2025年3月19日 星期三

美國國際開發署(USAID)在寮國

美國國際開發署(USAID)在寮國之援助概況

美國國際開發署(USAID)於寮國施以援手,其形式多樣,非僅金錢之助,亦有技術扶持與項目實施。

早期(一九六四年以前)

一九五五年十二月,項目評估辦公室(PEO)於寮國立,美國援寮之總額,自一九五五年之一百五十萬美元,驟增至一九五六年之二千六百萬美元。

軍事援助計劃(MAP)之直接援助,約佔美國援寮總額之四分之一,餘者則歸於他類,或為美國國際開發署之前身,或為其後身所施。一九五九年,美國援外總額約二千八百五十萬美元,其中軍事援助、國防支持(二千萬美元)、技術合作(一百七十萬美元)各佔其份。

一九五九年之《美國援寮運作》報告,論及援助計劃之諸多弊端,國際合作署(ICA,美國國際開發署之前身)亦在其列。道路工程之權責,自國際合作署/華盛頓,移交至美國駐寮國運作團(USOM)。美國駐寮國運作團之官員,亦助其建立營造壟斷。

美國援寮之大部,歸於國防支持之類,然“項目援助”亦在其中。

參與日增(一九六四年以後)

美國對寮國之財政援助,於後世增至三倍。

美國駐泰國聯合軍事顧問團副團長(DEPCH/JUSMAGTHAI),為軍事援助計劃之明暗援助提供後勤支持。美國國際開發署之支出,亦與軍事援助相若。

於沙灣拿吉新建空運中心(AOC),以輔助萬象(永珍)瓦岱機場之空運中心,或可見美國國際開發署參與與戰事相關之基礎設施建設。

美國國際開發署之具體活動

  • 警察項目: 國際合作署(後為美國國際開發署)於寮國之兩大項目之一,為警察項目,兼有技術指導與物資援助。至一九五九年二月二十八日,國際合作署已撥款約一百六十萬美元,用於設備、技術人員及合約服務,另有相當於六百五十萬美元之對等基金,用於警察薪酬及其他預算支持。此項目由美國警察顧問團實施。於美國國際開發署建立並支持之警察學院,亦有訓練。
  • 難民救濟: 美國國際開發署於共產黨軍事行動所致難民之救濟與安置中,扮演關鍵角色。至一九六七財年終,該計劃旨在使儘可能多之難民自給自足,或提供種子農具,或通過安置。因多數難民居於偏遠之地,空投往往為提供物資之唯一可行之法。美國國際開發署亦支持可及難民地區之自助營造項目。
  • 衛生: 美國國際開發署直接支持並協助多數民眾所得之唯一醫療服務,尤以城外為甚。此等服務包括基礎醫療、衛生設施、免疫接種及個人衛生教育。美國國際開發署亦旨在培養當地醫師、護士及醫療技術人員。由博愛行動訓練之鄉村診所工作人員,亦於美國國際開發署之協助下,於鄉村診所工作。
  • 教育: 美國之技術援助多用於教師培訓、教育設施與教材,以及課程與行政之改進。初以小學教育為重,後增擴展中學教育之努力。
  • 農業: 為增稻產,美國國際開發署支持大規模示範項目及稻種試驗。亦助其建立美國/寮國聯合機構,名為農業發展組織(ADO),以擴大稻種繁殖,改善分銷。農業發展組織亦研究農村信貸之形成。
  • 公路: 美國國際開發署為道路建設提供援助,包括連接行政首都萬象與其河港設施之一百公里國道。萬象至琅勃拉邦之國道北段之建設,亦於美國國際開發署之協助下啟動。
  • 小工業: 支持小工業發展之計劃,亦獲美國國際開發署之進一步援助。
  • 社區發展: 擴大難民住房及其他與社區發展相關之公共工程計劃,亦在考慮之中。
  • 財政方面:
    • 一九六五財年,美國國際開發署提供五千零六十萬美元之援助。
    • 一九六七財年之計劃,旨在遵循當前活動之準則。
    • 美國國際開發署亦管理美國援助物資所生之對等基金。用於美國援寮計劃行政之對等基金之百分比,較越南與柬埔寨為高(百分之十五),蓋因運輸成本相對較高。
    • 美國國際開發署亦提供人道主義援助,鼓勵包括國際組織在內之其他捐助者效仿。
  • 協調與控制: 國內計劃由駐萬象大使館控制。計劃與項目助理辦公室,美國國際開發署區域辦事處,對軍事援助服務基金(MASF)培訓計劃進行國內監督,並提出與包括美國駐泰國聯合軍事顧問團副團長在內之各實體協調之擬議計劃。美國駐泰國聯合軍事顧問團副團長亦依賴駐萬象美國國際開發署,提供中央情報局(CAS)所需之物資。
  • 援助效力之批判: 駐萬象大使館控制之國內計劃,似“未指向明確之目標”,其成功僅能以維持脆弱之政治軍事現狀來衡量。總體印象被描述為“僅比將錢倒入水溝稍好”。

總而言之,美國國際開發署於寮國扮演多重角色,於公共安全、難民救濟、衛生、教育、農業及基礎設施等諸多領域,提供重大財政與技術援助。此等努力旨在促進穩定,改善生活水平,並遏制共產主義之影響,然援助計劃之效力有時亦受質疑。美國國際開發署亦與美國政府其他機構及國際夥伴合作。

外匯運營基金(FEOF)

外匯運營基金(FEOF)為寮國提供外匯支持之機制。此於如寮國之國,其經濟多為非貨幣經濟,產生足夠之政府收入甚難,至關重要。外匯運營基金助其資助寮國之外匯支出。

外匯運營基金為多國渠道,表明其接受多國之捐助。此等國包括美國、法國、英國、澳大利亞及日本。

美國國際開發署亦通過外匯運營基金提供外匯支持。此表明外匯運營基金為寮國更廣泛對外援助努力之重要組成部分。

外匯運營基金運作之一特定方式,為促進美國國際開發署資助之商品進口。此暗示該基金用於提供寮國自他國購買商品所需之外匯。

美國援寮之更廣泛目標,包括外匯運營基金,旨在於長期政治軍事動盪所致通貨膨脹壓力下,促進金融穩定。外匯運營基金或通過確保必要進口所需外匯之供應,及管理寮國貨幣(基普),於此方面發揮作用。

項目評估辦公室(PEO)

項目評估辦公室(PEO)為美國於一九五五年十二月在寮國設立之實體。

項目評估辦公室之主要任務,為就軍事裝備之需求與使用,向美國駐寮國大使提供建議。其本質上為美國向寮國提供軍事援助之機制,同時試圖繞過日內瓦協定之限制。項目評估辦公室秘密裝備並訓練皇家寮國武裝部隊之正規部隊。

項目評估辦公室之設立,為美國秘密建立寮國有效空軍之嘗試,寮國為一發展不足之國,面臨被共產黨接管之威脅。一九五四年之日內瓦協定,及其於一九五六年之進一步澄清,規定僅法國可向寮國人提供軍事建議及訓練。然因法國方面明顯缺乏興趣與進展,美國增加其參與,並設立項目評估辦公室。通過以國防部(DOD)文職人員填充,美國旨在繞過日內瓦協定禁止法國殘留任務以外之外國軍事存在之規定。


項目評估辦公室(PEO)之角色演變


早期活動:

項目評估辦公室成立之初,其關注點不僅限於軍事裝備與訓練。其在政治領域亦有所作為,致力於秘密行動,以爭取萬象政府之民心。

早在1955年,項目評估辦公室已考慮向苗族提供秘密支持,苗族為山地部落,曾與法國結盟,對抗越盟。

角色演變:

項目評估辦公室之活動與觀點,於後世亦有所記載。例如,1961年,時任項目評估辦公室主任觀察到,寮國領導人富米·諾薩萬不願任何單一軍事人物權力過大。

項目評估辦公室亦對富米部隊之能力與士氣進行評估。

中央情報局對準軍事計劃之管理,亦與項目評估辦公室有所關聯。

與美國駐寮國運作團(USOM)之關係:

由於國務院禁止在寮國設立正式之軍事援助顧問團(MAAG),美國駐寮國運作團(USOM)早期亦於軍事事務中扮演角色。

最初,軍事計劃之管理責任置於美國駐寮國運作團之上,然其於此方面缺乏經驗。

隨後,美國駐寮國運作團內部設立一特別部門,由具備軍事預算與後勤方面專業知識之人員組成,此部門被稱為項目評估辦公室。此似為1955年設立之同一實體。

總之,項目評估辦公室為美國在寮國提供軍事援助及施加影響之關鍵早期工具,尤以日內瓦協定所加限制為背景。其從一個專注於軍事裝備之小型顧問團,演變為一個參與訓練、政治行動及寮國部隊評估之實體,同時正式作為美國援助團之文職組成部分。

USAID in Laos

USAID (United States Agency for International Development) played a significant role in providing various forms of assistance to Laos. Here's an overview of USAID funds and activities in Laos:

  • Diverse Forms of Support: U.S. support to Laos, including that administered by USAID, took diverse forms. This encompassed more than just financial aid, extending to technical assistance and project implementation.

  • Early Years (Pre-1964):

    • Following the establishment of the Program Evaluation Office (PEO) in Laos in December 1955, overall US aid jumped drastically from approximately $1.5 million in 1955 to some $26 million in 1956.
    • While direct MAP (Military Assistance Program) aid was about 25 percent of the total American aid to Laos, other significant portions came under different categories, likely including what would be administered by precursors to USAID or later by USAID itself. In 1959, total US foreign aid was around $28.5 million, including military assistance, defense support ($20 million), and technical cooperation ($1.7 million).
    • The report "U.S. Aid Operations in Laos" from 1959 discusses various shortcomings and inefficiencies in the aid program, including those related to the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), a predecessor agency. Control of the road program passed from ICA/Washington to USOM/Laos (U.S. Operations Mission). USOM officials also assisted in the development of a construction monopoly.
    • The bulk of US aid funds in Laos was in the defense support category, but "Project Aid" was also present.
  • Increased Involvement (Post-1964):

    • U.S. financial assistance to Laos was to increase threefold in later years.
    • The Deputy Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPCH/JUSMAGTHAI) logistically supported MAP aid, both overt and covert. USAID also expended comparable sums to military aid.
    • A new AOC (Air Operations Center) was constructed at Savannakhet to augment the one at Wattay Airport, Vientiane, suggesting USAID involvement in infrastructure projects related to the conflict.
  • Specific Areas of USAID Activity:

    • Police Project: One of the two major projects in ICA's (later USAID) Laos program was a police project, involving both technical advice and material aid. By February 28, 1959, ICA had obligated about $1.6 million for equipment, technicians, and contract services, plus the equivalent of over $6.5 million in counterpart funds for police salaries and other budgetary support. This project was carried out by a U.S. Police Advisory Group. Training in Laos was also conducted at the USAID-established and supported Police Academy.
    • Refugee Relief: USAID played a key role in providing relief and resettlement for refugees displaced by Communist military action. By the end of fiscal year 1967, the program aimed to make as many refugees as possible self-sufficient by providing seeds and farming tools or through resettlement. Since many refugees were in remote areas, air drops were often the only feasible means of providing supplies. USAID also supported self-help building projects in accessible refugee areas.
    • Health: AID directly supported and assisted the only medical services received by the majority of the population, especially outside urban areas. These services included basic medical treatment, sanitary facilities, immunisation, and education in personal hygiene. AID also aimed to train indigenous doctors, nurses, and medical technicians. Village clinic workers trained by Operation Brotherhood also staffed village clinics with AID assistance.
    • Education: Much of U.S. technical aid was devoted to teacher training, educational facilities and materials, and improvement of curricula and administration. Initially focusing on primary education, efforts were later added to expand secondary education.
    • Agriculture: To increase rice production, AID supported large-scale demonstration projects and experiments with rice varieties. It also assisted in creating a joint U.S./Lao agency called the Agriculture Development Organisation (ADO) to expand rice seed multiplication and improve distribution. ADO also studied the formation of farm credit.
    • Highways: USAID provided assistance for road construction, including a 100-kilometre stretch of the National Highway linking the administrative capital Vientiane with its river port facilities. Construction of the northern portion of the highway between Vientiane and Luang Prabang was also started with AID assistance.
    • Small Industries: A program to support the growth of small industries also received further AID assistance.
    • Community Development: Enlarged programs for refugee housing and other public works allied to community development were being considered.
  • Financial Aspects:

    • In fiscal year 1965, AID provided $50.6 million in assistance.
    • The fiscal year 1967 program was intended to follow the guidelines of current activities.
    • USAID also managed counterpart funds generated from American aid materials. The percentage of counterpart funds used for administration of American Aid programs in Laos was higher (15%) compared to Vietnam and Cambodia due to proportionately high transportation costs.
    • USAID also provided humanitarian assistance, encouraging other donors, including international organisations, to do the same.
  • Coordination and Control: The in-country program was controlled by the Embassy in Vientiane. The Office of the Assistant for Plans and Programs, RO/USAID, exercised in-country supervision of the MASF (Military Assistance Service Fund) Training Program and proposed programs for coordination with various entities, including DEPCH. DEPCH also relied on USAID in Vientiane for the supplies requested by CAS (Central Intelligence Agency).

  • Critique of Aid Effectiveness: the in-country program controlled by the Embassy, Vientiane, seemed "directed toward no firm objective" and its success was only measurable by maintaining a tenuous political-military status quo. The overall impression was described as "something just less than pouring money down a hole".

In summary, USAID played a multifaceted role in Laos, providing significant financial and technical assistance across various sectors, including public safety, refugee relief, health, education, agriculture, and infrastructure. These efforts were aimed at promoting stability, improving living standards, and countering Communist influence, although the effectiveness of the aid programs was sometimes questioned. USAID also worked in conjunction with other US government agencies and international partners in its operations. 



Here's what we know about the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund (FEOF) and how it worked inside Laos:

  • Purpose: The Foreign Exchange Operations Fund (FEOF) served as a mechanism to provide foreign exchange support to Laos. This was important for a country like Laos with a generally non-monetary economy, where generating sufficient government revenue was difficult. The FEOF helped finance Laos's foreign exchange expenditures.

  • Multilateral Support: The FEOF was a multi-national channel, indicating that it received contributions from several countries. These included the United States, France, Great Britain, Australia, and Japan (as mentioned in our conversation history).

  • Link to US Aid: The United States Agency for International Development (AID) also provided foreign exchange support through the FEOF. This suggests that the FEOF was an important component of the broader foreign aid efforts in Laos.

  • Supporting Commodity Imports: One specific way the FEOF operated was by facilitating the import of commodities that were financed by AID. This implies that the fund was used to provide the necessary foreign currency for Laos to purchase goods from other countries.

  • Maintaining Financial Stability: The broader objective of US aid to Laos, which included the FEOF, was to promote financial stability in the face of inflationary pressures created by the prolonged political and military unrest. The FEOF likely played a role in this by ensuring the availability of foreign exchange needed for essential imports and to manage the Laotian currency (Kip).

It is clear that the FEOF was a significant instrument for providing crucial foreign exchange support to the Laotian government during a period of instability.


The Program Evaluation Office (PEO) was a United States entity established in Laos in December 1955.

Here are the key details about the PEO:

  • Purpose and Function: The primary mission of the PEO was to advise the American Ambassador to Laos on the requirements for and the utilisation of military equipment. It was essentially the mechanism through which the U.S. could provide military assistance to Laos while attempting to navigate the restrictions imposed by the Geneva Accords. The PEO suneptitiously equipped and trained regular units of the Forces Armees Royales (Royal Laotian Armed Forces).

  • Establishment and Circumvention of Accords: The establishment of the PEO was a covert attempt to create an effective air force for Laos, an underdeveloped country facing the threat of being taken over by communists. The 1954 Geneva Accords, and their further clarification in 1956, stipulated that only the French were permitted to provide military advice and training to the Laotians. However, due to an apparent lack of interest and progress on the part of the French, the U.S. increased its involvement and established the PEO. By staffing it with Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, the US aimed to circumvent the provisions of the Geneva Accords that prohibited a foreign military presence beyond a residual French mission. Nominally, the PEO was presented as part of the economic aid program.

  • Reporting Structure: The small staff of the PEO reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC).

  • Early Activities: In its initial years, the PEO's focus extended beyond military equipment and training. It operated more in the political arena, concentrating on covert actions designed to popularise the Vientiane government. Furthermore, as early as 1955, the PEO had already considered providing clandestine support to the Hmong, who were mountain tribesmen with prior alliances with the French against the Viet Minh.

  • Evolving Role: The PEO's activities and views were noted in later years as well. For instance, in 1961, the then chief of the PEO observed that the Laotian leader Phoumi Nosavan was hesitant to allow any single military personality to become too powerful. The PEO also provided assessments of the capabilities and morale of Phoumi's forces. The CIA's management of paramilitary programs also had relations with the PEO.

  • Relation to USOM: The USOM (U.S. Operations Mission) also had a role related to military matters in the early days due to the State Department's prohibition against establishing a formal Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Laos. The responsibility for administering the military program was initially placed on the USOM, which lacked experience in such matters. Subsequently, a special section within USOM was staffed with personnel having some expertise in military budget and logistic matters, and this section was called the Programs Evaluation Office. This appears to be the same entity established in 1955.

In summary, the Program Evaluation Office (PEO) was a crucial early instrument for the United States to provide military assistance and exert influence in Laos, particularly in the context of the limitations imposed by the Geneva Accords. It evolved from a small advisory group focused on military equipment to an entity involved in training, political action, and assessment of Laotian forces, all while officially being a civilian component of the US aid mission.

Life in Vientiane Laos during the conflict years

Life in Vientiane appears to have been complex and significantly shaped by the ongoing political and military conflicts in Laos. 

  • Political and Military Instability: Vientiane was the centre of a "three-way struggle for power" involving the legal government of Prince Phouma, Captain Kong Le's paratroopers, and General Nosavan's force. The city was under the control of the legal government but faced the expectation of an attack. There were concerns about generals betraying the interests of the armed forces and the nation, suggesting internal conflict and mistrust within the military. A "change in the high command" was seen as a potential way to improve the army's efficiency.
  • Fear and Displacement: On one occasion, Vientiane transformed from a "teeming" city into an "eerie ghost town" after Kong Le's forces abandoned it, and General Phoumi's men were nowhere to be seen. This led to the entire civilian population either fleeing or remaining in hiding. This highlights the fear and disruption caused by the conflict.
  • Governmental and Strategic Centre: Despite the instability, Vientiane served as the seat of the Laotian government. The Vientiane government became "increasingly desperate to stem the threat to the Mekong Valley" and actively involved itself in tactical planning. Vientiane also served as a communication hub, with reports of events in other areas, such as Long Tieng, being relayed to "Vientiane and Headquarters". The US Mission in Vientiane was actively involved in making arrangements related to the Hmong resistance.
  • Presence of Opposing Forces: Interestingly, the Pathet Lao, the communist forces, were also present in Vientiane for "R&R" and stayed at a compound across the street from the morning market. While there, they generally remained within their compound and were wary of being photographed. This suggests a peculiar situation where opposing sides co-existed in the city, albeit separately.
  • Foreign Presence and Influence: The US had a significant presence in Vientiane, with the US Embassy continuing to operate even after the city had become deserted. Changes in US policy in Washington had repercussions and were "echoed in Vientiane".
  • Infrastructure and Living Conditions: One mentions the Lido Hotel in Vientiane as a "rundown old French hotel," indicating the presence of French-era infrastructure, some of which may have been in disrepair. The fact that someone staying there felt the need to keep a rope for fire escape suggests potential safety concerns.


2025年3月18日 星期二

Quotations of Chairman Mao Tse-tung

Chairman Mao Tse-tung made numerous comments on farmers over the years, reflecting their crucial role in the revolution and socialist construction. Here are some of his remarks in Chinese, presented with context where available:

  • During the early revolutionary period (pre-1949):

    • In his "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (1927), Mao highlighted the immense power and potential of the peasant movement:

      “目前农民运动的兴起是一个极大的问题。很短的时间内,将有几万万农民从中国中部、南部和北部各省起来,其势如暴风骤雨,迅猛异常,无论什么大的力量都将压抑不住。他们将冲决一切束缚他们的罗网,朝着解放的路上迅跑。一切帝国主义、军阀、贪官污吏、土豪劣绅,都将被他们葬入坟墓。一切革命的党派、革命的同志,都将在他们面前受他们的检验而决定弃取。站在他们的前头领导他们呢?还是站在他们的后头指手画脚地批评他们呢?还是站在他们的对面反对他们呢?每个中国人对于这三项都有选择的自由,不过时局将强迫你迅速地选择罢了。”

      This passage emphasizes the revolutionary force of the peasantry and the inevitability of their liberation. It poses a challenge to all political forces to align themselves with this powerful movement.

    • In "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (1939), Mao underscored the historical significance of peasant uprisings in China:

      “地主阶级对于农民的残酷的经济剥削和政治压迫,迫使农民多次地举行反抗他们的统治的起义。……只有农民的阶级斗争、农民的起义和农民战争,才是中国封建社会历史发展的真正动力。”

      Here, Mao identifies peasant class struggle as the driving force of historical development in Chinese feudal society.

    • Mao also recognised the economic vulnerability of poor peasants and the necessity of uniting with middle peasants while relying on the poor peasants:

      “依靠什么人去团结中农,实现整个农村的社会主义改造呢?当然只有贫农。在过去向地主作斗争、实行土地改革的时候是这样,在现在向富农和其他资本主义因素作斗争实行农业的社会主义改造的时候,也是这样。在两个革命时期,中农在开始阶段都是动摇的。等到看清了大势,革命将要胜利的时候,中农才会参加到革命方面来。贫农必须向中农做工作,把中农团结到自己方面来,使革命一天一天地扩大,直到取得最后的胜利。”

      This highlights the central role of poor peasants in uniting with other sections of the rural population for revolutionary change.

  • During the period of socialist transformation (post-1949):

    • Mao stressed the importance of socialising agriculture for the consolidation of socialism:

      “严重的问题是教育农民。农民的经济是分散的,根据苏联的经验,需要很长的时间和细心的工作,才能做到农业社会化。没有农业社会化,就没有全部的巩固的社会主义。”

      This indicates Mao's view that the collectivisation of agriculture was a fundamental requirement for building a strong socialist society.

    • He noted the enthusiasm of the peasantry for socialism:

      “群众中蕴藏了一种极大的社会主义的积极性。那些在革命时期还只会按照常规走路的人们,对于这种积极性一概看不见。他们是瞎子,在他们面前出现的只是一片黑暗。他们有时简直要闹到颠倒是是非、混淆黑白的程度。这种人难道我们遇见得还少吗?这些只会循着常规走路的人们,老是对于人民的积极性估计过低。一种新事物出现,他们总是不赞成,首先反对一气。随后就是认输,做一点自我批评。第二种新事物出现,他们又按照这两种态度循环一遍。以后各种新事物出现,都按照这个格式处理。这种人老是被动,在紧要的关头老是止步不前,老是需要别人在他的背上击一猛掌,才肯向前跨进一步。”

      This quote emphasizes Mao's belief in the inherent socialist drive of the masses, particularly the peasants, and criticises those who underestimate it.

    • Mao also addressed the tendency towards capitalism among wealthier peasants:

      “富裕农民中的资本主义倾向是严重的。只要我们在合作化运动中,乃至以后一个很长的时期内,稍微放松了对于农民的政治工作,资本主义倾向就会泛滥起来。”

      This shows Mao's awareness of the ongoing struggle between socialist and capitalist tendencies in the countryside and the need for continuous political work.

    • He emphasized the revolutionary nature of the agricultural co-operative movement:

      “目前农村中合作化的社会改革的高潮,有些地方已经到来,全国也即将到来。这是五亿多农村人口的大规模的社会主义的革命运动,带有极其伟大的世界意义。我们应当积极地热情地有计划地去领导这个运动,而不是用各种办法去拉它向后退。运动中免不了要出些偏差,这是可以理解的,也是不难纠正的。干部中和农民中存在的缺点或错误,只要我们积极地去帮助他们,就会克服或纠正。”

      This highlights the scale and significance of the co-operative movement as a socialist revolution in the countryside, emphasizing the need for active and positive leadership.

These quotes illustrate Mao's consistent focus on the peasantry as a fundamental revolutionary force and their critical role in both overthrowing the old order and building a new socialist society. His views evolved over time to address the specific challenges and tasks of different stages of the Chinese revolution.


Chairman Mao Tse-tung's comments on light industry

Light Industry

Based on the sources, Chairman Mao Tse-tung discussed light industry primarily in the context of its relationship with agriculture and the broader socialist transformation. Here are some of his remarks in Chinese:

  • In "On the Question of Agricultural Co-operation" (1955), Mao emphasized the interconnectedness of the socialist transformation of handicrafts (often considered part of light industry) with agriculture and heavy industry:

    “我们现在不但正在进行关于社会制度方面的由私有制到公有制的革命,而且正在进行技术方面的由手工业生产到大规模现代化机器生产的革命,而这两种革命是结合在一起的。在农业方面,在我国的条件下(资本主义国家内是使农业资本主义化),则必须先有合作化,然后才能使用大机器。由此可见,我们对于工业和农业、社会主义的工业化和社会主义的农业改造这样两件事,决不可以分割起来和互相孤立起来去看,决不可以只强调一方面,减弱另一方面。”

    This passage highlights that Mao saw the transformation of handicrafts (手工业生产) as an integral part of the broader socialist revolution, alongside the collectivisation of agriculture and the development of modern machine production (which includes heavy industry). He stressed that these aspects should not be viewed in isolation.

  • In the same speech, Mao further linked the development of handicrafts and light industry to the consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance and overall economic progress:

    “……统筹兼顾,是指对于六亿人口的统筹兼顾。我们作计划、办事、想问题,都要从我国有六亿人口这一点出发,千万不要忘记这一点。”

    “除了别的特点之外,中国六亿人口的显著特点是一穷二白。这些看起来是坏事,其实是好事。穷则思变,要干,要革命。一张白纸,没有负担,好写最新最美的文字,好画最新最美的画图。”

    While not directly mentioning light industry, the emphasis on the needs of the large population (六亿人口) and the idea of China being "poor and blank" (一穷二白) implies the need to develop industries, including those producing consumer goods, to meet the people's needs and improve their living standards. The reference to handicrafts in conjunction with large-scale industry suggests light industry's role in this context.

  • In "Our Economic Policy" (1934), Mao mentioned the need to preserve means of livelihood (生活资料) during the struggle against the feudal system, which would include the products of handicrafts and light industry:

    “为了迅速地恢复和发展农业生产和市镇上的工业生产,在消灭封建制度的斗争中,必须注意尽一切努力最大限度地保存一切可用的生产资料和生活资料,采取办法坚决地反对任何人对于生产资料和生活资料的破坏和浪费,反对大吃大喝,注意节约。”

    Here, "industrial production in small towns" (市镇上的工业生产) likely refers to smaller-scale industries, including handicrafts and light industry, which were important for providing "means of livelihood" (生活资料) to the population.


Chairman Mao Tse-tung's comments on light industry and then heavy industry

Heavy Industry

Chairman Mao Tse-tung consistently emphasized the paramount importance of developing heavy industry for China's socialist construction and national strength. Here are some relevant quotes in Chinese:

  • In "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" (1939), Mao outlined the goal of transforming China from an agricultural country to an industrial one:

    “中国革命的对象,按照其社会性质,依然是帝国主义和封建主义。完成这个革命,才能造成由资本主义发展到社会主义的必要条件。中国革命的第一步是新民主主义的革命,在打倒帝国主义和封建势力之后,建立一个工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民共和国。这个共和国的经济,将采取新民主主义的政策,逐步地由农业国变为工业国。”

    This early statement clearly sets the direction for China to transition from an agricultural country to an industrial country (由农业国变为工业国) under the leadership of the working class, implying a focus on building an industrial base, which includes heavy industry.

  • In "On Coalition Government" (1945), Mao explicitly linked the liberation of productive forces with the development of heavy industry:

    “社会主义革命的目的是为了解放生产力。农业和手工业由个体所有制变为社会主义的集体所有制,私营工商业由资本主义所有制变为社会主义所有制,必然使生产力大大地获得解放。这样就为大大地发展工业(例如重工业)创造了条件,这样也就使我国能够巩固国防,能够抵抗帝国主义的侵略,能够最后地消灭贫困,使人民富裕起来,过着幸福的生活。”

    Here, Mao states that the socialist transformation of ownership will create conditions for the great development of industry, "for example, heavy industry" (例如重工业). He connects this development to strengthening national defence, resisting imperialist aggression, eliminating poverty, and improving people's lives, highlighting the strategic importance of heavy industry.

  • In his "Speech at the Supreme State Conference" (1956), Mao reiterated the dual revolution in social system and technology, emphasizing the shift to modern machine production:

    “我们现在不但正在进行关于社会制度方面的由私有制到公有制的革命,而且正在进行技术方面的由手工业生产到大规模现代化机器生产的革命,而这两种革命是结合在一起的。”

    The emphasis on "large-scale modern machine production" (大规模现代化机器生产) directly points towards the development of heavy industry as the foundation for technological advancement and industrialisation.

  • In "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" (1957), Mao spoke of the need to build China into a socialist country with modern industry and agriculture:

    “专政的目的是为了保卫全体人民进行和平劳动,将我国建设成为一个具有现代工业、现代农业和现代科学文化的社会主义国家。”

    The goal of building a socialist country with "modern industry" (现代工业) underscores the central role of heavy industry in achieving national modernisation and socialist development.

  • Mao also stressed the need for self-reliance (自力更生) in building the industrial base:

    “我们的方针要放在什么基点上?放在自己力量的基点上,叫做自力更生。我们并不孤立,全世界一切反对帝国主义的国家和人民都是我们的朋友。但是我们强调自力更生,我们能够依靠自己组织的力量,打败一切中外反动派。”

    While this quote speaks to overall self-reliance, in the context of transforming China into an industrial power, it implies that the development of heavy industry should primarily rely on China's own efforts and resources.

In summary, Mao viewed heavy industry as crucial for the socialist transformation of China, for developing the productive forces, strengthening national defence, and ultimately improving the lives of the people. He saw it as a key component of the technological revolution alongside the social revolution and emphasized the need for self-reliance in its development. He also recognized the interconnectedness of heavy industry with agriculture and light industry in building a comprehensive socialist economy.


The Military (军队)

Chairman Mao Tse-tung held a strong belief in the primacy of the Party's leadership over the military (党指挥枪). He saw the military as a crucial tool for achieving political goals and for serving the people. Here are some of his key ideas as expressed in the sources:

  • Mao emphasised that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a fighting force but always under Party command:

    “我们的原则是党指挥枪,而决不容许枪指挥党。”
    “我全军将士必须时刻牢记,我们是伟大的人民解放军,是伟大的中国共产党领导的队伍。只要我们时刻遵守党的指示,我们就一定胜利。”
    “人民解放军永远是一个战斗队,就是在全国胜利以后,在我们国内阶级消灭和世界帝国主义制度消灭以前,我们的军队还是一个战斗队,在这个问题上是不能有丝毫的误解和动摇的。” \

    These quotes highlight the fundamental principle that the military must always be subordinate to the political leadership of the Communist Party. Its role as a "fighting force" (战斗队) is continuous, even after victory, until the complete elimination of internal classes and the global imperialist system.

  • Mao stressed the importance of unity within the military and between the military and the people:

    “八路军的政治工作的基本原则有三个,即:第一、官兵一致的原则,……第二、军民一致的原则,……第三、瓦解敌军和宽待俘虏的原则。我们的胜利不但是依靠我军的作战,而且依靠敌军的瓦解。”
    “我们的军队必须在军民关系上、军政关系上、军党关系上、官兵关系上、军事工作和政治工作关系上、干部相互关系上,遵守正确的原则,决不可犯军阀主义的毛病。官长必须爱护士兵,不能漠不关心,不能采取肉刑;军队必须爱护人民,不能损害人民利益;军队必须尊重政府,尊重党,不能闹独立性。”
    “军队须和民众打成一片,使军队在民众中间生根,发芽,开花,结果;使民众自觉地把自己的一切力量供给军队,战胜我们共同的敌人。” \

    Mao identified unity between officers and men (官兵一致), unity between the army and the people (军民一致), and disintegrating the enemy forces and treating captives leniently as the three basic principles of the PLA's political work. He warned against "warlordism" (军阀主义) and emphasised the need for mutual respect and support between the army and the people, viewing the people as the soil in which the army can thrive.

  • Mao recognised the crucial role of political work within the military:

    “那时(指一九二四——一九二七年第一次国内革命战争时期——编者)军队设立了党代表和政治部,这种制度是中国历史上没有的,靠了这种制度使军队一新其面目。一九二七年以后的红军以至今日的八路军,是继承了这种制度而加以发展的。”
    “在人民战争的基础上,在军队和人民团结一致、指挥员和战斗员团结一致以及瓦解敌军等项原则的基础上,人民解放军建立了自己强有力的革命的政治工作,这是我们战胜敌人的重大因素。”
    “政治工作是一切经济工作的生命线。在社会制度和社会经济制度发生根本变革的时期,尤其如此。” \

    Mao considered political work (政治工作) the "life-blood" (生命线) of all work, especially during times of significant social and economic change. The establishment of Party representatives and political departments was seen as a revolutionary development that transformed the army. Political education instilled class consciousness in soldiers and ensured their commitment to the revolutionary goals.

  • Mao advocated for democratic practices within the military, especially during training and combat:

    “关于军事民主,必须在练兵时实行官兵互教,兵兵互教;在作战时,实行在火线上连队开各种大、小会。在连队首长指导下,发动士兵群众讨论如何攻克敌阵,如何完成战斗任务。”
    “我们练兵的口号是:‘官教兵,兵教官,兵教兵。’战士们有很多打仗的实际经验。当官的要向战士学习,把别人的经验变成自己的,他的本领就大了。” \

    He promoted military democracy (军事民主), including mutual teaching between officers and soldiers and soldier participation in discussing combat plans. This approach aimed to leverage the practical experience of the rank and file and foster a more effective fighting force.

Party Cadres (干部)

Chairman Mao Tse-tung viewed cadres as the decisive factor once the political line is determined (政治路线确定之后,干部就是决定的因素). He laid out specific criteria and expectations for Party cadres to ensure the success of the revolution and socialist construction:

  • Mao defined the qualities of good cadres, emphasising adherence to the Party line, discipline, close ties with the masses, and selflessness:

    “共产党的干部政策,应是以能否坚决地执行党的路线,服从党的纪律,和群众有密切的联系,有独立的工作能力,积极肯干,不谋私利为标准,这就是‘任人唯贤’的路线。”
    “我们党的组织要向全国发展,要自觉地造就成万数的干部,要有几百个最好的群众领袖。这些干部和领袖懂得马克思列宁主义,有政治远见,有工作能力,富于牺牲精神,能独立解决问题,在困难中不动摇,忠心耿耿地为民族、为阶级、为党而工作。党依靠着这些人而联系党员和群众,依靠着这些人对于群众的坚强领导而达到打倒敌人之目的。这些人不要自私自利,不要个人英雄主义和风头主义,不要懒惰和消极性,不要自高自大的宗派主义,他们是大公无私的民族的阶级的英雄,这就是共产党员、党的干部、党的领袖应该有的性格和作风。” \

    According to Mao, good cadres should resolutely implement the Party line, observe Party discipline, maintain close links with the masses, possess independent working ability, be active and hardworking, and be selfless. He envisioned them as Marxist-Leninist, politically far-sighted, capable, self-sacrificing, independent, steadfast, and loyal servants of the nation, class, and Party, free from self-interest and arrogance.

  • Mao stressed the importance of the mass line in the work of cadres:

    “必须学会‘从群众中来,到群众中去’的领导方法,必须养成善于听取群众意见的民主作风。”
    “我们历来主张革命要依靠人民群众,大家动手,反对只依靠少数人发号施令。但是在有些同志的工作中间,群众路线仍然不能贯彻,他们还是只靠少数人冷冷清清地做工作。其原因之一,就是他们做一件事情,总不愿意向被领导的人讲清楚,不懂得发挥被领导者的积极性和创造力。”
    “要联系群众,就要按照群众的需要和自愿。一切为群众的工作都要从群众的需要出发,而不是从任何良好的个人愿望出发。” \

    Cadres were expected to master the leadership method of "from the masses, to the masses" (从群众中来,到群众中去) and cultivate a democratic work style by listening to the masses. Mao criticised cadres who relied on a small number of people and failed to explain policies to the masses or encourage their initiative. He emphasised that all work for the masses should proceed from their actual needs and wishes.

  • Mao highlighted the need for unity among cadres and a correct attitude towards those who make mistakes:

    “我们都是来自五湖四海,为了一个共同的革命目标,走到一起来了。……我们的干部要关心每一个战士,一切革命队伍的人都要互相关心,互相爱护,互相帮助。”
    “对于犯错误的干部,一般地应采取说服的方法。帮助他们改正错误。只有对犯了严重错误而又不接受指导的人们,才应当采取斗争的方法。在这里,耐心是必要的;轻易地给人们戴上‘机会主义’的大帽子,轻易地采用‘开展斗争’的方法,是不对的。” \

    He called for mutual care, love, and help among cadres who have come together for a common revolutionary goal. For cadres who make mistakes, the general approach should be persuasion and helping them to correct their errors, reserving struggle only for those who make serious mistakes and refuse guidance.

  • Mao warned against arrogance, bureaucracy, and other undesirable traits in cadres:

    “艰苦的工作就像担子,摆在我们的面前,看我们敢不敢承担。担子有轻有重。有的人拈轻怕重,把重担子推给人家,自己拣轻的挑。这就不是好的态度。有的同志不是这样,享受让给人家,担子拣重的挑,吃苦在别人前头,享受在别人后头。这样的同志就是好同志。这种共产主义者的精神,我们都要学习。”
    “不少的人对工作不负责任,拈轻怕重,把重担子推给人家,自己挑轻的。一事当前,先替自己打算,然后再替别人打算。出了一点力就觉得了不起,喜欢自吹,生怕人家不知道。对同志对人民不是满腔热忱,而是冷冷清清,漠不关心,麻木不仁。这种人其实不是共产党员,至少不能算一个纯粹的共产党员。”
    “必须反对只顾自己不顾别人的本位主义的倾向。谁要是对别人的困难不管,别人要调他所属的干部不给,或以坏的送人,‘以邻为壑’,全不为别部、别地、别人想一想,这样的人就叫做本位主义者,这就是完全失掉了共产主义的精神。” \

    Mao criticised cadres who were irresponsible, preferred ease to hardship, were self-serving, boastful, and indifferent to comrades and the people. He also condemned "selfish departmentalism" (本位主义), where cadres prioritise the interests of their own unit over the greater good. He emphasised the importance of bearing hardships before others and enjoying comforts after them as a mark of a good communist.

The Common People (人民)

Chairman Mao Tse-tung placed immense faith in the power of the masses (人民群众) and consistently advocated for the Party to maintain close ties with them (联系群众). He viewed the people as the driving force of history and the foundation of the revolution and socialist construction:

  • Mao believed that the people are the creators of history:

    “人民,只有人民,才是创造世界历史的动力。” \

    This famous quote encapsulates Mao's fundamental belief that the masses are the true makers of history and the source of all progress.

  • Mao stressed the importance of the Party serving the people whole-heartedly (全心全意地为人民服务):

    “我们的出发点是为人民服务,全心全意地为人民服务,一刻也不脱离群众;一切从人民的利益出发,而不是从个人或小集团的利益出发;向人民负责和向党的领导机关负责的一致性。”
    “白求恩同志毫不利己专门利人的精神,表现在他对工作的极端的负责任,对同志对人民的极端的热忱。每个共产党员都要学习他。” \

    Serving the people "whole-heartedly and never for a moment divorcing ourselves from the masses" was a central tenet of Mao's thought. He held up individuals like Norman Bethune as examples of utter devotion to others without any thought of self, a spirit he expected every Communist to learn from.

  • Mao emphasised the need for the Party to rely on the masses and to learn from them:

    “我们历来主张革命要依靠人民群众,大家动手,反对只依靠少数人发号施令。”
    “我们应该深刻地注意群众生活的问题,从土地、劳动问题,到柴米油盐问题。……一切这些群众生活上的问题,都应该放到自己的日程上来。”
    “要联系群众,就要按照群众的需要和自愿。一切为群众的工作都要从群众的需要出发,而不是从任何良好的个人愿望出发。”
    “我们共产党人好比种子,人民好比土地。我们到了一个地方,就要同那里的人民结合起来,在人民中间生根、开花。” \

    The revolution must rely on the masses taking a hand, not just a few issuing orders. The Party should pay close attention to the well-being of the masses and address their concerns, from fundamental issues to daily necessities. Connecting with the masses means acting according to their needs and will, not based on personal desires. Communists should integrate themselves with the people like seeds taking root in the soil.

  • Mao highlighted the importance of the mass line in policy formation and implementation:

    “在我党的一切实际工作中,凡属正确的领导,必须是从群众中来,到群众中去。这就是说,将群众的意见(分散的无系统的意见)集中起来(经过研究,化为集中的系统的意见),又到群众中去作宣传,使群众的意见变成群众自己的主张,坚持下去,见到成效。”
    “善于把党的政策变为群众的行动,善于使我们的每一个运动,每一个斗争,不但领导干部懂得,而且广大的群众都能懂得,都能掌握,这是一项马克思列宁主义的领导艺术。” \

    The mass line involves taking the scattered ideas of the masses, concentrating them into correct policies, and then returning these policies to the masses so they become the people's own convictions and actions. A key skill of Marxist-Leninist leadership is ensuring that Party policies are understood and mastered by the broad masses.

  • Mao recognised the dual nature of the people, including both progressive and backward elements, and the need for the Party to unite with the majority:

    “任何地方的群众,一般是先进的、中间的和落后的三部分人。故领导者必须善于团结少数先进分子作为领导的骨干,并凭借这批骨干去提高中间分子,争取落后分子。”
    “共产党人必须善于同群众的大多数(包括工、农、兵、学、商一切爱国的人们)一道工作。对于那些落后的人们,除了不可救药者外,不是采取排斥态度,而是采取规劝态度,使之翻然改进,弃旧图新。”
    “共产党员对于落后的人们的态度,不是轻视他们,看不起他们,而是亲近他们,团结他们,说服他们,鼓励他们前进。” \

    The masses consist of active, intermediate, and backward elements, and leaders must be skilled in uniting the active elements to elevate the intermediate and win over the backward. Communists should work with the vast majority of the people, including all patriots, and adopt a persuasive approach towards those who are backward, helping them to progress rather than excluding them.

人權學者,蓄奴罪成

 常春藤盟人權學者,蓄奴罪成

夫英倫近日之事,若夫穆甘貝法官者,實令人慨嘆不已。謂其身為法官,且涉聯合國事,理應明曉事理。當世竟有蓄奴之事?強迫他人無償勞役?於今之世,豈非匪夷所思乎?

其尤可憎者,乃其竟欲援引外交豁免權!「吾乃本國之法官,享有豁免!」噫!夫人,此非爾等凌虐他人之通行證也。反當使爾等行事更為謹慎,而非肆無忌憚。位高權重之人,竟濫用其權若此,實令人作嘔。

吾所痛心者,乃受害者之弱勢也。以虛妄之言誘至此地,困於囹圄之中,自覺無力脫身。此乃大謬不然之事也。此等事竟發生於英倫,英倫本應為世之表率。何以有人能如此待人?繼而又欲脅迫證人,其行可憎至極!

每聞此事,令人不禁疑慮,世間尚有正直之人乎?惟願正義得以伸張,不僅為受害者,亦欲昭告世人,此等行徑,無論何人,皆不可容忍。惜哉!此乃天理之淪喪也!


https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn892zq6z43o

Ivy League Human Rights Fellow Convicted for Having a Slave

Ivy League Human Rights Fellow Convicted for Having a Slave 


This whole thing going on in the UK with that judge, Lydia Mugambe, it's just...something else. You'd think a judge, especially one involved with the UN, would know better. Modern slavery? Forcing someone to work for free? In this day and age? It's unbelievable.

And the gall of it, claiming diplomatic immunity! "I'm a judge in my country, I have immunity!" Well, lady, that doesn't give you a free pass to exploit people. It should mean you're more careful, not less. It's disgusting when people in positions of power abuse that power like this.

What gets me is the vulnerability of the victim. Brought over under false pretenses, trapped in a situation where she feels she can't leave. That's just plain wrong. This is happening in the UK, which should be setting a good example. How can someone do that to another person? And then, trying to intimidate a witness? It is terrible.

You hear these stories, and it makes you wonder if anyone's really on the up-and-up anymore. You just hope there's some justice, not just for the victim, but to send a message that this kind of behavior is unacceptable, no matter who you are. It is so unfortunate, this is a travesty!

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn892zq6z43o