都同時串流 4K 影片時，「共享」的頻寬就會崩潰，結果誰也發不出郵件。
交通擁堵： 每個司機都選擇 GPS 顯示「最快」的路線。當每個人都做出同樣的自私選擇時，那條路就變成了停車場。
過度捕撈： 如果一艘漁船為了增加利潤捕撈更多的魚，其他船隻也會跟進以求競爭。很快，魚群數量崩潰，所有漁民都失去生計。

遊戲規則：蔡博士的課堂模擬

蔡博士在1993年設計的模擬實驗為參與者提供了強大的啟發。玩法如下：

準備工作：

資源池： 小組（4-5人）中間放一個碗，裝有16個「資源」（如糖果、餅乾或代幣）。
目標： 收集盡可能多的代幣。
回合： 每一輪，玩家可以從碗中拿取 0、1、2 或 3 個代幣。
再生規則（關鍵）： 每一輪結束時，指導員會將碗中剩餘的代幣數量翻倍（最高不超過初始的16個）。

典型的結果：

第一階段（禁止交流）： 玩家通常會因為擔心被別人拿光而立刻抓取 3 個代幣。碗在第一輪結束前就空了，資源「枯竭」，無法再生。所有人最終都失去了長期的供應。
第二階段（允許交流）： 玩家開始溝通，發現如果每個人每輪只拿 1 個代幣，碗裡的數量就能維持健康並每輪翻倍，大家永遠都有得吃。

核心教訓： 蔡勇美博士透過實驗證明，如果沒有溝通或共同規則，個人的理性選擇將導致集體的毀滅。合作不僅僅是「美德」，更是一種生存策略。

Shared Resources, Individual Greed: Dr. Yung-mei Tsai and the Tragedy of the Commons

Imagine a beautiful community garden. If everyone picks only what they need, the garden flourishes. But if one person decides to take extra to sell, and then others follow suit to avoid "missing out," the garden is picked bare in days. This is the Tragedy of the Commons, a social and economic trap that defines many of our modern crises.

Meet Dr. Yung-mei Tsai

To help students and the public understand this complex human behavior, Dr. Yung-mei Tsai, a distinguished Professor of Sociology at Texas Tech University, published a landmark paper in 1993. Dr. Tsai was an expert in urban sociology and social psychology, dedicated to revealing how social structures influence individual choices. His work turned abstract theories into lived experiences, most notably through his classroom simulation models.

What is the "Tragedy of the Commons"?

First coined by Garrett Hardin, the theory suggests that individuals acting independently and rationally according to their own self-interest will eventually deplete a shared resource, even when it is clear that it is not in anyone's long-term interest for this to happen.

Daily Examples of the Tragedy:

The Office Fridge: Everyone uses it, but no one cleans it. Eventually, it becomes a biohazard because everyone assumes "someone else" will take care of it while they continue to store their own food.
Public Wi-Fi: When everyone at a cafe starts streaming 4K video simultaneously, the "common" bandwidth crashes, and no one can even send a simple email.
Traffic Congestion: Every driver chooses the "fastest" route on GPS. When everyone makes the same selfish choice, that road becomes a parking lot.
Overfishing: If one boat catches more fish to increase profit, others do the same to compete. Soon, the fish population collapses, and all fishermen lose their livelihoods.

The Game: Dr. Tsai’s Classroom Simulation

Dr. Tsai’s 1993 simulation provides a powerful "aha!" moment for participants. Here is how it is played:

The Setup:

The Pool: A bowl in the center of a group (4-5 people) filled with 16 "resources" (candies, crackers, or tokens).
The Goal: Collect as many tokens as possible.
The Rounds: Each round, players can take 0, 1, 2, or 3 tokens.
The Regeneration: This is the key. At the end of each round, the instructor doubles whatever is left in the bowl (up to the original capacity of 16).

The Typical Outcome:

Phase 1 (No Communication): Players usually grab 3 tokens immediately, fearing others will take them all. The bowl is empty by the end of round one. The resource is dead. No regeneration occurs. Everyone "loses" the potential for a long-term supply.
Phase 2 (Communication Allowed): Players talk and realize that if everyone only takes 1 token, the bowl stays healthy, doubles every round, and everyone can eat forever.

The Lesson: Dr. Tsai showed that without communication or shared rules, individual rationality leads to collective ruin.Cooperation isn't just "nice"—it's a survival strategy.

南方的搖籃：為何淮河以南誕生了中國偉大的革命

在過去的五個世紀中，中國革命的政治地理呈現出明顯的南傾現象。從明朝的建立到清朝的覆滅，再到共產黨的興起，制度變革的主要催化劑大多源於淮河以南。這一地區——包括長江流域、珠江三角洲以及湖南、福建的丘陵地帶——一直是拆解舊秩序人物的孵化器：如朱元璋（安徽）、太平天國領袖（廣西/廣東）、孫中山（廣東）和毛澤東（湖南）。

南方反抗的歷史模式

北方通常是皇權合法性的所在地和抵禦游牧民族入侵的前線，而南方則成為了替代意識形態的實驗室。

朱元璋（明朝）： 出身於貧困的淮河流域，他領導紅巾軍起義驅逐元朝，這是在歷史上罕見的由南向北統一全國的案例。
太平天國： 洪秀全在廣西發起「拜上帝會」，通過佔領南京和動員數百萬南方農民，差點推翻了清朝。
孫中山與辛亥革命： 孫中山出生於廣東，利用海外網絡和南方秘密會黨，結束了兩千年的帝制。
毛澤東與中共： 儘管黨組織始於上海等城市，但其軍事核心是在湖南和江西的深山（如井岡山）中鍛造出來的。

專家分析南方激進主義的原因

1. 經濟獨立與「糧權」 專家指出，宋代以後，中國的經濟中心南移。南方控制著「魚米之鄉」以及茶葉和絲綢貿易。這種經濟盈餘使南方精英和秘密會黨能夠在不依賴北京中央財政的情況下資助起義。

2. 地理破碎與「山地治理」 與平坦、易於監控的華北平原不同，南方以複雜的地形——群山、水系和茂密的森林——為特徵。這種地理環境提供了天然的「游擊區」。像詹姆斯·斯科特（James C. Scott，《逃避統治的藝術》作者）這樣的專家認為，這種地形允許非正統團體在國家直接管轄範圍之外進行組織。

3. 海洋接觸與外來思想 廣東和福建等沿海省份最早接觸到西方和日本的思想。孫中山的共和思想和太平天國的教義都是南方海洋接觸的產物。南方是一扇「窗口」，讓北方的體制顯得過時。

4. 文化抵抗與「雙重身份」 歷史學家經常提到「南宋」遺產和滿清入關後的明朝遺民情結。南方保留了強烈的「漢」身份認同，將定都北方的清朝視為「異族」統治。這種文化摩擦使南方成為「反清復明」秘密會黨的沃土。

5. 「緩衝」悖論 淮河是氣候和農業的分界線。歷史上，當北方政府變得腐敗或專注於北方邊防時，對遠南地區的行政管理就會變得「鬆散」。這種鬆散給了地方民兵和激進知識分子成長的空間，直到他們強大到足以挑戰中央。

The Southern Cradle: Why the South of the Huai River Birthed China’s Great Rebellions

For the past five centuries, the political geography of Chinese revolution has displayed a consistent tilt. From the founding of the Ming Dynasty to the overthrow of the Qing and the rise of the Communist Party, the primary catalysts for systemic change have emerged from the south of the Huai River. This region—comprising the Yangtze Valley, the Pearl River Delta, and the rugged hills of Hunan and Fujian—has acted as an incubator for the figures who dismantled old orders: Zhu Yuanzhang (Anhui), the Taiping leaders (Guangxi/Guangdong), Sun Yat-sen (Guangdong), and Mao Zedong(Hunan).

The Historical Pattern of Southern Dissent

While the North was often the seat of imperial legitimacy and defense against nomadic incursions, the South became the laboratory for alternative ideologies.

Zhu Yuanzhang (Ming Dynasty): Emerging from the poverty-stricken Huai River basin, he led the Red Turban Rebellion to expel the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, marking a rare instance of a southern-based movement conquering the North.
The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Hong Xiuquan launched his "God Worshipping Society" from Guangxi, nearly toppling the Qing Dynasty by capturing Nanjing and mobilizing millions of southern peasants.
Sun Yat-sen & the Xinhai Revolution: Born in Guangdong, Sun leveraged overseas networks and southern secret societies to end 2,000 years of imperial rule.
Mao Zedong & the CCP: Though the party started in cities like Shanghai, its martial heart was forged in the mountains of Hunan and Jiangxi (the Jinggang Mountains).

Expert Reasons for Southern Radicalism

1. Economic Independence and "Grain Power" Experts note that after the Song Dynasty, the economic center of China shifted south. The South controlled the "rice bowl" and the tea and silk trade. This economic surplus allowed southern elites and secret societies to fund insurgencies without relying on the central imperial coffers in Beijing.

2. Geographical Fragmentation and "Mountain Governance" The South is characterized by complex topography—mountains, river networks, and dense forests—unlike the flat, easily policed North China Plain. This geography provided natural "guerrilla zones." Experts like James C. Scott (author of The Art of Not Being Governed) suggest that such terrain allows heterodox groups to organize out of the immediate reach of the state.

3. Maritime Exposure and Foreign Ideas Coastal provinces like Guangdong and Fujian were the first to encounter Western and Japanese ideas. Sun Yat-sen’s republicanism and the Taiping’s distorted Christianity were products of southern maritime contact. The South was a "window" that made the existing Northern-centric system look archaic.

4. Cultural Resistance and the "Dual Identity" Historians often point to the "Southern Song" legacy and the Ming-loyalist sentiment after the Manchu conquest. The South retained a strong "Han" identity that viewed the Northern-based Qing as "alien" rulers. This cultural friction made the South a fertile ground for "anti-Qing, restore Ming" (fanqing fuming) secret societies.

5. The "Buffer" Paradox The Huai River serves as a climatic and agricultural boundary. Historically, when Northern administrations became corrupt or focused on northern border defense, the administration of the far South became "loose." This laxity allowed local militias and radical intellectuals to grow in strength until they were powerful enough to challenge the center.

2026年1月2日星期五