2025年12月12日 星期五

the Obsolescence of Cost Accounting Systems part 1

 the Obsolescence of Cost Accounting Systems


I. The Historical Foundation: Cost Management (Pre-1925)

A. Original Purpose and Development of Accounting Systems

  • Management Accounting is Not New

    1. The use of accounting information for internal management planning and control is not a new phenomenon [Johnson and Kaplan].

    2. Accounting systems for managerial decisions and control can be traced back to the origins of hierarchical enterprises in the early nineteenth century [Johnson and Kaplan].

    3. Management accounting practices developed and flourished in the 19th and early 20th centuries, unencumbered by demands for external reporting [Johnson and Kaplan].

  • The Ancient Roots of Business Control: Why Management Accounting Isn't New

  • When people talk about modern business management—things like budgeting, calculating product costs, and evaluating managers—it is often assumed that these are new inventions, perhaps developed only after World War II [Johnson and Kaplan, 4].

  • In fact, the way managers plan and control their operations using internal information is a very old practice.

  • What is a Hierarchical Enterprise?

  • A hierarchical enterprise is simply a business big enough to have different levels of management, where owners or senior leaders employ managers and workers [Johnson and Kaplan, 19].

  • Before the 1800s, most businesses were small, and they bought or sold almost everything they needed in the open market[Johnson and Kaplan, 18]. If a merchant needed yarn and cloth, they paid an outside artisan a piece rate (a market price) to produce it [Johnson and Kaplan, 50].

  • However, starting in the early 19th century, especially with the rise of factories, large companies began doing multiple activities—like spinning, weaving, and dyeing—inside their own buildings, rather than buying these services on the market [Johnson and Kaplan, 19, 41, 42].

  • This change created a new and urgent problem for managers: How do we know if our internal operations are efficient?[Johnson and Kaplan, 19].

  • Because these internal activities were no longer priced by the market, managers had to invent their own measures to see if resources (like cotton, labor, and fuel) were being converted effectively into finished products [Johnson and Kaplan, 19, 51]. This need to monitor internal processes gave birth to management accounting [Johnson and Kaplan, 19, 43].

  • Early Examples of Management Control

  • One of the first places these systems appeared was in New England textile mills [Johnson and Kaplan, 46]. These companies integrated spinning and weaving into a single plant [Johnson and Kaplan, 52]. The accounting systems they created tracked conversion costs—the expenses related to changing raw material into a final product [Johnson and Kaplan, 24, 74]. These accounts tracked the outlay on internally controlled resources per unit of output, such as labor and overhead costs per pound of yarn [Johnson and Kaplan, 46, 48]. This information helped managers make short-run decisions, like setting prices for special orders [Johnson and Kaplan, 58].

  • Another prime example is the railroad industry [Johnson and Kaplan, 21, 64]. To oversee vast operations stretching across wide geographical areas, railroads had to develop detailed internal accounting systems [Johnson and Kaplan, 21, 65]. They invented measures like cost per ton-mile (how much it costs to move one ton of freight one mile) and the operating ratio (revenues divided by operating costs) to measure the efficiency and profitability of different segments (like passenger services versus freight) [Johnson and Kaplan, 22, 36, 68].

  • The Freedom of Focusing on Internal Needs

  • The third point explains why these early systems were so effective before they became standardized and distorted:

  • To be "unencumbered by demands for external reporting" means that early managers did not have to worry about rules set by government regulators, the tax authorities, or outside auditors [Johnson and Kaplan, 5, 30]. They did not have to worry about pleasing stockholders with periodic reports [Johnson and Kaplan, 24].

  • Instead, they kept two separate systems [Johnson and Kaplan, 24]:

    • Financial Accounting: Simple books (usually double-entry) to record cash received and paid, mainly to track assets and debts for owners and creditors [Johnson and Kaplan, 24, 43].

    • Management Accounting: A completely independent system designed purely to measure internal efficiencyand help managers make daily and strategic decisions [Johnson and Kaplan, 24, 74].

  • Because they were only focused on internal utility, the records were incredibly practical. For instance, the conversion cost measures used by managers like Andrew Carnegie in his steel works only focused on continuously gathering data on all direct costs in every process [Johnson and Kaplan, 61]. The system gave managers good information about operating costs to make decisions but ignored things like asset depreciation, which is a major concern for today's external financial reports [Johnson and Kaplan, 63].

  • In short, in the 19th century, management accounting was a tool for control and profit-seeking—a straightforward way to figure out where to reduce costs and increase productivity [Johnson and Kaplan, 19, 74]. It only became complicated and misleading decades later, when the financial system demanded that internal accounting rules be bent to meet the needs of external auditors and regulators, causing the system to lose its focus on internal relevance [Johnson and Kaplan, 5, 32].

  • The Necessity of Internal Measurement

    1. Management accounting emerged when conversion processes (like manufacturing or transportation) that were formerly priced through market exchanges began occurring within organizations [Johnson and Kaplan].

    2. Lacking market prices for these internal conversion processes, owners devised measures to determine the "price" of output from internal operations and monitor efficiency [Johnson and Kaplan].

    3. Management accounting focused people's attention on the potential gains from internal coordination, thus facilitating the growth of large-scale firms [Johnson and Kaplan].

  • The Invisible Handshake: Why Factories Needed Accountants

  • For a very long time in history, if you owned a business, you knew exactly how much things cost because you bought and sold everything on the open market.

  • If you made shoes, you paid a shoemaker a piece rate (a market price) for every pair of soles he stitched [Johnson and Kaplan, 48]. If you needed leather, you bought it from a supplier at a market price [Johnson and Kaplan, 41]. Your business was simply recording cash going in and cash going out [Johnson and Kaplan, 18].

  • But, starting in the 1800s, everything changed, which explains the first statement

  • The Move Indoors

  • This means that owners started bringing many separate steps of production inside their own business [Johnson and Kaplan, 40]. Instead of paying an independent worker a market price for weaving yarn, the owner built a factory and hired that worker for a fixed wage [Johnson and Kaplan, 49]. The process of converting raw materials (like cotton) into finished goods (like cloth) was now happening "within the organization," under one roof [Johnson and Kaplan, 40].

  • This was a vertical change—instead of relying on the market to price every step, the owner took over two or more of those processes [Johnson and Kaplan, 40, 42].

  • Imagine a railroad company [Johnson and Kaplan, 21]. Previously, moving freight across a tiny region might have involved negotiating with several independent local carting services (the market). Once the railroad built a massive system spanning hundreds of miles, they were doing the job themselves [Johnson and Kaplan, 35]. The activity of moving goods (transportation) was now performed within their gigantic organization [Johnson and Kaplan, 19].

  • This led immediately to the problem described in the second statement:

  • Lacking market prices for these internal conversion processes, owners devised measures to determine the "price" of output from internal operations and monitor efficiency [Johnson and Kaplan, 19].

  • Inventing the Internal Yardstick

  • When you hire a worker for a daily wage instead of paying a piece rate, you lose the automatic market signal of how efficient that worker is [Johnson and Kaplan, 49]. If the market used to charge £5 per bolt of cloth, and now your internal factory takes too much labor time and too much wasted material to produce it, how do you know? No one is selling you that internal step anymore [Johnson and Kaplan, 19, 49].

  • Owners needed a new kind of accounting, which became management accounting, to figure out the "price" of those internal activities [Johnson and Kaplan, 19].

  • They started creating measures to monitor efficiency [Johnson and Kaplan, 19]:

  • In Textile Mills: They calculated conversion costs—how much they spent on labor and factory overhead (things like fuel and maintenance) to convert raw cotton into finished yarn or fabric [Johnson and Kaplan, 24, 74]. These calculated costs provided a rational basis to evaluate internal costs and compare them to the prices the market used to charge [Johnson and Kaplan, 50].

  • In Railroads: They couldn't use "cost per bolt" of cloth, so they invented entirely new measurements like cost per ton-mile (how much it costs to move one ton of freight one mile) [Johnson and Kaplan, 36].

  • These measures served two crucial purposes: first, to calculate if the internal process was truly profitable [Johnson and Kaplan, 50], and second, to motivate and evaluate the managers who oversaw these internal processes [Johnson and Kaplan, 19]. If the internal manager could keep the conversion costs low, they were doing a good job.

  • The Growth Engine

  • The ability to create these accurate internal measurements had a huge outcome, as noted in the final statement:

  • Management accounting focused people's attention on the potential gains from internal coordination, thus facilitating the growth of large-scale firms [Johnson and Kaplan, 43].

  • Before this type of accounting existed, a company could only grow so large before the owner lost control. Imagine trying to manage a nationwide railroad or a complex steel mill without knowing the cost per unit in each region or department [Johnson and Kaplan, 21, 59]. The system would collapse into chaos.

  • Management accounting provided the necessary information and control needed to coordinate highly complex operations [Johnson and Kaplan, 21]. By creating numbers that showed managers where value could be gained by coordinating activities inside the firm—rather than using the market—it provided the justification and the tools for companies to increase their size and complexity [Johnson and Kaplan, 43]. This is why management accounting may have facilitated the growth of large-scale firms in the first place [Johnson and Kaplan, 42]. It gave owners the confidence that they could expand without losing track of their profits.

  • Key Managerial Focus: Conversion Costs

    1. In nineteenth-century single-activity firms (like textile mills and railroads), management accounting practices had one common purpose: to evaluate a company's internalized processes [Johnson and Kaplan].

    2. Textile Mills (Early 19th Century): Cost accounts were created to ascertain the direct labor and overhead costs of converting raw material, focusing primarily on the outlay on internally controlled resources per unit of intermediate output [Johnson and Kaplan].

    3. Railroads: Systems were created to control operations across large geographic scales, using measures like cost per ton-mile [Johnson and Kaplan].

    4. Steel Works (Andrew Carnegie): The system focused primarily on continuously gathering data on all direct costs in every process, using cost sheets to evaluate department managers and check raw material mix [Johnson and Kaplan].

  • The First Job of the Manager: Measuring the Internal Engine

  • For businesses in the 1800s, success depended on how well they converted raw materials into finished goods or services. The sources explain that management accounting was created for this precise task.

  • The first key idea is the central, shared mission of early internal accounting:

  • In nineteenth-century single-activity firms (like textile mills and railroads), management accounting practices had one common purpose: to evaluate a company's internalized processes [Johnson and Kaplan, 37, 74].

  • In the early 1800s, businesses began growing very large by bringing many steps of production or service delivery "inside" their organization, rather than paying outside merchants or contractors for every small task [Johnson and Kaplan, 19, 35]. These companies were called "single-activity firms" because they focused on mastering just one overall job, like manufacturing or transportation [Johnson and Kaplan, 35, 74].

  • Since managers were no longer using market prices to judge how well their internal steps were running, they had to invent a single purpose for their internal accounting: to evaluate and control the efficiency of these self-managed processes [Johnson and Kaplan, 15, 74]. If the internal process was efficient, the owners were confident the entire business would be profitable in the long run [Johnson and Kaplan, 74].

  • The following examples show how this common purpose led to different, specialized internal measurement tools for each industry:

  • Example 1: The Textile Mills (Measuring Conversion Cost)

  • The early textile factories in New England, which combined spinning and weaving into one integrated plant, needed to measure the cost of changing raw material (cotton) into finished goods (cloth) [Johnson and Kaplan, 24, 46].

  • Textile Mills (Early 19th Century): Cost accounts were created to ascertain the direct labor and overhead costs of converting raw material, focusing primarily on the outlay on internally controlled resources per unit of intermediate output [Johnson and Kaplan, 24, 48].

  • This means they focused on Conversion Costs [Johnson and Kaplan, 24]. They meticulously tracked:

  • Direct Labor Costs: How much they spent on workers’ wages in each step (like picking, spinning, or weaving) [Johnson and Kaplan, 25, 29].

  • Overhead Costs: Expenses beyond raw material and labor, such as fuel, starch, repairs, and factory supplies [Johnson and Kaplan, 28, 50].

  • By tracking these costs, managers could determine the "outlay on internally controlled resources per unit" [Johnson and Kaplan, 42]. For example, they could calculate the labor cost per pound of yarn produced [Johnson and Kaplan, 29, 51]. This information was used to make quick decisions, such as setting prices for special orders, because it measured the one thing the manager could influence: the rate at which workers converted raw cotton into fabric [Johnson and Kaplan, 54].

  • Crucially, these early textile accounts were not designed to satisfy external financial reports; they were strictly an internal tool to control costs and provide incentives for workers to achieve productivity goals [Johnson and Kaplan, 55].

  • Example 2: The Railroads (Measuring Scale and Distance)

  • Railroad companies were some of the largest, most geographically spread-out businesses of the 19th century [Johnson and Kaplan, 35]. Their activity was transportation, not manufacturing.

  • Railroads: Systems were created to control operations across large geographic scales, using measures like cost per ton-mile [Johnson and Kaplan, 36].

  • Since a railroad’s output isn't a factory-made unit, they had to invent measures specific to their vast operations [Johnson and Kaplan, 36]. The most famous measure was Cost Per Ton-Mile [Johnson and Kaplan, 36]: the cost of moving one ton of freight over one mile [Johnson and Kaplan, 37].

  • This measurement allowed managers to:

  • Control Operating Costs: They could see how much operating expenses (like fuel and maintenance) were costing per unit of work (the ton-mile) [Johnson and Kaplan, 36, 64].

  • Evaluate Subordinate Managers: Because railroads were so complex, they were the first businesses to have managers reporting to other salaried managers. The cost per ton-mile became a critical tool for assessing the performance of those subordinate managers across different geographical segments [Johnson and Kaplan, 37, 65].

  • Measure Profitability: They also developed the "operating ratio" (revenues divided by operating costs) to measure the profitability of segments like passenger versus freight services [Johnson and Kaplan, 37, 66].

  • Example 3: The Steel Works (Measuring Cost Obsession)

  • The giant steel companies of the late 1800s were highly complex and capital-intensive, but like the textile mills, their activity was still converting raw materials into a finished product [Johnson and Kaplan, 32, 56].

  • Steel Works (Andrew Carnegie): The system focused primarily on continuously gathering data on all direct costs in every process, using cost sheets to evaluate department managers and check raw material mix [Johnson and Kaplan, 33, 57].

  • Andrew Carnegie, a famous steel entrepreneur, was obsessed with continuously gathering data on all direct costs in every process from the blast furnace to the rolling mill [Johnson and Kaplan, 33, 57].

  • He used cost sheets as his main control tool [Johnson and Kaplan, 59]. These reports gathered daily or monthly data on every input—ore, coal, labor, repairs, fuel—for each ton of steel produced [Johnson and Kaplan, 58]. These precise cost sheets were used to:

  • Evaluate Managers: They were Carnegie’s primary instrument of control, used to question department heads about any changes in unit costs [Johnson and Kaplan, 59].

  • Check Quality: They helped check the quality and mix of raw materials [Johnson and Kaplan, 60].

  • Pricing: They were invaluable for estimating costs and quoting prices for non-standard items like bridges [Johnson and Kaplan, 60].

  • Carnegie's famous rule was: "Watch the costs and the profits will take care of themselves" [Johnson and Kaplan, 59]. His success demonstrated that managers could achieve high returns simply by having excellent information about their direct operating costs [Johnson and Kaplan, 61].

  • Original Assumptions of Early Cost Management

    1. External Independence: The management and financial systems operated independently of each other [Johnson and Kaplan].

    2. Focus on Efficiency: The goal was to promote efficiency in the key operating activity [Johnson and Kaplan].

    3. No Inventory Valuation: These early systems did not typically compile data to attach costs to product inventory for financial reporting. Inventories were often valued at market prices in reports to stockholders [Johnson and Kaplan].

  • The Early Days of Business: Two Separate Books of Truth

  • In the early years of large companies (the 1800s and early 1900s), the way businesses kept track of their money was very different from today. They kept two entirely separate sets of books, each serving a clear and distinct purpose. This explains the three concepts you asked about, particularly why managers were free to focus solely on running the factory efficiently.

  • 1. External Independence: Two Systems, Two Jobs

  • The first concept addresses the separation between the internal view and the external view of the company:

  • External Independence: The management and financial systems operated independently of each other [Johnson and Kaplan, 5, 21].

  • Think of a successful business today. It needs to know two things:

  • External Truth (Financial System): Did we make enough money to please our investors, satisfy the government’s tax rules, and keep our bank happy? This system tracks cash coming in and cash going out, recording transactions with the outside world [Johnson and Kaplan, 17, 36].

  • Internal Truth (Management System): Is the factory running smoothly? Are our workers being productive? Which internal departments need help?

  • In the 19th century, these two "truths" were kept completely apart [Johnson and Kaplan, 21]. The managers did not have to worry about the rules of the financial system when designing the internal one [Johnson and Kaplan, 5].

  • For example, a railroad company had a financial system to track ticket sales and expenses for the owners and creditors (people who loaned money) [Johnson and Kaplan, 36]. Separately, they had a unique internal system to calculate things like "cost per ton-mile" to see if their trains were moving freight efficiently [Johnson and Kaplan, 36]. The internal system was designed purely for management’s use and control; it did not need to be shown to the public or external regulators [Johnson and Kaplan, 5].

  • 2. Focus on Efficiency: Mastering the One Job

  • Because management was free from external reporting demands, their internal system could concentrate entirely on what they could control inside the factory or warehouse:

  • Focus on Efficiency: The goal was to promote efficiency in the key operating activity [Johnson and Kaplan, 21].

  • In those days, companies typically focused on mastering just one core task—a "single economic activity" [Johnson and Kaplan, 35, 59]. For instance, a textile mill’s single activity was converting raw cotton into finished cloth [Johnson and Kaplan, 59]. A railroad’s single activity was transportation [Johnson and Kaplan, 34].

  • The management accounting system was set up solely to measure and promote efficiency in that main, "key operating activity" [Johnson and Kaplan, 21].

  • Example (Andrew Carnegie's Steel Works): The key activity was converting raw materials (iron, coal) into steel [Johnson and Kaplan, 59]. Carnegie’s managers didn't focus on abstract financial ratios; they focused relentlessly on direct costs in every process and kept detailed records (cost sheets) to check the efficiency of conversion for every ton of steel produced [Johnson and Kaplan, 33, 59]. Carnegie believed if they watched the costs and kept efficiency high, the profits would naturally follow [Johnson and Kaplan, 59].

  • 3. No Inventory Valuation: Using Market Prices

  • The third idea explains a crucial difference in how they valued their products compared to modern companies:

  • No Inventory Valuation: These early systems did not typically compile data to attach costs to product inventory for financial reporting. Inventories were often valued at market prices in reports to stockholders [Johnson and Kaplan, 24, 131].

  • "Inventory valuation" means figuring out the specific monetary cost of all the goods the company hasn't sold yet (the inventory). Today, accountants use complex rules to "attach" every expense—labor, overhead, and materials—to each unit of product still sitting in the warehouse [Johnson and Kaplan, 131, 136].

  • In the early days, they skipped this complicated process entirely [Johnson and Kaplan, 131]. When preparing financial statements for outside investors, if a textile mill still had unsold cloth, they didn't try to calculate exactly how much every worker and every machine contributed to that cloth's cost. Instead, they often simply used the current market price of similar cloth to value their inventory [Johnson and Kaplan, 131].

  • Why this matters:

  • Speed and Simplicity: They didn't have to spend time and effort accumulating all those internal costs into a unit cost figure for external reports [Johnson and Kaplan, 24]. They just looked at what the market was charging for the same item.

  • Focus on Action: This freed the internal management system to focus purely on cost control and efficiency[Johnson and Kaplan, 47, 48]. The internal reports only measured controllable elements like conversion cost per unit of output [Johnson and Kaplan, 24, 48]. Managers used this direct cost information to decide on special order prices or equipment modifications, ignoring complex overhead figures that are mandatory today [Johnson and Kaplan, 47].

  • In essence, these three principles meant that early management accounting was a practical, streamlined tool for making things and saving money, unburdened by the external rules now known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) [Johnson and Kaplan, 5, 27]. It was only later in the 20th century that the external financial rules took over and forced the internal management systems to become "too late, too aggregated, and too distorted" for managers to use effectively [Johnson and Kaplan, 9].

  • The Scientific Management Movement (1880-1910)

    1. Engineers like Frederick W. Taylor developed information about standards to gauge the potential efficiency of tasks and minimize waste of material and time [Johnson and Kaplan].

    2. This led to the calculation of finished product unit cost to aid managerial decisions, such as pricing, and these costs were closer to replacement cost than to historic cost [Johnson and Kaplan].

    3. By 1925, virtually every management accounting procedure used today had been developed [Johnson and Kaplan].

  • The Golden Age of Management: Inventing the Tools of Business Control

  • The history of management accounting, particularly in the period between 1880 and 1925, shows a time of intense creation. This was when business managers and engineers invented almost every internal financial tool we still use today. These innovations were driven by the need to control complex factories and ensure every resource was used as efficiently as possible.

  • 1. Frederick W. Taylor and the Invention of "Standards"

  • The first idea focuses on efficiency and minimizing waste:

  • Engineers like Frederick W. Taylor developed information about standards to gauge the potential efficiency of tasks and minimize waste of material and time [Johnson and Kaplan, 75, 76].

  • This development happened mainly in metal-working firms (companies making complex machine parts, locks, typewriters, etc.) in the late 19th century [Johnson and Kaplan, 47, 48, 71]. These factories were complicated, and managers found it hard to know if workers were performing tasks as efficiently as possible [Johnson and Kaplan, 73].

  • Frederick W. Taylor led the movement known as "Scientific Management" [Johnson and Kaplan, 50, 75]. His goal was to find the "one best way" to perform every job, minimizing waste of both labor and material [Johnson and Kaplan, 76].

  • What are Standards?

  • Taylor's approach meant moving beyond simple historical records and actually determining what output should be [Johnson and Kaplan, 75].

  • Standards are Planned Measures: Instead of just recording that a job took four hours (historic cost), Taylor's engineers would study the task (using things like time-and-motion studies) and develop physical standards [Johnson and Kaplan, 18, 76]. They would determine that the job should take, say, only three hours and use exactly 10 pounds of steel, thus minimizing wasted time and materials [Johnson and Kaplan, 75, 76].

  • Focus on Physical Efficiency: This information was designed to monitor the physical efficiency of labor and materials [Johnson and Kaplan, 76]. It was a tool for planning the flow of work and making sure waste was kept to an absolute minimum [Johnson and Kaplan, 76].

  • This process allowed managers to stop relying on luck or custom and start relying on measured, engineered rules for efficiency [Johnson and Kaplan, 48, 50, 75].

  • 2. Unit Costs for Real-Time Pricing Decisions

  • Once engineers had accurate physical standards (how much labor and material should be consumed), they converted these into financial terms, leading to the second point:

  • This led to the calculation of finished product unit cost to aid managerial decisions, such as pricing, and these costs were closer to replacement cost than to historic cost [Johnson and Kaplan, 18, 78].

  • The engineers calculated the finished product unit cost by translating the standard time and standard material usage into standard labor cost and standard material cost [Johnson and Kaplan, 18, 78].

  • A Key Tool for Pricing

  • This finished product unit cost was used to help managers make critical decisions, especially pricing [Johnson and Kaplan, 78]. Managers used this unit cost to set the minimum price they needed to charge a customer [Johnson and Kaplan, 78].

  • The Difference Between Replacement and Historic Cost

  • The most important feature of these costs was that they were designed to be current and actionable, meaning they were not tied to old, outdated records [Johnson and Kaplan, 18].

  • Historic Cost: This is the traditional accounting cost—what the product actually cost to make using the labor wages and material prices paid weeks or months ago [Johnson and Kaplan, 78].

  • Replacement Cost: These standard costs were frequently updated to reflect the most current prices for labor and materials [Johnson and Kaplan, 18]. They told managers what it would cost to replace or reproduce the item today [Johnson and Kaplan, 18].

  • By using costs closer to replacement cost, managers had a reliable figure for current pricing decisions [Johnson and Kaplan, 78]. This calculation was solely meant to aid management decisions and was kept separate from the official, historical records used for external financial reporting [Johnson and Kaplan, 18, 78].

  • 3. The Culmination of Management Innovation

  • The efforts of engineers like Taylor, combined with the earlier work in railroads and textile mills, reached a peak in the early 20th century:

  • By 1925, virtually every management accounting procedure used today had been developed [Johnson and Kaplan, 21, 173].

  • This statement confirms that the entire foundation of modern business planning and control was laid in this 100-year window (roughly 1825 to 1925) [Johnson and Kaplan, 173]. By 1925, businesses had invented and fully developed nearly every internal procedure needed to run a complex, large-scale enterprise [Johnson and Kaplan, 21]:

  • Cost Accounts: Systems to track the cost of labor, materials, and overhead [Johnson and Kaplan, 21].

  • Budgeting: Tools for planning cash flow, income, and large capital investments [Johnson and Kaplan, 21].

  • Control Systems: Standard costs and variance analysis (tracking deviations from standard costs), and flexible budgets (adjusting costs based on volume changes) [Johnson and Kaplan, 21, 173].

  • Performance Measures: Methods like Return on Investment (ROI) and divisional performance measures [Johnson and Kaplan, 21, 64].

  • This means that the management accounting systems we use today are fundamentally based on practices developed decades ago to meet the needs of those historical organizations [Johnson and Kaplan, 173]. After 1925, the pace of innovation stopped [Johnson and Kaplan, 21].

2025年12月8日 星期一

論「報、保、包」之義及其與承包制度之關

 

《論「報、保、包」之義及其與承包制度之關》


中國社會之人際脈絡,久以「義、責、序」為網,而「報、保、包」三字,尤為其中深層之基礎。三字同音而義異,其所涵攝者,正是華人社會理解責任、義務、信任與承擔之方式。

一、報:報償、報答、報仇之三重意義

「報」之一字,含義深長:

  1. 報償 —— 有受必有返。

  2. 報答 —— 以恩還恩,以義還義。

  3. 報仇 —— 受害必雪恥,不容無狀。

「報」兼善惡兩端:善則以德為報,惡則以仇為報。儒家以人倫為本,故行善須有報,受害亦須伸冤。不能「報」者,無以立於關係之中。

二、保:保有、保持與維繫

「保」者,守之也。其義有三:

  • 保有委託之事物

  • 保持穩定不中斷

  • 保護人事,不使其失序

此字之精神重在承續。無論是家族、財產、職務或社會秩序,「保」皆代表一種不可輕棄之責。

三、包:全任、全責、全承

「包」所指者,是全幅度之承擔
一旦「包」之,則成敗皆由己負,無可推責。

傳統行會、村社、契約制度之形成,皆以此字之精神為根基。能「包」者,乃可信、可任之人。


四、「報、保、包」與鄧小平承包制度之連結

鄧小平改革時,採行承包制度,使農業、企業、地方皆以契約方式運作。此制度之所以能深入社會,部分因其深合三字傳統:

  • 承包即「包」:全責、全利、全風險皆由承包者負。

  • 達成目標而得獎即「報」:符合華人「有功必報」之邏輯。

  • 地方必須維持秩序即「保」:安定為先。

三字同時運作,使承包制度既有效率,又具文化正當性。


五、其陷阱:文化邏輯之反噬

然此三字亦引出長期弊端:

  1. 「包」致責任過度集中
    地方幹部對稅收、增長、穩定全數「包」下,易生造假、壓迫與濫權。

  2. 「報」生利益交換
    以績效換獎賞,易化為私人恩怨、上下其手之「報償」網絡。

  3. 「保」使體制避險
    官員求穩不求變,只求「保位」、「保數」而不敢創新。

由此觀之,「報、保、包」不僅塑造了中國的人情邏輯,也牽動了改革後的制度運作,使承包制度既成功又脆弱。

The Three Pillars of Commitment: “Bao 報”, “Bao 保”, and “Bao 包” in Chinese Culture and Their Link to Deng Xiaoping’s Contracting System

 

The Three Pillars of Commitment: “Bao 報”, “Bao 保”, and “Bao 包” in Chinese Culture and Their Link to Deng Xiaoping’s Contracting System


Chinese society has long been shaped by a set of implicit cultural logics that define relationships, duties, and social expectations. Among these, the trio of “報” (repayment), “保” (preservation), and “包” (total responsibility) forms a subtle but powerful framework. Although these three characters share phonetic similarity, their meanings extend in different directions—together forming a uniquely Chinese way of understanding obligation and trust.

1. 報: The Logic of Reciprocity, Gratitude, and Vengeance

In Chinese thought,  carries three major strands:

  1. 報償 — to repay what one has received.

  2. 報答 — to return kindness, often with loyalty.

  3. 報仇 — to repay harm, often through vengeance.

This dual nature—gratitude and vengeance—reflects the Confucian belief that relationships are moral transactions. Good deeds must not go unanswered; nor should injustice remain unresolved. To Chinese society, one who cannot “報” is unreliable, unrooted, and unbound by duty.

2. 保: The Responsibility to Uphold, Maintain, and Defend

, by contrast, emphasizes continuity. It implies:

  • to preserve what has been entrusted,

  • to maintain stability, and

  • to protect people or resources under one’s care.

“保” expresses a commitment not to innovate radically but to safeguard what must not be lost—family, property, agreements, loyalty. It is the cultural basis for why Chinese clans emphasized guardianship and why imperial administrators were judged by their steadiness, not flamboyance.

3. 包: Total Responsibility, Full Commitment

 suggests wholenesscompleteness, and full accountability.
To “包” something is to take full charge of it, without excuses or partial responsibility.

In traditional society, someone who “包” a task is not only performing it—they are guaranteeing its outcome. This became the root concept behind many contractual, guild, and village arrangements.

Connecting These Concepts to Deng Xiaoping’s Contracting System (承包制度)

During the reform era of the late 1970s and 1980s, Deng Xiaoping introduced the system of 承包—contract responsibility, applying market principles to agriculture, state-owned enterprises, and local governance.

This policy resonated strongly with traditional cultural principles:

  • 承包 = 包 (full responsibility)
    Contractors guaranteed output, profit, or quotas, taking total responsibility for results.

  • 成功要報 (reward)
    Those who met quotas were rewarded—fitting the moral logic of “報償”.

  • 地方需保 (preserve stability)
    Local officials had to “保” order and continuity, upholding production and social stability.

But the Pitfalls: When Cultural Concepts Become Economic Distortions

The cultural resonance of 報、保、包 made the contracting system feel natural—but also created long-term weaknesses:

  1. 包 leads to over-responsibilization
    Local cadres “包” everything—taxes, growth, stability—leading to abuse, corner-cutting, and falsification.

  2. 報 encourages transactional loyalty
    Rewards created networks of personal repayment (報償), sometimes drifting into corruption or patron-client ties.

  3. 保 reinforces risk-aversion
    Officials avoided bold reform to “保” their positions, leading to stagnation or bureaucratic conservatism.

Thus, the contracting system succeeded in unleashing productivity but also carried deep cultural risks.
The trio of 報、保、包—core to Chinese ethics—became tools for both rapid development and systemic imbalance.

哈爾濱之影:東亞三國記伊藤博文之死

 

哈爾濱之影:東亞三國記藤博文之死


光緒三十五年十月二十六日,日本前相藤博文於哈爾濱車站,被朝鮮義士安重根一槍斃命。此一瞬間,震撼東亞,而三國所記,情旨各異,足見史不一途,國有其心。

日本之記:元老殞命

日本視依藤為開國元老,制憲名臣。其死載於日報,多言:

  • 國之喪事,

  • 和平之士無辜遇害,

  • 皇國聲名受損。

日本史家或言藤不甚贊同殖韓之急進,此說雖爭論未息,然其於日本記憶中,終為殞身之志士。

朝鮮之記:義士殉國

朝鮮則以安重根為:

  • 愛國志士,

  • 抗日先聲,

  • 以身赴義之烈士。

朝鮮史乘記之曰:日人侵陵既急,國步已危,安公奉志一擊,以警天下。其獄中所書,痛陳藤之罪,遂成朝鮮民族記憶之根。

中國之記:列強角逐之象

中國所見不同。哈爾濱為東北要衝,時有俄勢、日本之力,而清政日衰。中國之史論此事,多曰:

  • 清末國權不振,

  • 列強肆行中國疆土,

  • 東亞風雲將變。

中國雖非事之主體,然此案昭示:華土久為他國角力之場。

異同之義

藤之死,使人知史之本非一辭,乃三國之三鏡:

  • 日本記其元老,

  • 朝鮮頌其義士,

  • 中國恥其國弱。

同一事件,而評判乃殊。其所以然者:

  • 國情不同,

  • 苦樂異源,

  • 歷史自為其說。

哈爾濱一槍,非徒陳跡;其意猶在,示人東亞今日之局,多由昔日之記所造也。

The Shadow in Harbin: How Three Nations Remember the Death of Itō Hirobumi

 

The Shadow in Harbin: How Three Nations Remember the Death of Itō Hirobumi


On 26 October 1909, at the Harbin railway station, the first Prime Minister of Japan, Itō Hirobumi, was shot and killed by the Korean independence activist An Jung-geun.
The assassination became one of the most symbolically charged events in modern East Asian history—not merely because a statesman died, but because three civilizations recorded the same moment with three very different hearts.

Japan’s Record: A Fallen Elder Statesman

In Japan, Itō Hirobumi was remembered as a genrō—an elder statesman who helped modernize Japan and shape the Meiji Constitution.
Japanese accounts of the time framed his death as:

  • national tragedy,

  • A murder of a respected diplomat,

  • A disruption of Japan’s role in “stabilizing” the Korean Peninsula.

Newspapers portrayed Itō as a peace-seeking figure who opposed the harshest forms of colonial rule—though historians still debate the accuracy of this portrayal. Nevertheless, in the Japanese memory, Itō’s death symbolized an attack not only on a statesman, but on Japan’s rising international prestige.

Korea’s Record: A Martyrdom of Resistance

In Korea, the same event is remembered in an opposite light.
To Koreans, An Jung-geun is not merely an assassin, but:

  • patriot,

  • freedom fighter,

  • A man who sacrificed himself to resist Japanese encroachment.

Korean history textbooks record his act as righteous resistance against Japan’s tightening colonial grip, especially after the 1905 Protectorate Treaty. An’s writings in prison—arguing that Itō was responsible for Korea’s suffering—became part of Korea’s national consciousness. The Harbin gunshot was, in Korean telling, the strike of a nation refusing to die quietly.

China’s Record: A Stage for Foreign Powers

China, where the assassination occurred, had a more detached but symbolically significant perspective.
Harbin at the time was a frontier city entangled with:

  • Russian influence through the Chinese Eastern Railway,

  • Japanese expansion in Manchuria,

  • Qing decline.

To Chinese observers, the event revealed:

  • The weakness of the late Qing,

  • The intrusion of foreign powers on Chinese soil,

  • The turbulence of East Asia on the eve of revolution.

While China had no direct stake in the Itō–An confrontation, the assassination highlighted how Chinese territory had become a battleground for the struggles of others.

Why the Differences Matter

The death of Itō Hirobumi demonstrates how history is never a single story.
It is a national mirror.

  • Japan saw a fallen architect of the Meiji state.

  • Korea saw a spark of liberation.

  • China saw a symptom of imperial intrusion and national weakness.

These divergent memories reveal deeper questions:

  • Who has the right to define justice?

  • How do nations turn trauma into identity?

  • How do shared events become unshared histories?

The assassination in Harbin is not simply an old event—it is a reminder that East Asia’s present is built on the layered memories of its past. And until these memories are understood, reconciled, or at least acknowledged, the shadows of Harbin will linger.

夢境與工廠:維多利亞英倫所生之〈愛麗絲〉與〈資本論〉

 《夢境與工廠:維多利亞英倫所生之〈愛麗絲〉與〈資本論〉》


觀〈愛麗絲遊仙境〉與〈資本論〉,若雲壤之異:前者以奇想娛童心,貓可隱形,茶會無終;後者剖析工商之機制,言利潤、勞力、交換之理,深峻若嶽。然而二書皆出於維多利亞英倫同一時世,相距不過二年,皆受其經濟風潮、社會變易所鑄成,蓋非偶然,乃同源異流也。

一、英倫既夢且算

十九世紀中葉,英倫為工業革命之極點。蒸汽日鳴,廠屋林立,童工辛苦,鐵路貫通四方。美國南北戰爭方作,棉價暴騰,人心浮動;富貴若朝露,工人之生計如塵埃。

卡羅爾與馬克思,同踐斯地、同吸其霧;然所見同而所應各異:
卡羅爾以奇想逃世;
馬克思以論著破世。

二、仙境亦映經濟

仙境雖若荒唐,然維多利亞時人視之,處處寓諷:

  • 紅心之后之專斷,如有司之橫暴。

  • 發條帽客之永無止境茶會,似工人日復一日之勞作。

  • 愛麗絲忽長忽短,如社會浮沉之身世。

彼時人心,正處於舊習崩壞、新制未立之際,市場瞬息、房貸暴長、技藝被機器所奪。仙境之不定,正寫時代之不安。

三、馬氏亦於同塵中觀大機

馬克思於大英博物館書室著〈資本論〉,以英倫為天下工業之所徵驗:
有交易之所、工廠之巨構、殖民之財源、巷陌之窮民、貧富之懸隔。

卡羅爾視其荒誕;
馬克思究其矛盾。
然兩者之眼光,俱出於同一壓力:舊理之崩、機械之興、人心之迷。

四、二書之奇緣

雖文體殊異,然有若干相通:

• 皆示世界之不定。

愛麗絲身長短異;商品價值忽高忽下。

• 皆露理性之背後乃不理性。

卡氏以無稽顯其真;
馬氏以嚴論揭其虛。

• 皆論權勢之形跡。

后之欲斬首,如資本家之壓工。

• 皆問「我為誰?」

愛麗絲迷其身分;
工人失其本我,化為「勞力」。

• 皆具政治之意。

卡氏以遊戲映世;馬氏以學術破制。

五、同為大英帝國之兩鏡

維多利亞之世,乃理性之國而多癲狂;工業騰達而貧者如故;童書蓬勃而童工遍地。

於是,一鏡為〈愛麗絲〉之夢境;
一鏡為〈資本論〉之深論。
同照一世之矛盾,同映一國之靈魂。

Tea Parties and Factories: How Victorian England Gave Birth to Both Wonderland and Capital

 “Tea Parties and Factories: How Victorian England Gave Birth to Both Wonderland and Capital”


At first glance, nothing seems further apart than Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Das Kapital. One is a whimsical children’s fantasy about vanishing cats, impossible tea parties, and logic turned upside-down. The other is a dense, weapon-forged critique of industrial capitalism, written in exile by a restless revolutionary. Yet both books emerged from the same England, within two years of each other, and both were shaped by the same swirling forces of Victorian economics, technology, and social tension.

This is not coincidence — it is convergence.

1. The England that Dreamed and Calculated

The 1860s were the high noon of the Industrial Revolution. London had become the beating, coughing heart of global finance and manufacturing. Steam engines roared; textile mills swallowed child labor; the railways stitched the country together with iron thread. Cotton prices spiked during the American Civil War, fortunes rose and collapsed overnight, and the new urban working masses lived in conditions unimaginable to earlier generations.

In the midst of this, two very different writers — Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) and Karl Marx — walked the same London streets, breathed the same factory soot, and watched the same transformations.

Carroll, a mathematician at Christ Church, Oxford, responded by escaping into absurdity — a world where the rules of logic could be broken, rearranged, and played with. Marx, observing the same society, responded by dissecting it — exposing the invisible machinery of profit, labor, and exploitation.

2. Wonderland as an Economic Parable

Wonderland seems nonsensical, but Victorian readers recognized the satire:

  • The Queen of Hearts is an autocrat of arbitrary authority.

  • The Mad Hatter’s endless tea party resembles the endless cycles of Victorian labor — stuck in ritual, never advancing.

  • Alice grows and shrinks like the social mobility of the age: expanding with aspiration, shrinking under pressure.

Victorians lived in a world where rules changed overnight — markets crashed, mortgages ballooned, and factory machines transformed skills into irrelevance. Wonderland was not fantasy; it was the psychology of industrial modernity.

3. Marx’s London: The Same Stage, Different Spotlight

Marx wrote Das Kapital in the British Museum Reading Room, surrounded by the statistics, parliamentary reports, and economic data of the very system Carroll gently mocked. Britain was the ideal laboratory:

  • The first stock exchanges

  • Large-scale factories

  • Global colonial trade

  • Crowded slums of laborers

  • Enormous inequalities

Where Carroll saw absurdity, Marx saw contradiction.
Where Carroll turned to whimsy, Marx turned to critique.

But their perceptions originated from the same pressures: the collapse of old certainties, the rise of machine logic, and the growing sense that society was slipping through the fingers of those who once controlled it.

4. The Hidden Similarities

Despite their differences, the two books share surprising traits:

• Both explore unstable worlds.

Alice’s body changes size; commodities in Marx’s world change value. Nothing is fixed.

• Both expose the irrationality beneath Victorian rationalism.

Carroll uses nonsense to reveal truth; Marx uses analysis to show that “rational markets” are built upon irrational exploitation.

• Both deal with power and control.

Queens shouting for beheadings mirror industrial magnates dictating wages.

• Both question identity.

Alice constantly asks “Who am I?”
Marx shows how capitalism fractures the worker’s identity into mere “labor power.”

• Both books are political, just in different dialects.

Carroll’s politics are playful and psychological; Marx’s are structural and revolutionary.

5. Two Mirrors Held to the Same Empire

Victorian England was a paradox: it was the empire of reason, yet governed by financial panic; a society of progress, yet riddled with poverty; the nation that adored children’s literature while relying on child labor.

Out of this contradiction came two books that reflected the same world:

  • One through a looking-glass,

  • One through a microscope.

Both remain enduring because both capture the surreal logic of a society simultaneously rising and unraveling.

細偽成災:政者自飾之心理與信任之墜

 

細偽成災:政者自飾之心理與信任之墜

政人好自飾其身,古今皆然。心理家言,名位之士多有「自增」之行:小飾其履歷,微加其功績,以求形象之完美。此等誇飾,雖非必本於惡意,然若習以為常,則為害甚深,蓋能損其誠信,敗其名節,並壞公論。

英國政壇近有瑞芙斯之事,正為此例。其所述昔年於英格蘭銀行任職之久短,與其少時稱為棋壇之冠,皆與實錄稍異。此非大政之欺,乃細微之飾,而細飾亦可見其心路之趨向。

心理學謂此「細偽」之成,有三端:

一、求形象之壓也。
居官者常欲以完美之身示人,故輕增其功,以自成可敬之象。

二、細語漸積之勢也。
微偽起初或無深意,然久而重言之,乃自誤其真,終使虛實互換。

三、護其名號之故也。
既以某事自名,若承認誇飾,則其身分之敘事受傷,故反更執之以固其名。

然此等細偽之害,於民心尤大。民若察政者連細事亦不實,則其信任頓失,視大政更不敢委之。蓋民心所思簡易:
「小事尚虛,大事何可任乎?」

瑞芙斯之爭,只見其行之例,非指其人之本性。然其所示者,全乃政界常見之心理:以小偽護形象,以形象求權勢,而終致誠信之蝕、制度之弱。

民主之本,不唯在法度,更在領袖之誠。若從政者習於飾己,則政治之明光受其障翳。欲保公信,須以真言、謙德、實錄為本。蓋細偽亦能傷大義,小欺足以蔽國心。

Small Lies, Big Shadows: A Psychological Analysis of Political Self-Decoration

 Small Lies, Big Shadows: A Psychological Analysis of Political Self-Decoration”

Psychologists have long observed that political figures, like many public personalities, often engage in self-enhancement— the subtle inflation of credentials, achievements, or personal history. While not always malicious, this tendency can become dangerous when a leader’s self-presentation repeatedly departs from fact. Even small inaccuracies, if habitual, can suggest a deeper pattern of impression-management that damages public trust.

The recent controversies surrounding UK politician Rachel Reeves illustrate this dynamic. Reeves has faced criticism for inflating aspects of her biography — including portraying her time at the Bank of England as the work of a long-tenured economist, and describing herself as a youth chess champion when the formal national records grant that title to another competitor. These are not grand policy lies, but subtle, image-shaping claims.

Psychologists point out that such “minute-scale” embellishments arise from three well-documented cognitive tendencies:

1. Self-presentation pressure.
Public figures often feel compelled to present an idealised professional identity — one that appears exceptional, authoritative, and polished. By amplifying achievements, a leader attempts to craft a narrative of competence.

2. The escalation of small untruths.
Minor embellishments rarely start as deliberate deception. They often begin as small narrative shortcuts, later repeated until they gain the weight of “truth” in the speaker’s own memory. The danger is cumulative: repeated slight distortions gradually erode an individual’s relationship with accuracy.

3. Identity maintenance.
Once a politician has built a public persona around certain achievements, admitting exaggeration threatens the coherence of that identity. Thus, the individual may cling to earlier claims even when challenged.

The public impact of these behaviours, however, is anything but small. Research shows that when citizens detect falsities — especially unnecessary ones — they experience a sharper drop in trust than when confronted with policy disagreements. A politician who misstates trivial biographical details can appear less honest than one who openly defends a controversial ideology.

For voters, the logic is simple:
If a leader distorts small truths, what might they distort in matters of national consequence?

These controversies surrounding Reeves exemplify a psychological pattern rather than a diagnosis. They illuminate how political incentives, personal ambition, and impression management can intersect in ways that corrode credibility. The damage extends beyond the individual: public faith in institutions weakens, cynicism rises, and engagement declines.

A democracy relies not only on policies but on the perceived integrity of those who govern. When leaders reshape their histories to appear more impressive, they inadvertently cast shadows over the political system itself. Transparency, humility, and factual precision remain essential — for without them, even small lies can dim the light of public trust.

誠信之喪與政治之殞:一心理由政客欺誑之觀

 《誠信之喪與政治之殞:一心理由政客欺誑之觀》


政治之欺,非徒失德,蓋心性之裂與社會之衰也。心理家觀察,治國者若常以虛文自飾,則民眾視誠信如虛影,真偽之分遂變。當此等謗語,不僅出自一隅,而自朝廷之巔者亦然,其害遠甚於私語也。 SpringerLink

近者英國大臣瑞芙斯,因誇飾往昔經歷,而成議論之中心。彼曾稱於英格蘭銀行服務十載為經濟學者,然實際履歷及其LinkedIn所示,工齡不足十年,未必如是。又言幼時為英國女子十四歲棋王,然史籍所見,冠軍另有其人,其冠乃他項賽會之別稱耳。 The Times+1

若以小戲視之,其實質甚重。心理之研究示,長時聞政客所言不實,則民眾漸以謗語為常態,真言與巧辯之界日益模糊,人心生疑,政事為戲。蓋此乃所謂“首領啟發效應”,令人以為言不由衷可行。 SpringerLink

其不利,有三:

其一,誠信之損也。信任者,社稷之本也。若公卿言行為虛誕,則庶民不復信朝廷、法度及典章,追念真實者如雲煙,信心之基土崩瓦解。

其二,漠然與疏離也。民見政客自利而欺言,多不以義憤應之,反致漠不關心,不從時議,罷參政事。此則民主體制之責問削弱,誠信之檢驗亦隨之衰。

其三,治道之壞也。若政事以誤志為基,則決策必偏離正道。領袖誇其學識,或以偽證證成策,則國策失衡、民生困頓,禍生無窮。

心理學者又言,此為循環之勢:信任既失,疑心更深,人心以謗語為常,從而尋求自辯之理,謂“有其理由”、“諸人皆然”,如是者使欺語似無罪。久之,不誠之風蔓延而不可止。 SpringerLink

其害甚巨。盛世賴明君誠言,眾心可共事於真理。然當世見政客誇飾其往昔或偽其行狀,或強或弱,其舉皆損政治之常信,令公論動盪不安。

欲挽此頹勢,非唯逐一核實,尤須領袖以透明與問責為重,不以浮名為念。若不然,惡果愈深:疑心、疏離、及民主之衰,繫此而長。

Why Political Falsehoods Fracture Trust: A Psychologist’s View on Deception and Democratic Decline”

 “Why Political Falsehoods Fracture Trust: A Psychologist’s View on Deception and Democratic Decline”


Political lying is not merely an ethical lapse — it is a psychological and social rupture. As psychologists have observed, once leaders become habitual in presenting themselves in misleading ways, the symbolic cues they send about honesty and credibility begin to reshape how citizens perceive politics itself. When lies come not only from anonymous elites but from those at the heart of government, the consequences reverberate far beyond the individuals involved. SpringerLink

A recent case in point is the controversy around the UK’s Chancellor, Rachel Reeves. Over time, Reeves has been accused of overstating aspects of her professional history — such as claiming she spent “a decade” working as an economist at the Bank of England when records and her LinkedIn profile suggest a shorter tenure, and asserting that she was the British girls’ under-14 chess champion when the historical championship record identifies another winner and the title she held was from a separate event. The Times+1

At first glance, embellishing a CV might seem like small political theatre. But psychological research shows that repeated exposure to leaders’ dishonesty creates what scholars call a priming effect: when citizens are regularly confronted with falsehoods from politicians, the boundary between truth and spin blurs, and cynicism becomes normalized. People begin to expect dishonesty not as an aberration but as an accepted feature of political life. SpringerLink

This normalization has three harmful effects:

First, it erodes trust. Trust is the cement of democratic society; when citizens perceive leaders to be untruthful, their faith in institutions — parliaments, administrations, the civil service — deteriorates. A political culture where leaders are seen as manipulating facts reinforces the notion that the game is rigged and the public cannot rely on official narratives.

Second, it breeds disinterest and disengagement. When political actors appear self-serving and untruthful, many citizens respond not with outrage but with apathy. They withdraw from debate, avoid voting, or conclude that participation is futile. This disengagement weakens democratic accountability and allows less trustworthy actors to rise unchallenged.

Third, pervasive political dishonesty leads to worse governance. Decisions made on distorted premises — whether about economic competence or fiscal credibility — tend to produce poor outcomes. When leaders misrepresent their qualifications or the evidence they use to justify policy, the likelihood of ill-advised strategies increases, exacerbating social and economic problems.

Psychologists also warn of a feedback loop: as trust erodes, public cynicism grows and the threshold for demanding honesty rises. Politicians may further adapt by using rationalizations — “I had good reasons,” “everyone does it” — that make lying seem less blameworthy. Over time, such rationalizations embed a culture of dishonesty that is harder to dismantle. SpringerLink

The stakes are enormous. Democracies depend on leaders who can speak truth to facts and who model integrity. When the public sees political figures embellishing their histories or bending facts to suit their ambitions — whether about economic expertise or youthful achievements — it chips away at the very idea that politics can be a domain of shared, verifiable reality.

Rebuilding trust requires more than fact-checking; it requires leaders who prize transparency and accountability over image. Without that, the negative psychological consequences — distrust, disengagement, and democratic decline — continue to deepen.

三十六載之闕生:一胎政影下之人數之失

三十六載之闕生:一胎政影下之人數之失

自一九八〇年至二〇一六年之間,中國施行減育之政,禁約滋繁,歷三十餘載。今以簡明之法,推算其勢:若中國於此諸年,悉依天下平均之生率,而非實際所行,則其少生之數,當以億計。中率估之,約闕生二億六千萬;寬估則約自一億五千萬至四億之間。其所以累至於斯者,以一九八〇年中國之民,已逾九億八千萬,天下生率又高於今時;大國抑育數十年,勢所至也。

然生育之減,非一端所致。夫生率之興衰,繫於經濟之隆替,城鄉之變遷,婦女受學之深淺,節育之普及,風俗之移易,及官府之政教。中國自七十年代即倡「少生」之風,至一九七九、八〇年尤申明其法,俗稱「一胎之令」。其施行之際,賞罰並行,地方吏治,或有籍籍;史牒與報章,皆載有強制節育、迫令墮胎之事,其害於人倫,已為世所議。

然而,此諸數字,非徒為史記,實關今日國計民生。闕生既久,則壯丁之數日減,老者之比日增,舉國之社會、財政、兵農、養老諸制,皆受其勢。雖近年稍弛成法,縱許二胎、三胎,然少壯本已不生,歲月既往,不可復追。昔年所不生者,今不可補也。

是故有三議:
其一,計數宜明。國家之政,貴在可考,生率之算,能使世人洞見勢之所往。
其二,方法殊途,義理大異。以教化、以扶助而民自願減育,與以威壓而迫其不生,其情理判然。中國舊制,志願與強制並存,宜為後世詳考,以資信義。
其三,人口之勢,行於數十年之間。欲振生息,必賴長久之策,並重家計、教化、女權、社會之安,使家室願生,而非徒弛禁令而已。

終之,數者,記人間之變;然其背後者,皆本可生之命。此計雖為近似,然足使人深省:以備記錄,以為存思,以見前車之戒。


Counting the Missing: A demographic reckoning of China’s one-child era (1980–2016)


“Counting the Missing: A demographic reckoning of China’s one-child era (1980–2016)”

Between 1980 and 2016 China pursued a suite of population-control measures that, collectively and controversially, sharply reduced the number of births. Using a simple, transparent comparison — asking how many births China would have had if it experienced the global crude birth rate in each year from 1980 through 2016 — the arithmetic points to hundreds of millions of “missing” births over the period. A mid-range estimate is roughly 260 million fewer births than the global-rate baseline would imply, with a plausible uncertainty band from about 150M to 400M depending on the assumptions. (World Bank Open Data)

Two numbers stand out. China’s population was already large in 1980 (≈981 million). And the world’s crude birth rate was higher then than in later decades. When a nation of that scale reduces births below the global average for decades, the cumulative difference becomes enormous. That arithmetic does not, by itself, prove intent or tally every forced procedure — but it forces a moral and policy question into stark terms: tens to hundreds of millions of human lives that were not born.

Why this gap emerged is complicated. Fertility is shaped by economic opportunity, urbanization, female education, access to contraception, cultural norms, and public policy. China’s government actively promoted small-family norms from the 1970s, and in 1979–1980 formalized limits often summarized as the “one-child policy” for the ethnic Han majority. Enforcement included incentives and penalties administered at the local level; documented practices in some periods and places included fines, forced sterilisations and abortions, and intense administrative pressure. These enforcement realities — and their human costs — are described in contemporary reporting and later investigations. (WIRED)

But the demographic effects are not merely historical trivia. The missing births reshape labor markets, dependency ratios, pension sustainability, and the balance of generations. China now faces an aging population and, in recent years, falling annual births despite policy relaxations (two-child policy in 2016, then three-child and supportive measures later). The long shadow of a multi-decade fertility decline cannot be erased overnight: a birth skipped in 1985 cannot be made up later. (National Bureau of Statistics of China)

A few policy lessons:

  • Counts matter: policy should be evaluated with transparent metrics. Crude birth-rate arithmetic shows the scale of demographic change in ways that raw rhetoric hides. (DataBank)

  • Rights & methods: population policy that reduces births by persuasion, education, and economic support is very different in moral terms from coercive measures. Historical records show both voluntary and coercive elements in China’s program; a clear accounting is necessary for justice and future trust. (TIME)

  • Long horizons: demography moves on decades. Reversing an aging trend requires sustained pro-family economic, social, and gender-equity policies — not just regulatory permission to have more children. (Levy Economics Institute of Bard College)

Finally, numbers do not substitute for stories. Each counted birth is a human life; each “missing” birth from the arithmetic above represents not a statistic but a constellation of family choices, state pressures, and historical forces. The calculation here — careful, documented, but inevitably approximate — should not be read as a moral verdict measured only in millions. It is, however, a prompt: to record, to remember, and to learn.


Method & sources 

  • Baseline population and yearly China mid-year populations: World Bank / UN population series. (World Bank Open Data)

  • China annual births & crude birth rate: China Statistical Yearbooks / World Bank / FRED (World Bank indicator SP.DYN.CBRT.IN for China). (Wikipedia)

  • Global crude birth-rate baseline: World Bank / UN / Our World in Data (long-run crude birth rate series). (Our World in Data)

  • Contemporary reporting and investigations on one-child policy enforcement and human-rights impacts: Wired, Time, Reuters and academic reviews. (WIRED)

2025年12月3日 星期三

以交通樞紐上蓋為治:通盤之策

以交通樞紐上蓋為治:通盤之策

徒繫意於「舊址棄地」,則失「開天之空」之大用也。凡今既有之車站、車廠,其上虛空,皆可化而為宅,第如香港、星洲、東京諸城,已試而行之矣。

此策所創,乃於城市中央別得新地:既「交通既備」(可行以運輸導向之發展,TOD),又「基礎既成」(減其通水電諸費)。其以「空權」造構之術,今已臻熟,只需於構架之間為隔音、減震之計,非復別設新基址也。

其利乃系統而顯著:

一、可即時生財。
於此「無本空間」所建之屋,售租之利,可反哺基下之公共運輸,使財流自成善環。

二、乘客與安寧俱增。
居民即居於樞紐,客流自盛;人煙不絕,則車站晝夜有常安之象。

三、減民往返之勞。
既無「末里路」之苦,通勤時省而人多捨車,亦助淨零與清氣之志。

四、成就都心之新核。
上蓋之地,可設所需之商鋪、細業、社服,使凡車廠車庫之地,皆化為生氣錯落之混融市鎮。

開此「空權」之鎖,則住房之患可解,而交通、安全、經濟三者亦並進焉。


Building Above Transport Hubs: A Systemic Solution

 Building Above Transport Hubs: A Systemic Solution

 

Focusing solely on brownfield sites overlooks the massive potential of converting "open sky space" above existing train stations and bus depots into housing—a model proven successful in cities like Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo in Asia.

This strategy effectively creates new, centrally located land that is already Transport-Ready (supporting Transit-Oriented Development, or TOD) and Infrastructure-Ready(reducing utility connection costs). The "air-rights" construction technology is mature, requiring structural engineering for sound-dampening, not entirely new infrastructure.

The benefits are systemic:

  1. Immediate Profitability: Revenue from selling/renting these central units (built on "free" air space) can be reinvested directly into upgrading the underlying public transport, creating a powerful virtuous cycle.
  2. Enhanced Ridership & Safety: Placing residents directly at transport nodes guarantees high ridership, boosting revenue. A constant residential presence makes stations safer and more vibrant 24/7.
  3. Reduced Commuter Strain: Eliminating the "last mile" problem cuts commuter times and encourages a shift away from car usage, supporting net-zero and clean air targets.
  4. Integrated Urban Centres: These developments can host essential retail, small businesses, and community services, transforming functional depots into lively, mixed-use economic hubs.

By unlocking these "air-rights," the city addresses the housing crisis while simultaneously improving transport, safety, and economic vitality.

倫敦之形象,當以安全為本,非虛飾口號而已。

 倫敦之形象,當以安全為本,非虛飾口號而已。


凡市井廣告,有一古訓亙古不渝:未備真實之體驗,切勿遽以華詞招客。此理於城邦,與於商賈,等無差別。乃倫敦當道,急欲售其虛榮之城於四海賓客,及至遊人親履,則所見迥異,尤以牛津街為甚。


未可遽呼「來遊倫敦」也,當先正視遊人實所遭遇:白晝劫手機之盜賊橫行,街衢狼藉滿布穢物,連甍皆洗錢之「糖果店」,空舖比比、百葉窗閉,盡顯衰敗而非繁華。縱有萬卷錦繡廣告,終不能掩此不安、不治、誠可謂冷落之街景。


旅遊之興,繫於信字。人必往其心安之處、街清之處、警衛顯然有效之處、商賈真實而不詭譎之處。若城邦不能保此基本,則一切宣傳,皆成過許而不足償,良賈深避之譏。


與其勞民傷財張皇旅遊之名,或倉卒閉街為步行區,毋寧先復安全、潔淨與信心為急務:強警力,淨街衢,嚴治可疑之肆,扶正當之商,所以牛津街得復為旗艦購物之區,而非衰敗之戒鑑。


惟倫敦真備——安全、繁盛、可信——斯可廣而告之。在斯之前,最負責任之領袖之言,非「來遊」也,乃「吾輩正修其要」而已。

London’s Image Starts with Safety, Not Slogans

London’s Image Starts with Safety, Not Slogans

In advertising, there is a simple rule that has stood the test of time: never promote a product until it is truly ready for the customer experience you are promising. This principle applies just as strongly to cities as it does to brands. Yet London’s leadership seems eager to sell a version of the city that visitors simply won’t find when they arrive—especially around Oxford Street.

Before inviting the world to “Visit London,” we must face what tourists actually encounter: phone snatchers operating in broad daylight, pavements littered with rubbish, rows of money-laundering “candy shops,” and far too many shuttered storefronts that signal decline rather than vibrancy. No amount of glossy marketing can cover up a street scene that feels unsafe, unmanaged, and frankly unwelcoming.

Tourism thrives on trust. People travel to places where they feel secure, where streets are clean, where policing is visible and effective, and where local commerce feels authentic, not suspicious. If the city cannot guarantee these fundamentals, then any promotional campaign becomes an exercise in over-promise and under-deliver—a trap every good advertiser avoids.

Instead of spending effort championing tourism or rushing to pedestrianize streets, the priority must be restoring safety, cleanliness, and confidence. Strengthen the police force. Clean up the streets. Enforce regulations on dubious retailers. Support legitimate businesses so Oxford Street can regain its identity as a flagship shopping district rather than a cautionary tale.

Only when London is genuinely ready—safe, vibrant, and trustworthy—should it be advertised. Until then, the most responsible leadership message is not “Come visit,” but “We are fixing what matters.”