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2026年7月30日 星期四

Resolving the Drone vs. Traditional Force Debate



Resolving the Drone vs. Traditional Force Debate

Using the Theory of Constraints Conflict Cloud

Technology does not replace soldiers. Soldiers cannot win modern wars without technology.

Introduction

The debate between investing in drones and AI versus investing in traditional artillery, ammunition, and manpower is often presented as an either-or decision.

Ukraine has experienced this debate in a highly visible way. One side argued that an aging population and limited manpower required a technological leap through autonomous systems. The other argued that no amount of technology could compensate for collapsing front lines if infantry lacked ammunition and support.

Both sides appear to disagree over budgets.

In reality, they share the same objective.


The TOC Conflict Cloud

Common Objective (A)

Defend the nation and maximize the probability of victory while preserving national survival.


Requirement B

Maintain an effective frontline capable of holding territory today.


Requirement C

Develop decisive future military capability capable of changing the balance of the war.


Prerequisite D

Spend most available resources on:

  • artillery

  • ammunition

  • logistics

  • infantry

  • salaries

  • conventional forces


Prerequisite D'

Spend most available resources on:

  • drones

  • AI

  • autonomous systems

  • electronic warfare

  • rapid innovation


The Conflict

Traditional military leaders argue:

Without a frontline, there is no country left to defend.

Technology advocates argue:

Without technological superiority, the frontline will eventually lose anyway.

Both statements are true.

The conflict exists because of one hidden assumption:

The same budget dollar cannot simultaneously strengthen today's battlefield and tomorrow's battlefield.

TOC asks whether this assumption is actually true.


Injection 1

Create Two Independent Innovation Loops

Instead of treating drones as another procurement program, separate military spending into two distinct systems.

System A — Operational Readiness

Responsible for:

  • ammunition

  • artillery

  • logistics

  • soldier equipment

  • vehicle maintenance

Measured by:

  • readiness

  • survivability

  • response time


System B — Battlefield Innovation

Responsible for:

  • drones

  • AI

  • autonomous boats

  • software

  • electronic warfare

  • rapid experimentation

Measured by:

  • innovation speed

  • deployment cycle

  • combat effectiveness


Each system has:

  • different leadership

  • different KPIs

  • different procurement rules

  • different approval cycles

The innovation organization behaves more like a venture-capital-backed technology company than a government department.

Ukraine has already demonstrated elements of this model through rapid drone procurement and decentralized innovation.


Injection 2

Every Drone Must Eliminate Future Conventional Spending

Instead of asking

"How many drones should we buy?"

Ask

"Which traditional military cost does each drone replace?"

For example:

One long-range drone that destroys an ammunition depot may replace:

  • hundreds of artillery shells

  • dozens of dangerous reconnaissance missions

  • significant fuel consumption

  • future casualty costs

Instead of viewing drones as additional spending, they become investments that reduce future operating costs.

Budget discussions shift from:

Technology versus artillery

to

Technology that reduces artillery requirements.

Both sides now benefit.


New Conflict Cloud

Instead of:

Traditional vs Technology

becomes

Traditional + Technology

where technology exists to:

  • reduce casualties

  • multiply combat power

  • preserve conventional capability


Lessons for Taiwan

Taiwan faces a similar strategic discussion.

The debate is often framed as:

  • missiles or drones

  • navy or unmanned boats

  • fighters or AI

  • traditional procurement or innovation

This framing creates political deadlock because each side believes the other threatens national security.

A TOC approach suggests reframing the discussion.

The objective is not to maximize any individual weapon system.

The objective is to maximize deterrence while ensuring Taiwan can continue fighting if deterrence fails.

This requires maintaining sufficient conventional capability while simultaneously accelerating innovation.

Innovation should not wait until every traditional procurement debate has concluded.

Likewise, traditional readiness cannot be sacrificed in pursuit of future technology.


Conclusion

The real conflict is not between generals and technologists.

It is between two planning horizons.

One side is trying to survive tomorrow.

The other is trying to win next year.

A successful defense strategy must accomplish both.

As Dr. Eliyahu Goldratt often observed:

"People are not in conflict; assumptions are."

Once the incorrect assumption is removed, the apparent conflict disappears.

Technology and conventional forces are no longer competitors.

They become force multipliers for one another.