The Unseen Wake: Last Departures from Fragrant Harbour

 

The Unseen Wake: Last Departures from Fragrant Harbour

Hong Kong, 1996 – The humid air of Hong Kong, thick with the scent of jasmine and the distant hum of development, also carried a more subtle, yet pervasive, undertone: the quiet thrum of a clock counting down to July 1997. Whispers of "Armageddon" were never far from the lips of those in power, a chilling internal shorthand for the unthinkable mass exodus that haunted Whitehall's most secret chambers. For families like the Lams and the Chans, this was no abstract "scenario" but a looming, visceral reality, a phantom limb ache from a history they never thought would repeat itself, yet echoed the desperate flights from Shanghai decades prior.

The Green Phase: Lingering Hope, Preparing for the Storm

Li Mei Lam, a meticulous civil servant, clung to the "Green" phase directives, monitoring the delicate balance of confidence in the territory. Her husband, David, a mid-level manager at a British trading house, often dismissed her anxieties, repeating the government's public assurances that "British policy is to maintain and strengthen confidence in Hong Kong". Yet, privately, they watched the emigration statistics, a barometer for the city's unspoken fears, which the Home Office was meticulously tracking, shifting from monthly to weekly figures for "early warning indicators". The cost calculations alone – billions for moving millions – were enough to make any sane person flinch. They knew, intuitively, that the United Kingdom could not handle a mass evacuation alone. This meant that securing international support and firm pledges from other countries was not merely desirable, but "essential".

David recalled tales from his grandparents, refugees from Shanghai in 1949, who recounted the "panic to flee" that engulfed their city as the Communist forces closed in. They spoke of overloaded trains and ships, desperate people fighting for tickets, and the sheer impossibility of moving millions without widespread chaos. This "Last Boat Out of Shanghai" saga, once a distant family history, now felt unnervingly close to their present reality.

The Amber Phase: The Unspoken Imminence

For the Chan family, the "Amber" phase felt like an eternal state of being. Mr. Chan, a construction worker, and his wife, a domestic helper, lacked the BDTC status that offered a sliver of hope to others. Their applications for asylum after July 1997 would be "more likely" but also "more difficult to refuse" in practice, creating a legal minefield for the British government. Their attempts to get visas to Canada or Australia were met with "whites-only" policies that still subtly (or overtly, in Australia's case) dictated who was welcomed. They envisioned themselves on an "improvised means" of escape, perhaps a fishing junk, much like the Vietnamese boat people whose plight had filled Hong Kong with regional clearing centres, often unpopular with locals.

The official documents grimly predicted "serious constraints" on available aircraft and ships, requiring long lead times for chartering, if even possible. The "Amber" phase, when a crisis appeared "imminent," could be "very short". It was a period of frantic preparation, decisions on immigration control relaxation, and the outline of plans for chartering aircraft and ships. The government sought to identify nearby staging posts for temporary accommodation, a desperate measure to keep Hong Kong from becoming a "glorified soup kitchen for refugees".

The Red Phase: The Inevitable Departure

When the "Red" phase arrived, it would mean the mass exodus had begun, triggering full-scale evacuation, reception, and resettlement operations. For the Lams, this translated to a frantic dash to secure berths on one of the increasingly rare commercial vessels or, God forbid, a chartered military transport. The costs were staggering; moving one million people by sea to Taiwan was estimated at £165 million, flying them to Manila at £40 million, with total costs for reception and resettlement in the UK soaring to £5.4 billion for one million people over six months.

The narrative from Shanghai provided a chilling precedent: families separated, property confiscated, and lives irrevocably altered. The British government's attempts to keep the contingency planning secret were aimed at preventing the very panic that had seized Shanghai in 1949, where rumors and Nationalist propaganda had inflamed the public's fear. The "Armageddon scenario" was not just about logistics; it was about managing public confidence, a brittle thing that could shatter at the slightest hint of trouble.

Ultimately, for many Hong Kong families, the choice wasn't about staying or leaving, but about managing the mannerof their departure. Like a ship sailing into a known, but unpredictable, storm, they were all too aware of the potential for the "last boat" to be less a triumphant escape and more a desperate scramble for survival.

Echoes of Wisdom: Kissinger and Brzezinski on the Harvard Foreign Student Issue

 In the corridors of history, two titans of American foreign policy—Dr. Henry Kissinger and Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski—"reunite" in a hypothetical conversation, as they contemplate the complex situation facing foreign students in American higher education, particularly at Harvard University.

Kissinger: (Clears throat, voice calm) Zbig, you see, this controversy at Harvard regarding foreign students, especially those young people from the great Eastern power, seems to have become a new front in the strategic competition between Washington and Beijing. The balance between academic freedom and national security has always been a subtle art, not a science.

Brzezinski: (Voice slightly hoarse, tone sharper) Henry, you and I know well that no geopolitical chessboard is confined to borders and military might. The exchange of ideas, the dissemination of technology, and even potential influence penetration have always been part of great power rivalry. America's spirit of openness is certainly commendable, but if it leads to a loss of vigilance, it places itself in danger. I have warned many times that if we fail to understand the nature of the challenge, arrogance and carelessness will be our greatest enemies.

Kissinger: Indeed, national interest is the highest principle. We cannot ignore the possibility of certain countries exploiting academic channels to acquire sensitive technologies or conduct intelligence activities. However, America's strength lies not only in its military power but also in its ability to attract top talent globally. If we tighten too much and push these potential allies and thinkers elsewhere, it will, in the long run, damage our soft power. Diplomacy is always about seeking the best balance among contradictory options.

Brzezinski: Balance is important, but the bottom line must be clear. We cannot allow so-called "academic freedom" to become a cover for certain regimes to engage in intellectual property theft or influence operations. During the Cold War, we had specific regulations for Soviet students. Today's China, in some respects, with its geopolitical ambitions and ideological control, surpasses the Soviet Union of yesteryear. We should attract students who genuinely embrace the values of freedom and democracy, rather than providing convenience for potential adversaries.

Kissinger: But that also raises another question: how do we define "potential adversary"? Too broad a definition could lead us to create enemies among potential collaborators. Globalization has tightly connected the world, and even if we close our doors, the flow of knowledge will not stop. More importantly, allowing these young people to experience American society and values firsthand is itself a long-term strategic investment. Who can say that, years from now, these elites who have personally experienced America's openness and vitality will not become forces of understanding, or even affinity, towards us in their own countries?

Brzezinski: Of course, the long-term impact of education cannot be underestimated. But at the same time, we must soberly recognize that these elites from specific backgrounds, their upbringing and thinking patterns, may differ from our expectations. We cannot rely solely on wishful "soft power persuasion" to build national security. What is important is that we must possess the ability to identify potential risks and take decisive action when necessary. The formulation of rules should be precise and specific, avoiding generalized strikes, and absolutely not allowing for vague gray areas.

Kissinger: Ultimately, it boils down to whether we have a clear national strategy. If we know where we are going and how to deal with different powers, then the policy towards foreign students is just one piece on this grand chessboard. Without an overarching plan, any isolated adjustment might gain one thing only to lose another, or even backfire. History never stops; complexity is its norm, and a clear strategy is the only way to navigate chaos.

Brzezinski: (Sighs softly) Yes, a clear strategy. That seems to be the rarest commodity in our era. In a world consumed by short-termism and domestic political considerations, contemplating a truly grand strategy and consistently executing it is far more difficult than it was in our time. The issue of foreign students at Harvard is but the tip of the iceberg, reflecting deeper strategic dilemmas.

Brief Biographies and Harvard Connections:

• Henry Kissinger (1923-2023): A German-born American diplomat, political scientist, and geopolitical consultant who served as United States Secretary of State and National Security Advisor under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. He was a central figure in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, pioneering the policy of détente with the Soviet Union and opening relations with China.

  • Harvard Connection: Kissinger earned his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University. He then joined the Harvard faculty, where he taught in the Department of Government and at the Center for International Affairs for many years before entering government service.

• Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017): A Polish-American diplomat and political scientist who served as a counselor to President Lyndon B. Johnson and as the National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter. He was a prominent strategist who emphasized the importance of geopolitical advantage and was known for his hawkish stance on the Soviet Union.

  • Harvard Connection: Brzezinski received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1953 and was a member of the faculty there from 1953 to 1960. He taught Soviet and international politics, establishing himself as a significant figure in Cold War studies.