Redesigning the Engine: The IFG’s Roadmap for UK Economic Growth

 

Redesigning the Engine: The IFG’s Roadmap for UK Economic Growth

The UK government has made economic growth its "national mission," yet the machinery of the state—the "Centre"—is currently ill-equipped to deliver it. The Institute for Government (IFG) identifies a disconnect between high-level political ambition and the technical execution required to move the needle on national productivity.

Summary of Findings

• Fragmentation of Power: Economic policy is currently split between the Treasury, the Department for Business and Trade, and the Cabinet Office, leading to "siloed" thinking and conflicting objectives.

• The "Brain Drain" in Whitehall: High staff turnover in civil service roles means that institutional memory and deep sector expertise are lost, resulting in policy "churn" rather than long-term strategy.

• Weak Implementation: There is a significant gap between announcing a growth policy (like "Levelling Up") and the actual delivery of infrastructure and business support at a local level.

Core Recommendations

• A "Growth Unit" at the Centre: Establishing a powerful, permanent unit (likely within the Cabinet Office or Treasury) to coordinate growth strategy across all departments.

• Long-term Funding Cycles: Moving away from annual budgets toward multi-year funding to give businesses and local governments the certainty needed for investment.

• Empowering Local Leaders: Devolving more fiscal and decision-making powers to Mayors and local authorities who understand the specific growth drivers of their regions.

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Critical Review via Theory of Constraints (TOC)

To evaluate these recommendations, we can apply the Theory of Constraints, which posits that any system is limited by its weakest link (the constraint).

1. Current Reality Tree (CRT): Identifying the Undesirable Effects (UDEs)

A CRT analysis reveals that the IFG’s identified symptoms—siloed departments, high turnover, and short-termism—are not the root causes but UDEs.

• UDE 1: Policy Churn (Departments constantly change direction).

• UDE 2: Low Private Investment (Businesses are afraid of "U-turns").

• UDE 3: Infrastructure Delays (Planning and funding are misaligned).

• The Constraint: The Treasury’s "Gatekeeper" Model. By controlling all spending through a narrow, short-term fiscal lens, the Treasury inadvertently chokes off the long-term, high-risk investments necessary for growth.

2. Evaporating Cloud (Conflict Resolution)

The core conflict (The Cloud) in UK growth policy is:

• Requirement A: Maintain strict fiscal discipline to avoid market instability.

• Requirement B: Invest aggressively in long-term infrastructure and R&D to drive growth.

• The Conflict: These two requirements compete for the same limited pool of capital and political will. The IFG’s recommendation of a "Growth Unit" attempts to "evaporate" this conflict by creating a body that prioritizes growth alongside fiscal discipline.

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The Real Root Cause: The "Stability-Growth" Paradox

While the IFG suggests structural reforms (new units, better funding), the real root cause for the lack of growth in the UK is a cultural and systemic obsession with risk aversion.

The UK's political and administrative system is designed to prevent failure rather than facilitate success. This manifest in:

1. Planning Paralysis: A planning system that prioritizes local vetoes over national growth.

2. Fiscal Conservatism: A "bean-counting" culture in Whitehall that values immediate cost-savings over long-term value creation.

3. Governance Inconsistency: Every few years, a new Prime Minister or Chancellor reshuffles the growth deck, resetting the clock for private investors.

https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/2026-01/how-the-centre-of-government-can-design-better-growth-policy.pdf

A Sea Change or Just a Ripple? Examining Proposed Reforms to England and Wales' Water Industry

 A Sea Change or Just a Ripple? Examining Proposed Reforms to England and Wales' Water Industry

A monumental 465-page report by Sir Jon Cunliffe has landed, proposing radical overhauls to the water industry in England and Wales, including the scrapping of Ofwat, the current economic regulator. While Environment Secretary Steve Reed heralds a new single watchdog to "prevent the abuses of the past," skepticism abounds, with campaigners dismissing the recommendations as merely an "illusion of change" and "putting lipstick on a pig." The core concern? Without fundamentally incorporating "skin in the game" (Taleb) into the design of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and applying rigorous systems thinking to avoid unintended consequences, this report risks falling short, leaving consumers to continue suffering both physically through inadequate service and financially through escalating fees.

The announcement to dissolve Ofwat and establish a new unified regulator aims to address widespread public frustration over poor performance and underinvestment in infrastructure. However, the continuity of many of Ofwat's existing staff within the new body raises immediate questions about the true extent of the proposed transformation. Campaigners are quick to point out that the report deliberately avoided considering nationalization, a measure many believe is essential for genuine reform.

Adding to consumer woes, Sir Jon Cunliffe himself warns that bills are likely to surge, potentially by 30% above inflation in the next five years, to fund much-needed infrastructure investment. While Water UK boss David Henderson welcomes the report as "exactly what's needed," he conveniently shifts blame for past underinvestment onto the very regulator now facing abolition.

The critical missing link in these proposed reforms, as highlighted by critics, is the absence of mechanisms that genuinely align the interests of water companies with those of their consumers. The concept of "skin in the game," popularized by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, argues for accountability through shared risk. If the new regulatory framework does not embed this principle – for instance, by linking executive bonuses directly to tangible improvements in water quality, reduced leakages, and fair pricing, rather than just abstract financial metrics – then the cycle of consumer suffering is unlikely to break.

Furthermore, any significant restructuring of a complex system like the water industry demands a deep understanding of systems thinking. Without meticulously mapping out potential knock-on effects of each proposed change, there's a high risk of creating new, unforeseen problems while attempting to solve old ones. If the new KPIs are not carefully designed to account for interdependencies within the system, companies might optimize for one metric at the expense of others, leading to continued suboptimal outcomes for consumers.

In conclusion, while the report signals a political acknowledgment of the deep-seated issues within the water industry, its ultimate success hinges on moving beyond superficial organizational changes. True reform requires a radical rethinking of how accountability is enforced, how performance is measured, and how the entire system interacts. Without "skin in the game" for the industry and a comprehensive systems thinking approach to prevent unintended consequences, the promised "prevention of abuses of the past" may prove to be little more than a mirage, leaving consumers to navigate a continued torrent of poor service and high costs.