How Government Money Twisted the Market: The UK’s Special Education Dilemma

 How Government Money Twisted the Market: The UK’s Special Education Dilemma

When governments inject vast sums of money into a system, they often hope to improve equity and quality. Yet, the UK’s special education framework shows how funding can distort incentives instead of solving underlying problems.

At the heart of the issue lies the Education, Health and Care Plan (EHCP)—a legally binding document guaranteeing special support for children with additional needs. Over the past decade, the number of EHCPs has more than doubled from around 240,000 to over 570,000. The High Needs Block, a section of the local education budget that funds these high-cost cases, now exceeds £10 billion, pushing many councils into deep deficit.

Why the rapid growth? The funding mechanism itself encourages it. Ordinary schools, under financial strain, find it rational to refer students for EHCPs since doing so shifts part of the cost to the central high-needs budget. Parents, seeing the same logic, find it rational to appeal when support is denied—especially since nearly 90% of appeals succeed. The result: a procedural battlefield where money flows into assessments and legal processes rather than classrooms or early intervention.

On the supply side, public special schools are scarce, so councils rely on expensive private placements—many costing £60,000 to £100,000 per student per year. Transport costs inflate further as students are placed across districts, with some requiring one-to-one taxi services costing tens of thousands annually.

Meanwhile, preventive and early support programs have been cut, forcing families to escalate to EHCPs as the only route to get help. Fragmented budgets between education, health, and social care deepen inefficiency. Everyone acts rationally, yet collectively the system becomes irrational: schools pass costs upward, parents lawyer up, suppliers raise prices, and councils delay to stay solvent.

Fixing this requires more than just adding or cutting funds—it demands redesigning incentives so that early support is rewarded, collaboration is cheaper than conflict, and quality—not bureaucracy—drives outcomes.

 This discussion explores the concept of Antifragility—a term coined by Nassim Taleb—to describe systems that thrive on volatility. In contrast, the English property market's "Chain" system serves as a perfect case study of a Fragile system.

Property Chains vs. Antifragility: Why the English Housing Market is Built to Break

1. The Core Argument: Fragility through Interdependence

In an Antifragile system, individual failures do not compromise the whole (like the restaurant industry). However, the English "Property Chain" is the definition of Fragile. Because every transaction is linked, the failure of one person (a rejected mortgage or a change of heart) causes a "domino effect" that collapses the entire line. The system has zero redundancy.

2. Comparison: The Hong Kong Model (Independent/Robust)

Hong Kong’s market is Robust. Transactions are independent. Once the "Preliminary Agreement" is signed and the deposit paid, the buyer and seller are legally committed ("Must Buy, Must Sell"). Whether the seller can buy their next home is their own problem, not the buyer's. This decoupling prevents localized stress from becoming a systemic collapse.

3. Identifying the Weak Points (The "Triggers of Fragility")

• Zero Skin in the Game: Until the "Exchange of Contracts," either party can withdraw without financial penalty (Gazumping/Gaxundering). There is no "cost" to backing out, which encourages flippancy.

• Information Asymmetry & Delays: Local authority searches take weeks, and solicitors have no legal deadline to respond. In a fragile system, time is the enemy. The longer a chain stays open, the more "Black Swan" events (interest rate hikes, job loss) can occur.

• The Multiplier Effect of Risk: A chain of 7-8 families means 7-8 different banks, 7-8 different surveys, and 7-8 different emotional states. The probability of success is not the average of these risks, but the product of them—making the failure rate (currently 1/3) a mathematical certainty.

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Conclusion 

The English housing market is a "linear" system in a "nonlinear" world. To become Antifragile, the system would need to decouple individual transactions (like the HK model) or introduce immediate financial consequences for withdrawal. Until then, it remains a system that relies on luck rather than logic.