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2026年1月31日 星期六

Davos, Demand, and Desire – Prostitution and the World Economic Forum

 Davos, Demand, and Desire – Prostitution and the World Economic Forum

Every January, the Swiss Alpine town of Davos hosts the World Economic Forum (WEF), a gathering of political leaders, corporate chiefs, and global elites who come to discuss climate change, inequality, and the “future of capitalism.” Yet alongside the official agenda, another economy blooms: the sex‑work market, whose demand surges dramatically whenever the Davos summit opens. From an economic‑history perspective, this pattern is not a scandalous anomaly but a recurring feature of how concentrated wealth, power, and temporary privilege generate short‑run spikes in demand for personal services—including prostitution.

The Davos demand spike

Reports from Swiss and international media show that, during the WEF week, requests for erotic services in Davos can rise by up to 40 times the usual level. One adult‑service platform recorded 79 bookings on the first day of the 2026 forum, compared with an average of about two per day outside the conference. Much of this demand comes from high‑net‑worth attendees—CEOs, politicians, and wealthy individuals—many of whom are willing to spend tens of thousands of dollars over a few days on escorts and parties.

Economically, this looks like a classic temporary demand shock: a fixed, small town suddenly flooded with extremely wealthy visitors, each with high disposable income and limited time. In a country where prostitution is legal and regulated, sex workers—professional escorts, students, teachers, and travellers—move into Davos to capture this short‑term rent.

Supply response and labour mobility

The supply side of this market is highly mobile. Sex‑work agencies report a sharp influx of women from across Europe and beyond, including students and professionals who treat the WEF week as a high‑income seasonal job. Some workers wear business attire to blend in with delegates, while others are hired not only for sex but also for companionship, speech‑rehearsal “audiences,” or role‑play scenarios.

From an economic‑history standpoint, this mirrors older patterns of seasonal or event‑driven sex‑work markets around fairs, military camps, and imperial capitals: when elites concentrate in one place, a parallel service economy follows. The difference today is that Davos is explicitly framed as a summit of global responsibility, even as it generates a shadow economy of desire and discretion.

Power, inequality, and the “dirty secrets” of Davos

Commentators have long noted that the same leaders who speak about gender equality and social inclusion at the WEF often patronise sex workers in the hotels and bars of Davos. Critics argue that this exposes a deep hypocrisy: the forum’s official agenda focuses on cooperation and sustainability, while its informal social circuit reinforces hierarchies of money, status, and bodily access.

For an economic‑history reading, Davos prostitution is a visible symptom of inequality and privilege. The demand spike is not random; it reflects the concentration of global decision‑making power in a handful of individuals who can afford to treat sex work as a luxury good. At the same time, the supply side reveals how economic precarity—student debt, low wages, and insecure jobs—pushes some women into high‑risk, high‑reward labour during the WEF week.

What this tells us about global capitalism

In broader economic‑history terms, the Davos‑prostitution nexus illustrates how global summits and financial centres generate shadow markets around them. Just as ports, stock exchanges, and imperial capitals once attracted brothels and gambling dens, today’s hubs of policy and finance attract short‑term, high‑margin services that are rarely mentioned in official communiqués.

The Davos case also highlights the limits of a purely moralistic view of prostitution. Instead of treating the phenomenon as mere vice, an economic‑history lens sees it as an adaptive labour response to extreme inequality, temporary agglomeration of wealth, and the blurred line between business networking and personal indulgence.



What “Affluenza” Means – An Economist Article Explained

 What “Affluenza” Means – An Economist Article Explained

In The Economist newspaper, “affluenza” is used not as a medical term but as a social and behavioural label for the psychological and social costs of chasing wealth and status in rich societies. The word, a blend of affluence and influenza, suggests a kind of “contagious” condition spread by consumer culture: the more people pursue money, possessions, and social prestige, the more they feel anxious, overworked, and unfulfilled—even as their incomes rise.

How The Economist frames it

An article in The Economist would typically present affluenza as a by‑product of modern capitalism and inequality:

  • People in rich countries work longer hours, accumulate debt, and buy more goods, yet report little gain in happiness once basic needs are met.

  • The pursuit of “more” becomes self‑reinforcing: higher incomes raise expectations, so people feel they still need more, leading to chronic dissatisfaction and stress.

In this view, affluenza is less about being rich and more about being trapped in a cycle of comparison, consumption, and status‑seeking.

Individual and social effects

At the individual level, affluenza often shows up as:

  • An obsessive focus on work and income, strained relationships, anxiety, and a self‑image tightly tied to financial success.

  • A sense that money should bring happiness, yet feeling hollow or restless once material goals are achieved.

At the social level, The Economist‑style analysis links affluenza to:

  • Rising inequality and “luxury fever,” where the rich consume ever more while others feel left behind.

  • Environmental damage from overconsumption, as constant buying drives resource use, waste, and emissions.

Why it matters to The Economist

For The Economist, affluenza is a shorthand for questioning the limits of GDP‑driven progress. If more income and more stuff do not reliably make people happier, then policies that only chase growth may be missing the point. A typical piece would conclude that tackling affluenza means rethinking how societies measure success—not just by wealth, but by well‑being, time, and sustainability.